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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to assess the post-IPO performance structures of 
young entrepreneurial firms. Based on the propositions of the signaling model, I propose 
that the firm IPO performance is a determining factor in post-IPO changes in ownership 
structures. Furthermore, I contend that the new owners that replace the original ones in 
young IPO firms will be prone to request changes in corporate governance mechanisms 
such as top management team membership and the boards of directors based on the need 
to have their own agents looking after their interests as recommended by the agency 
theory. Following these alterations in corporate governance mechanisms, I propose such 
changes will be detrimental for the performance of the young entrepreneurial firms as 
these firms, due to their uniqueness, are still in great need of the tacit knowledge 
provided by their original decision makers. Finally, moderating effects of the 
environmental dimensions of dynamism, complexity and munificence are hypothesized to 
impact the relationship between the rate of change on corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm performance. 
In the literature review section I review studies that explore why firms go public, 
the main areas of IPO research, the importance of executives and directors in young 
entrepreneurial firms, the theories related to IPO performance and its measures, the 
uniqueness of these firms and the potential impact of environment on decision making 
iii 
iv 
routines. I develop a model that explains the interrelated relationships I propose to be 
present and the corresponding hypotheses. Using the SDC database, I identified 185 
young entrepreneurial firms that went public in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005. Based 
on the previous literature, the criterion I used for being a young entrepreneurial firm was 
the founding date. Firms that were founded in 1991 and forward were included in this 
study. Using the Edgar Database, Compustat Research Insight, CRSP, Disclosures, and 
the company websites, I compiled a database that consists of stock performance, 
operating performance, and the governance data for these companies for the five years 
following their IPOs. 
The results revealed that one of the IPO performance measures, underpricing, 
impacts subsequent changes in blockholder ownership in young entrepreneurial firms. 
Following the changes in ownership structure, the new owners tend to request changes in 
one of the corporate governance mechanisms I considered, boards of directors, but not 
top management teams (TMT). I also observed a negative impact for changes in boards 
of directors on subsequent firm performance when accounting-based measures are 
considered; this was not the case with TMTs. Furthermore, the results also showed that 
two of the environmental dimensions exacerbated the relationship between the changes in 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. These results implied that 
young entrepreneurial firms operating in complex and less munificent environments are 
in more need of the inputs provided by their original directors. The study ends with a 
discussion of the theoretical and managerial implications of the findings together with the 
specification of possible future extensions and limitations. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
An Initial Public Offering (IPO) is one of the most critical steps in a firm's 
developmental process (Daily, Certo, Dalton, & Roengpitya, 2003). With that in mind, 
researchers acknowledge the fact that most of the issues related to the IPO process a firm 
goes through are still not fully understood (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). The impact of 
the subsequent changes in corporate governance systems on firm performance during the 
post-IPO stage remains an area that warrants attention (Certo, Holcomb, & Holmes, 
2009). Jain and Kini (1994) contend that changes in corporate governance mechanisms of 
a firm following the IPO process have a direct impact on the operating performance of 
that firm. In a more recent article Kroll, Walters and Le (2007) propose that, corporate 
governance mechanisms that may be effective for large, well-established firms may not 
be appropriate for younger firms that just underwent an IPO. They in effect question the 
applicability of classical agency theory contentions for firms that just completed the IPO 
process. 
Certo et al. (2009) mention the tremendous growth in IPO activity in the last 
decade relative to the one before. According to those authors, close to 3,000 IPOs took 
place between 1998 and 2007 resulting in over $600 billion in capital being raised. 
Research also shows that the majority of these firms are not large companies and are 
1 
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likely to face different agency prescriptions then large, well established organizations 
(Kroll et al., 2007). These young firms face what scholars refer to as the liability of 
newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) in the first years of the post-IPO period and may require 
relatively different approaches when compared to large corporations (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). In that regard, it is the intention of this study to investigate the series of 
interrelated corporate governance steps young entrepreneurial firms go through following 
the IPO process. In short, this dissertation aims to explain some of the unknowns 
resulting from the impact of changes in ownership structure on corporate governance 
mechanisms such as board composition and TMT structure and consequent operating 
performance changes together with the potential moderating effect of environment on 
young entrepreneurial firms.1 
Motivation of the Study and Brief Description 
of Proposed Relationships 
As previous research demonstrates, most of the firms that go public are often 
small young firms (Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001). Young firms that go public within a 
few years of their original founding date are at a vulnerable point of their developmental 
processes (Kroll et al., 2007). Decision makers in such companies have to face many 
challenges regarding the transition from private ownership to public ownership, which 
includes dealing with regulatory bodies such as Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and meeting the expectations of potential investors (Fischer & Pollock, 2004). 
Investors consider every IPO firm as a new investing opportunity. One obvious reason for 
this interest is that the share prices of IPO firms, on average, tend to increase on the first 
As Kroll, Walters and Le (2007) suggest, young entrepreneurial firms are the ones that are founded within 
the ten-year period prior to going public for the first time. 
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day of trading as the initial offer price set by the underwriter is too low (Certo el al., 
2009; Loughran & Ritter, 2004). Thus, it is common to earn high returns on the first day 
of trading of an IPO. Underpricing is formally defined as the difference between a firm's 
IPO issue price and its first day closing price (Arthurs, Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Johnson, 
2008). If the firm is underpriced relative to the value the market places on the shares, 
which is referred to as underpricing (Heeley, Matusik, & Jain, 2007), the initial investors 
who bought shares at the price offered by the underwriter will be rewarded as their 
investment has just appreciated in value, although the management has just left money on 
the table in the form of lost equity capital that could have been captured by the firm 
(Ritter, 1991). 
While the finance literature primarily concentrates on the initial fluctuations of 
IPO stock prices (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Aggarwal, 2000; Cornelli & Goldreich, 2001), 
this study considers these fluctuations as the starting point for a series of relationships. 
One of the issues that may be of interest in the post-IPO context is: what happens to firm 
ownership structure after the IPO? Goergen & Renneboog (2007) report that, in the 
United Kingdom, on average, old pre-IPO shareholders hold 62.8 percent of the shares 
immediately after the IPO. That percentage goes down to 51.4, 47.3, 37.7, 33.6 and 31.4 
percentages after one, two, three, four and five years respectively. In another article, 
Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997) report that, once the IPO is completed, firms face 
continuous changes in their shareholding compositions. For instance, they report that 
inside ownership falls by over 50 percent after the IPO and keeps falling during the 
following five years. Adapting a signaling theory perspective (Certo, 2003), finance 
literature considers initial IPO performance (i.e. underpricing) as a signaling device for 
4 
firm quality such that underpriced IPO firms signal more promising future results to 
potential investors. Furthermore, it has been empirically demonstrated that, original 
shareholders of IPO firms maybe more willing to transfer shares of stock to outside 
investors after the IPO for personal income (Welch, 1989). It is proposed that, large first 
day stock price appreciation following an IPO will attract investors to acquire shares in 
the company. In other words, once the IPO process signals a potentially promising future 
for the company, investors will step in to acquire these appealing shares. Some of these 
investors may be doing this for short-term investment reasons such as quick-entry-and-
exit type institutional investors, which do not tend to play an active role in firm corporate 
governance systems, but others such as buy-and-hold type investors may be more willing 
to intervene in the governance of the firms. This dissertation proposes that once investors 
become interested in these companies, some of these investors will acquire blockholder 
ownership in order to have sufficient power to influence the governance of the focal firm. 
In a well-established large corporation, such an intervention may not be considered a 
major threat, while in young entrepreneurial firms, a dramatic change in corporate 
governance systems may lead to some detrimental effects (Kroll et al., 2007). For this 
reason, these young entrepreneurial firms may constitute a unique field for corporate 
governance research. Thus, the focus of this study will be on young entrepreneurial firms 
that just completed the IPO process. 
The changes in ownership structure will also probably lead to changes in firm 
TMT structure and board composition. Fama and Jensen (1983) contend that directors 
derive their power from the shareholders. Powerful shareholders like to appoint their own 
agents as directors to the board of a company in which they have some level of control. 
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For the purpose of this dissertation, shareholders with blockholder ownership, which 
corresponds to at least 5 percent ownership in the focal firm (Kroll, Wright, Toombs, & 
Leavell, 1997) are considered to be powerful enough to make appointments to the board 
of directors or the executive team. Once the IPO process is completed and firm IPO 
performance has acted as a signaling mechanism, the post-IPO investors who bought 
shares in the company are likely to ask for changes in board composition by appointing 
their directors and asking for changes in TMT structure by appointing their own 
executives, which is also anticipated by agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Among the long-time agency prescriptions for mitigating the agency problem between 
the executives and the owners is effective monitoring by directors (Booth & Deli, 1996). 
Instead of relying on oversight by people whom the new investors do not know, newly 
appointed directors may look after the new shareholders' interests. Thus, the changes in 
ownership structure after the IPO are likely to lead to changes in board composition. One 
study reports that, on average, outside representation on the board jumps from less than 
50 percent to 67 percent during the five years following the IPO (Curtchly, Garner, & 
Marshall, 2002). As the SEC requires companies to have at least 50 percent of the 
directors to be independent directors prior to IPO (Certo et al., 2001), this significant 
jump in outside representation may be attributed to changes in ownership structure as the 
new owners, particularly the ones that bought the shares of the firms they consider 
potentially successful of the future, will appoint directors to the board to look after their 
interests. 
The same logic may also apply to changes in TMT structure. If an active 
shareholder is interested in appointing his or her own directors to the board, he or she will 
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not be reluctant to appoint his or her own executives given the chance. The board and 
executives are two important components of the strategic decision making apparatus 
(Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). Unlike privately owned firms, publicly traded firms 
are required to get board approval for strategic decisions (Bruton, Fried, & Hisrich, 
2000). So, changes in ownership structure should not only be associated with changes in 
board structure but also with changes in TMT composition. There is empirical evidence 
suggesting that, following an IPO, companies may expect to see changes in their TMT 
structure (Wasserman, 2003). One of the fundamental duties of a board is to select and 
hire new members of the top management team (Fama & Jensen, 1983). If we expect 
changes in board composition, corresponding changes in TMT structure should also be 
expected. Based on agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the directors appointed by 
the new owners should be more willing to hire executives who are likely to act in concert 
with the new owners. In other words, changes in ownership structure in potentially 
promising young entrepreneurial firms not only should lead to changes in board 
composition but also to changes in TMT structure as well. 
In summary, based on signaling theory (Certo, 2003; Sanders & Boivie, 2004), 
promising companies will attract investors following an IPO, and those new owners may 
be willing to interfere with two of the most important corporate governance mechanisms: 
board composition and TMT structure as they will be looking for agents to look after 
their interests given agency theory concerns regarding managerial abuse (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The question at that point becomes: "what happens to the operating 
performance of these firms?" The answer to this question represents the final part of a 
series of relationships this dissertation proposes to investigate. 
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As mentioned previously, firms go through radical changes in their corporate 
governance mechanisms following the IPO process (Mikkelson, Partch, & Shah, 1997; 
Bruton, Fried, & Hisrich, 2000; Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001). While some researchers 
may associate changes like more outside representation on the board with positive 
operating performance based on vigilance requirements of agency theory (Booth & Deli, 
1996), recent research demonstrates that such changes may not be appropriate for young 
entrepreneurial firms' subsequent firm performance after all (Kroll et al., 2007; Walters, 
Kroll & Wright, 2010). There is empirical evidence showing that radical post-IPO 
corporate governance changes have negative effects on firm performance (Daily & 
Dalton, 1995; Bergh, 2001). If changes in ownership structure following a successful IPO 
yields changes in board composition and TMT structure, then these changes may actually 
lead to lower subsequent operating performance. Once the original structure of the young 
firm is changed, the entrepreneurial efficacy of the company may decline and the firm 
may start to perform relatively worse as it is still in need of the knowledge-base provided 
by the original TMT and board members to deal with the vulnerabilities of the liability of 
newness (Stinchcombe, 1965). The original decision makers, who carried the firm 
towards the IPO stage, may be likely to act more in line with the propositions of 
stewardship theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Firms at this critical stage of their life-
cycle are still in need of the knowledge base provided by the original TMT members and 
directors (Kroll et al., 2007), a point which may also be supported by the contentions of 
Resource Based View (Barney, 1991). This dissertation aims to investigate if this is 
really the case. If this proposition is verified, the implications of such a finding may be 
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important for corporate governance research, young entrepreneurial firms and potential 
investors in such firms. 
In addition to the above mentioned relationships between changes in corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance, moderating effects of environmental 
factors are also proposed. Dess and Beard (1984) talk about three dimensions of 
environment. First, dynamism is the extent to which the firm's environment is turbulent. 
Complexity refers to the number of factors in the environment that have the capacity to 
influence how the firm operates. Munificence on the other hand is the extent to which the 
environment can support sustained growth (Starbuck, 1976). Recent work in the 
environment literature contends that firms have to use internal mechanisms to deal with 
the external complexities of the environments they operate in (Brown & Eisenhardt, 
1997; Walters & Buhian, 2004). According to the model in this study, once such internal 
mechanisms, like the presence of original TMT members of young entrepreneurial firms 
with working knowledge of how to deal with the external environment, are deactivated 
firm performance suffers. In that regard, if the environment is complex, dynamic or less 
munificent, the relationship between changes in corporate governance mechanisms and 
lower firm performance may become stronger. The environment is known to have an 
impact on structure (Burns & Stalker, 1961) and strategy (Miller, 1988). The 
environment's impact on executive decision making, strategy formulation and its 
outcomes is substantiated by previous research (Miller & Friesen, 1983; Grag, Walters, & 
Priem, 2003). For this reason, environmental factors are considered to moderate the 
relationship between TMT structure and board composition variables and firm operating 
performance of young entrepreneurial firms. 
9 
The Need for Future Research 
As Cohen and Dean (2005) observe, an IPO can be characterized as involving 
significant information asymmetry between the potential investors and current owners. 
Current insiders of the firm, such as the original executives and board members, possess 
considerable amounts of knowledge about the company while the potential investors have 
to act on the limited information they can access (Leland & Pyle, 1977). In that regard, 
potential investors, either during the pre- or post-IPO stages, have to act upon the signals 
to which they are exposed (Certo, 2003). As previously mentioned, while the finance 
literature is primarily concerned with stock price fluctuations (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; 
Aggarwal, 2000; Cornelli & Goldreich, 2001), the impact of post IPO changes in the 
corporate governance structures of recently completed IPOs still remains an area that 
needs attention (Certo et al., 2009). Thus, research from a strategy perspective may 
contribute to the literature. In order to understand this stage more clearly, it is logical to 
start with the reasons that trigger these changes. For that reason, the change in ownership 
structure following an IPO, particularly for a young entrepreneurial firm, can be 
considered as the initial trigger. Based on signaling theory (Certo, 2003), underpriced 
IPOs which can be considered potentially promising investing opportunities, are likely to 
encourage investors to acquire shares in a young entrepreneurial company that just 
recently completed the IPO process. The real importance of these changes in ownership 
structure is related with how these new owners act after acquiring shares in the company. 
Will they be more likely to stay inactive and rely on the decisions of the original 
executives and directors who successfully brought the firm this far, or will they be more 
inclined to appoint their own agents such as new executives and directors based on 
10 
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Booth & Deli, 1996)? The answer to these 
questions obviously falls within the boundaries of corporate governance research. 
Furthermore, with regard to the new investors that choose to be active and appoint 
their own agents, what happens to the performance of the firm that is probably still in 
need of the entrepreneurial efficacy provided by the original insiders based on the 
resource based view (Barney, 1991)? Recent research demonstrated that, classical 
explanations like agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) may not be appropriate for 
young entrepreneurial firms because of this need (Kroll et al., 2007). So, this area 
obviously needs attention. Besides, as most of the firms that go public are small 
entrepreneurial firms rather than large, well-established ones (Certo et al., 2001), 
focusing on the evolution of governance in these types of firms should have both 
theoretical and practical implications. The literature is not very rich with regard to the 
potential impact of corporate governance changes on operating performance of these 
young firms, future research is definitely warranted. Finally, although seminal literature 
in the field highlights the importance of environment in decision making (Burns & 
Stalker, 1961; Dess & Beard, 1984), its potential moderating effect on the relationship 
between changes in corporate governance mechanisms and firm operating performance, 
particularly for young entrepreneurial firms, certainly needs attention (Walters et al., 
2010). What happens to the operating performance of such a firm that takes on new TMT 
members when it operates in a turbulent environment? Does the firm need even more of 
the entrepreneurial efficacy provided by the original TMT members? The answers to 
these questions will shed some light on the too many unknowns of the relationship 
between the environment and corporate governance research. 
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In short, using the model depicted in Figure 1.1, this study aims to demonstrate 
the detrimental effects of interfering with original entrepreneurial efficacy of young firms 
that just completed the IPO stage. As the proposed relationships are explored with an 
extensive literature review and through empirical analysis, the findings may enlighten the 
readers about whether to intervene in corporate governance mechanisms of young 
entrepreneurial firms. 
IPO underpricing of 
young 
entreprenurial 
firms 
Changes in Ownership 
Structure 
(Blockholder ownership) 
Changes in TMT 
structure 
(rate of change in 
TMT membership) 
Complexity 
Changes m Board 
Composition 
(rate of change in 
Board membership) 
Fiim performance 
Dynamism Munificence 
Figure 1.1 Model of the Series of Relationships Reflecting the Changes in Post IPO 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Corresponding Firm Performance. 
Statement of Problem and Objectives of the Study 
In this dissertation, the purpose is to address the gaps mentioned in the previous 
section. In particular, the primary purpose is to investigate the series of relationships and 
the subsequent environmental moderating variables depicted in Figure 1.1. The specific 
objectives of this dissertation can be summarized as follows: 
1- To examine whether IPOs of young entrepreneurial firms attract potential 
investors to acquire blockholder ownership during the post-IPO period. 
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2- To examine whether potential investors that acquire controlling shares in the 
focal firm request changes in TMT structure and board composition. 
3- To examine whether the appointment of new executives and directors impacts 
the entrepreneurial efficacy that brought the firm to the IPO stage. 
4- To examine whether the changes in TMT composition have detrimental 
effects on subsequent firm operating performance. 
5- To examine whether the changes in board structure have detrimental effects 
on subsequent firm operating performance. 
6- To examine whether environmental factors like dynamism, turbulence and 
munificence have a moderating impact on the relationship between changes in 
TMT composition and subsequent firm operating performance. 
7- To examine whether environmental factors like dynamism, turbulence and 
munificence have a moderating impact on the relationship between changes in 
board structure and subsequent firm operating performance. 
8- To examine whether or not young entrepreneurial firms' corporate governance 
mechanisms should be interfered with. 
9- To contribute to the explanation of post-IPO performance. 
10- To contribute to the literature on the relationship between pre- and post-IPO 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. 
13 
Contributions of the Study 
Through the examination of the proposed series of relationships and related 
environmental variables as moderators, this dissertation promises a number of 
contributions and implications, from both theoretical and practitioner perspectives. First, 
it will provide some answers to the long-term debated about whether signaling model 
holds for young entrepreneurial firms. Also, it is likely to provide an answer to the 
question: "Should the new owners interfere with the corporate governance mechanisms 
of young entrepreneurial firms?" An answer to this question will shed light on the debate 
about the classical contentions of agency theory. Second, based on the resource based 
view, should young entrepreneurial firms hang on to their original executives and 
directors who were successful in bringing the firm to the IPO stage? The answer to this 
question will enlighten the practitioners about whom to appoint and whom not to appoint. 
This answer also extends the work of Kroll et al. (2007) by bringing in the direct and 
indirect impact of changes in ownership structure on subsequent changes in corporate 
governance mechanisms and their effect on post-IPO operating performance. There is a 
debate present in the literature about the impact of boards of directors from a strategic 
decision making perspective. If the results show that the changes in board structures of 
young entrepreneurial firms result in lower performance, then a significant contribution 
to this debate can also be made. Third, although environment is a popular variable to 
consider in executive decision making in corporate governance literature, not a lot has 
been done within the context of young entrepreneurial firms and particularly the ones that 
just completed the IPO process. While Walters et al. (2010) investigated whether a 
moderating effect exists between TMT board membership and firm performance, in this 
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dissertation, the rate of change in TMT and board membership sourcing from changes in 
ownership structure after the IPO is taken into account, and an operating performance 
perspective over five-year period rather than a stock market based performance is 
considered (Walters and his colleagues used holding period returns over two years as 
their dependent variable). Finally, this dissertation is also likely to contribute to the 
entrepreneurship literature as researchers call for more empirical research in the area. 
While the finance literature has primarily concentrated on pre- and post-IPO stock price 
movements, the insights provided in this dissertation are likely to shed light on some of 
the many unknowns of the corporate governance literature. 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Why Firms Go Public 
Companies need financial resources to facilitate their growth and expansion. 
Some companies may only rely on the cash offered by their owners while others choose 
to gather this important resource from the external environment. Still others may have 
venture capitalists or angel investors financing their growth. Those that decide to go to 
external sources may either approach bankers for a credit line or may choose to sell 
shares to the public. An Initial Public Offering (IPO) enables a company to sell its equity 
to outside investors (Certo et al., 2009). As Daily, Certo and Dalton (2005:94) observe, 
"An IPO is one of the more critical junctures in the development of a firm." It is at this 
stage that new stakeholders, such as the post-IPO owners, governing bodies such as 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and other potential investors are introduced 
to the routines of the company. 
What motivates companies to go public? As the decision to go public is complex, 
it cannot be explained by a single literature stream (Pagano, Panetta & Zingales, 1998). 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) provide an excellent review of the different perspectives about 
the factors that motivate companies to go public. One group of scholars considers the cost 
of capital as the main reason behind the decision to go public. According to this view, 
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instead of using internal equity and debt financing, selling equity to external parties may 
lower the overall cost of capital, which in turn results in value maximization of the firm 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1963; Mysers & Majluf, 1984; Mysers, 1984). Another group 
argues that an IPO is the point at which the insiders cash out their long-term efforts of 
bringing the company successfully to this critical stage (Mello & Parsons, 2000; Ang & 
Brau, 2003). Thus, if the IPO turns out to be a successful, which obviously is the 
intention of the insiders, the founders experience significant personal gain. The third 
literature stream is concerned with the subsequent acquisition of the firm following an 
IPO. The researchers in this stream consider an IPO as the first step in establishing a true 
valuation of the firm, which in turn may lead to the acquisition of the firm in the ensuing 
years following an IPO (Brau, Francis & Kohers, 2003). Finally, the fourth group 
considers an IPO as a strategic move. Following an IPO, the ownership structure of the 
firm gets dispersed (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1999), the publicity and reputation of the 
firm will be enhanced (Maksimovic & Pichler, 2001) and the activities of the firm will 
receive more attention (Bradley, Jordan & Ritter, 2003). 
Arguably, the two most influential scholars in the area, Jain and Kini (1999:1281) 
also review the related literature concerning the reasons why firms go public: 
"Conventional wisdom suggests that the public offering represents a stage in the growth 
phase of a corporation and, therefore, all private firms with growth prospects eventually 
go public to finance investments." One explanation Jain and Kani discuss is financing 
expansion. According to this view, companies have to go public when the owners do not 
have enough money to support expansion and need external financing to keep moving 
forward (Jain & Kini, 1994; Mikkelson, Partch & Shah, 1997). One other explanation 
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discussed is rebalancing of the accounts after a period of high investment to facilitate 
growth (Pagano et al., 1998). As mentioned above in referring to Brau et al.'s (2003) 
work, the third reason is about the future sale of the company. Through the IPO process, 
the market determines the value of the company so that the original owners can sell the 
company as a whole in the future based on this market price (Zingales, 1995). Finally, the 
motive that refutes the basic contentions of the above three says that companies decide to 
go public when the entrepreneurs recognize that there is a possibility of failure, and it is 
time to divest through the sale of stock to the public (Jain & Kini, 1999). 
In summary, scholars report somewhat different views about the motivations for 
going public (Jain & Kini, 1994; Pagano et al., 1998; Brau & Fawcett, 2006). The 
intention of this dissertation is not to take a position about any of these competing views 
but to assess what happens after a firm goes public. These competing theories may be 
helpful in explaining how and why the company comes to the IPO stage. However, the 
focus of this study is on the happenings of post-IPO period. The following section will 
provide an overview of the literature regarding the main areas of IPO research. The 
section following that reviews the literature about the different measures of IPO 
performance. Also reported are the various theories concerning a specific IPO 
performance measure called underpricing. Further, included is background information 
about the uniqueness of young entrepreneurial firms, which constitute a major focus of 
this study. Finally, a potential moderating variable, environment, will be introduced 
before moving on to hypotheses development. 
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Main Areas of IPO Research 
In a recently published article, Certo and colleagues (2009) review the different 
perspectives concerning IPO research from a macro management perspective. Certo and 
his colleagues mention that, out of 103 articles, they managed to identify as IPO research 
studies published in the last 20 years, 65 percent were conducted on topics related to 
either corporate governance or upper echelons. This study builds on their review, and 
also reports the related literature about corporate governance and upper echelons within 
the IPO context. 
Perhaps one of the most widely cited studies that reports on performance and 
corporate governance within the IPO context is Ibbotson and Ritter (1995). These authors 
talk about three different agency issues present in IPO situations. The first is information 
asymmetry. An agency conflict arises between the parties involved in the IPO process 
due to different levels of access to valuable information. Those with possibly better 
knowledge about the company, such as the current owners and the underwriter, naturally 
have a better idea about the firm's value versus those with less knowledge, such as the 
outside investors. Thus, "high levels of information asymmetry characterize the IPO 
process" (Certo et al., 2009:1343). The second agency issue is adverse selection (Stiglitz, 
1985). Due to the presence of information asymmetry between the parties, the ones with 
more information tend to take actions, such as the valuation and timing of the IPO, to 
protect their own interests. Outside investors who have less information about the current 
condition of the firm face adverse selection, which makes them question the 
appropriateness of their investment decisions in the focal firm (Grinblat and Hwang, 
1989). The final agency issue is moral hazard (Ibbotson and Ritter 1995 study). In 
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addition to adverse selection, parties with more knowledge, such as the insiders or the 
investment bankers who arrange the issuance of the stock, tend to take hidden actions, 
such as pre-IPO manipulations, yielding what researchers refer to as a moral hazard. 
These agency issues must be considered in any explanation of the behavior of decision 
makers in an organization, such as the executives and the board of directors. 
IPOs and Executives 
Hambrick and Mason (1984), in their highly influential article, discuss the 
importance of the dominant coalition on a firm's strategic decision making. The IPO 
process happens to be one of the most important stages in a firm's life cycle (Jain & Kini, 
1999) so the importance of the dominant coalition during the IPO stage, or in Hambrick 
and Mason's (1984) term, upper echelons, becomes obvious. For that reason, a similar 
amount of attention is paid to upper echelons, relative to that paid to corporate 
governance in IPO research (Certo et al., 2009). One group of researchers has focused on 
the impact of TMT compensation and ownership structure on pre- or post-IPO 
performance (Marino, Castaldi & Dollinger, 2003; Certo, Daily, Cannella & Dalton, 
2003; Nikbakht, Shahrokhi & Martin; 2007). Marion et al. (1989) highlight the need for 
including executive compensation in IPO research. Certo et al. (2003) analyze the 
potential signaling impact of executive stock options on firm IPO performance. They 
observe that executives with more stock options are considered to have more trust in their 
company's performance, and they will be more willing to take the required risks in the 
future to facilitate the growth of the company. Nikbakht et al. (2007) also found that CEO 
compensation structure can be seen as a signaling device at the pre-IPO valuation stage as 
the researchers and the public considers CEO future (post-IPO) behavior being directly 
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tied to the type of the compensation schema offered to him or her (e.g. cash, bonus, 
stocks, and stock option grants). Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) propose that, if the 
executives have greater bargaining power due to their compensation schemas, the firm 
may experience a more successful IPO stage, although Lowry and Murphy (2007) 
proposed that no such relationship exists between compensation schemas and IPO 
success. 
Another group of researchers is more interested in the ownership and founder 
effect of the executives (Leland & Pyle, 1977; Ritter, 1991; Certo, Convin, Daily & 
Dalton, 2001; Fisher & Pollock, 2004). Leland and Pyle (1977) consider management-
retained ownership as the main signaling device for IPO valuation. Fisher and Pollock 
(2004), using U.S. IPOs in 1992, found that founder CEOs with a significant percentage 
of shares following the IPO lower the chance of post-IPO firm failure. Certo et al. (2001) 
investigate whether the presence of founder CEOs and the wealth they retain prior to IPO 
have a positive impact on IPO underpricing. According to this study, the more equity the 
founder CEOs retain in the firm right before the firm becomes publicly traded, (as 
opposed to leaving money on the table as Ritter (1991) suggests) the more appreciation 
he or she will experience based on the first day stock price appreciation. Certo and his 
colleagues empirically show that firms with founder CEOs are more severely 
underpriced, as the investment banker values the company less generously in order to 
account for the inexperience of the management in running a publicly traded company 
(Wat, 1983). Using data from the insurance industry, Napompech, Kroll and Shelor 
(2002) report reduced ownership retention by the managers following an IPO increases 
agency costs. Some researchers say that the presence of founder entrepreneur ownership 
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can limit IPO underpricing (Brennan & Franks, 1997; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). In a 
Taiwanese setting, Yang and Sheu (2006) found that an equity stake owned by 
management, and, specifically the top management, enhances the chance of survival just 
as proposed by agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Balatbat, Taylor and Walter 
(2004), in an Australian setting, show that the amount of ownership executives retain 
during the IPO stage does not affect subsequent firm performance during the first three 
years of the post-IPO stage. However, they also mention that there seems to be some 
impact on performance at the fourth and fifth years following the IPO. Using empirical 
data from Canada, Li and McConomy (2004) are able to demonstrate how more 
management ownership at the IPO is a primary determinant of IPO valuation. In support 
of Hughes (1986) signaling model, Li and McConomy (2004) empirically showed that 
management retained ownership increases firm value at the IPO. Bruton, Chahine and 
Filatotchev (2009) report a curvilinear relationship between a founder's retained equity 
and underpricing, which means, to a certain extent, a founder's ownership may eliminate 
adverse selection, but in the meantime it may also encourage moral hazard. 
One other group of researchers is more concerned about the experiences and 
demographics of the executives during the IPO. According to Chemmanur and Paeglis 
(2005), firms with higher quality managers are more likely to attract higher quality 
underwriters and investors. Kor and Mahoney (2005) consider significant industry 
experience as a determining factor for R&D investment, which in turn has a positive 
effect on subsequent firm performance. In parallel, Amason, Shrader and Thompson 
(2006) discuss the importance of TMT heterogeneity. This construct has also been 
influential in studies that investigate the impact of complex environments on strategic 
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decision making (Carpenter, 2002; Siegel & Hambrick, 2005) which also happens to be a 
moderating factor in the relationships that are explained in detail later in this chapter. 
Higgins and Gulati (2003) found that prominent downstream affiliations of upper 
echelons attract prestigious underwriters to take roles in the IPO process. 
In summary, as the main actors in the strategic decision making process, upper 
echelons (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) have received significant attention from finance 
and macro management researchers. While upper echelons are the major focus of this 
dissertation, more generalizable contentions about their impact are needed. One of the 
contributions of this study will be to formulate a model based on the empirical results. In 
order to create this new model, the literature addressing the relationship between a board 
of directors and pre- and post- IPO performance must also be reviewed. 
IPO and Board of Directors 
The literature on the relationship between boards of directors and IPO 
performance is not as in depth as that addressing upper echelons (Certo, Holmes & 
Holcomb, 2007). Different time frames have been considered by researchers with regard 
to the impact of the board of directors on IPO performance. In the short-term, Finkle 
(1998) shows a positive relationship between the presence of directors appointed by 
underwriters and the size of the IPO. Certo et al. (2001) also found that firms with 
prestigious boards are less likely to be underpriced. Li and Naughton (2007), using 
Chinese IPOs, consider the number of directors to be a factor in short-term post-IPO 
performance while, in the long-term, abandoning duality seems to have a positive impact 
on performance. Chahine and Filatotchev (2008) find that the proportion of outside 
directors lessens the likelihood of underpricing using an entrepreneurial firm sample and 
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suggest that the independence of the board is surely a signaling mechanism that lowers 
underpricing. Contrary to that, Boulton, Smart and Zutter (2010) contend that 
underpricing is more likely to happen in countries where outsider dominance on the 
board is considered to be more important. Howton, Howton and Olson (2001) found that 
IPO pricing anomalies are directly related with board structure and strong board of 
directors can be a way to undermine the importance of information asymmetry and moral 
hazard. Considering the internationalization of entrepreneurial firms following an IPO, 
young IPOs are more likely to go international if the directors possess international 
experience (Carpenter, Pollock & Leary, 2003). Chen and Dempere (2009) investigate 
the impact of director composition on IPO bank acquisitions and show that equity based 
compensation plans for directors reduce the likelihood of acquisitions after the IPO. 
In summary, as the organizational leaders (Certo et al., 2007) who derive their 
power from the owners (Fama & Jensen, 1983), the board of directors has received 
relatively less attention from IPO researchers. However, there is enough information 
available to underline their importance during the pre-IPO and post-IPO stages. This 
study will shed light on the impact of the board of directors on post-IPO operating 
performance. Further discussion about directors and their effect on the performance of 
young entrepreneurial firms that recently completed IPO will be provided in this chapter 
under the hypotheses development section. 
Underwriting Process 
The focus of this study is on young entrepreneurial firms that just underwent an 
IPO so it may be useful to review briefly the underwriting process firms go through. The 
original legal background of IPOs goes back to the Securities Act of 1933. Based on this 
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act, companies that decide to go public start with selecting an investment bank to walk 
the company through the IPO process. This investment bank, or the so-called 
underwriter, can be an individual company or a leader of a consortium composed of 
several investment banks. There are several factors an IPO company takes into account 
when selecting an underwriter. For instance, prior relationship with the investment bank 
through the board members (i.e. board members may have been involved in IPOs of other 
companies, particularly the venture capitalists), prior reputation of the underwriter or the 
expertise and experience of the underwriter with the issuer's industry (Ellis, Michaely & 
O'Hara, 1999). The underwriting starts with preparing an outline of the underwriter 
agreement called "letter of intent." In this document, parties agree on the fees and 
commissions associated with the IPO process. For instance, the underwriter specifies 
what percentage of the gross spread (the difference between the price of the stocks that 
are bought from the issuer by the underwriter and the price of the stocks when they 
become publicly traded) it is going to charge. Following the due diligence period, once 
both parties agree on all the financial and administrative issues, they sign a document 
called "underwriting agreement." By signing this agreement, the underwriter commits to 
buy the securities at a specific price. 
The interaction with SEC starts after the parties sign the underwriting agreement. 
Due to Securities Act of 1933, the issuer and the underwriter prepare the registration 
statement. There are primarily two parts of a registration statement. First one, named as 
"prospectus," contains information that the IPO company has to provide to the public, 
such as the prior performance of the company or the background information about the 
board of directors and top management team (Welbourne & Cyr, 1999). The company 
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and the underwriter are responsible for the contents in the prospectus (Beatty & Zajac, 
1994). The second part of the registration statement, which is called "Part II," contains 
information that SEC inspects on behalf of the public. After the registration statement is 
filed the SEC it becomes a "preliminary prospectus" and SEC will respond to it within 20 
days with the amendments it requires to be enacted. 
Once the SEC approval is received, the period that researchers call as "road 
show" begins. This is the period where underwriter contacts institutional investors on 
behalf of the company. After a period of various presentations by the company and the 
underwriter to institutional investors (they do not have to institutional investors but 
underwriters tend to prefer them to individual investors), based on the interest on the 
company stocks, the underwriter comes up with an offer price. It should be noted that, 
none of the sales to institutional investors are official until the effective date. The 
underwriter aims to get two to three times oversubscription to create a "good IPO" (Ellis 
et al., 1999). This can only happen if the institutional investors believe that the company 
is likely to be successful both at the IPO and after the IPO. In fact, that is why 
underpricing of an IPO is said to be associated with positive signals about a company 
(Ritter, 1991). The final prospectus statement with the price amendment and the number 
of shares going to sold is published on the morning of the effective date. On the morning 
of the effective date, company stocks open for trading and the institutional investors 
officially acquire shares based on the previously agreed price. If the closing price at the 
end of that day is higher than the offer price, the company is said to have "left money on 
the table" (Ritter, 1991; Ritter & Welch, 2002) or in other words underpriced (Arthurs et 
al., 2008). 
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Although details of signaling theory is provided in other sections of this study, it 
may be useful to mention why underpricing is an important signaling mechanism based 
on signaling theory assumptions. According to the seminal studies of signaling models 
(Allen & Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt & Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989), by underpricing 
their stocks, IPO firms signal future firm quality. Although the original owners had just 
left money on the table (Ritter, 1991), the only way they can make up for their initial loss 
is through future profit of the company from the operations financed by the money raised 
at the IPO and subsequent sales of stocks. In other words, signaling model does not only 
consider pre-IPO signals that investors take into account for valuation of the firm but also 
the underpricing which happens at the end of the first trading day. In fact that is why, 
some scholars recently aimed to investigate the direct relationship between IPO 
underpricing and post-IPO operating performance (i.e. Jain, 1996; Zheng & Stangeland, 
2007). Once the firm is underpriced some institutional investors may choose to sell their 
stocks right away to experience profit while others may choose to hold on to these stocks 
if they adopt a long-term investment strategy. Still others may gather shares in the 
secondary market to accumulate a controlling stake in the company (five percent or 
more). The underlying theme of this study is not about short-term institutional investors 
but it is about the long-term ones which are likely to be listed as blockholders in the first 
annual statement following the IPO. 
Before closing this section, the last concept that needs to mentioned is the "lock-
up" period. SEC requires that the pre-IPO owners of a company cannot sell their shares 
for a certain time period (usually for 180 days). This period is called the "lock-up" period 
(Espenlaub & Tonks, 1998). In other words, the owners of shares mentioned in the 
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prospectus statement are restricted from selling shares for a certain time period once the 
company becomes publicly traded. The implication of this requirement within the context 
of this study is; the ownership structure changes following the IPO and subsequent 
changes in corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance can easily be tested 
through the comparison of prospectus statement and subsequent annual statements. 
Theories of Underpricing 
Several theoretical explanations have been offered by scholars to explain the 
many unknowns about the underpricing of IPO shares. This section provides some 
background information about these theories so that the upcoming hypotheses section 
may make more intuitive sense. 
Certo et al. (2001), abstracted from Tinic (1988) and Ritter (1998), provides 
different theories explaining underpricing. As they summarize, there are several theories 
to be considered in explaining the so-called underpricing phenomena. The risk-averse 
underwriter hypothesis focuses on the investment bankers. This theory suggests that 
investment bankers set IPO offer prices lower on purpose to account for the risks 
associated with new publicly traded firms (Reilly, 1973). The monopsony power 
hypothesis is more concerned about the reputation of the underwriters. According to this 
hypothesis, highly reputable investment bankers set the prices lower so that the customers 
they sell the IPO stocks to get compensated through stock price appreciation on the very 
first day (Baron & Holmstrom, 1980). The speculative bubble hypothesis proposes that, 
due to speculation on the first day by investors who were unable to access shares during 
the pre-IPO stage, the first day closing price reflects such investors bidding up the stock. 
The implicit insurance hypothesis concentrates on the legal side of the IPO pricing. This 
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hypothesis contends that if the offer price is low, the chances of subsequent legal action 
taken against the underwriter by initial investors is reduced, so, once again, the 
underwriter sets the offer price lower than what it is supposed to be (Nakatani, 1984). 
The market feedback hypothesis posits that, during the pre-IPO stage, the investment 
banker uses the feedback from the preferred investors to calculate the offer price 
(Jegadeesh, Weinstein & Welch, 1993). Rationally, these preferred investors set the value 
of the firm lower than what it really is so they get to experience appreciation in their 
investments once the first day closing price is lower than the offer price (underpricing). 
According to the ownership dispersion hypothesis, the focal firm will prefer an 
underpriced stock so that due to high demand, no one investor can gather a controlling 
interest (Booth & Chua, 1996). The asymmetric information hypothesis, one of the most 
popular hypotheses, proposes that the natural reason for underpricing is the presence of 
information asymmetry between investors, underwriters and the issuing firm (Brennan & 
Kraus, 1987). The winners curse hypothesis, is also related to information asymmetry. 
According to this hypothesis, informed investors may not have the sufficient wealth to 
buy out the IPO shares, so issuers underprice their IPO shares to attract uninformed 
investors (Rock, 1986). Last, but certainly not least, is the popular signaling hypothesis. 
This hypothesis is the major theoretical foundation I rely upon to explain the series of 
relationships proposed in my model. According to the signaling hypothesis, or the so-
called signaling model (Leland & Pyle, 1977), underpricing acts as a signaling 
mechanism about the firm's future as it may lead to subsequent sales of stocks for higher 
prices after the IPO (Welch, 1989; Allen & Faulhaber, 1989). One last theory that also 
must be mentioned is screening theory. As Sanders and Boivie (2004) summarize, 
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screening theory is very similar to the signaling model. The main difference is that the 
signaling model historically concentrated on an informed buyer acting first, while 
screening theory assumes that the buyer of the stock is acting with some filtering 
routines. Based on screening theory, higher quality issuers underprice their IPO price on 
purpose, thus leaving some money on the table, and the way they make up for this 
sacrifice is to get involved in additional issuing activity in the future at a higher price, 
which is a mirror image of the basic contentions of signaling model as specified by 
Sanders and Boivie (2004:169). As theoretical explanations, both the signaling model and 
screening theory make intuitive sense. Based on a combination of these two explanations 
of post-IPO investor behavior, this dissertation proposes that once the firm, particularly a 
young entrepreneurial one, is underpriced, the underpricing acts as a signaling 
mechanism for active investors to acquire shares and ask for subsequent changes in the 
corporate governance structure of the firm once they become new owners. The result is 
lower operating performance due to interventions with the firm's entrepreneurial 
efficacy. Further discussion of the signaling model and its application in this model will 
be provided in the hypotheses development section. 
Before moving to the section that covers the measures of IPO performance, I 
believe a brief literature review about the consequences of IPO underpricing may clarify 
potential ambiguities about the underlying theme of my study. Particularly, the changes 
in ownership structure following the IPO is of interest as the focus of this study on the 
consequences of ownership structures following an IPO. Two studies stand out among 
others regarding the changes in ownership following underpriced IPOs. Stoughton and 
Zechner (1998) report that following an underpriced IPO, a more concentrated block 
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ownership structure is likely to emerge. Their reasoning is that only large stockholders 
can acquire stocks of underpriced IPOs and their intentions will be to monitor 
management after acquisition of these shares. Brennan and Franks (1997) approach the 
situation from a different perspective. According to their reduced monitoring hypothesis, 
underpriced IPOs will be related to more dispersed ownership. These authors contend 
that instead of concentrated ownership, several smaller owners may acquire shares after 
the IPO which may lower their power to monitor managerial actions. Although the 
results are mixed about both studies' views (Hill, 2006; Arugaslan, Cook & Kieschnick, 
2004), there is a need to shed some light on the ongoing debate about post-IPO ownership 
structure changes due to underpricing. One of the contributions of this study will be do 
that within the context of young entrepreneurial firms. 
Measures of IPO Performance 
In their IPO research summary article, Certo et al. (2009) discuss two different 
time frames to assess IPO performance. The first one is short-term performance. Most of 
the finance literature is concerned with what happens to stock prices on the opening day 
of trading (Ritter, 1991; Fisher & Pollock, 2004; Heeley, Matusik & Jain, 2007). The 
primary measures of IPO short-term performance deal with first day closing price. If the 
difference between the first day opening price and closing price is different from zero that 
means the company is either overpriced or underpriced (Aurthurs et al., 2008). If the 
closing price is higher than the opening price, the underwriter has valued the company for 
less than what it really is worth (Heeley et al., 2007). In other words, the pre-IPO owners 
did not get what they could have gotten from the IPO. Thus, as some authors say, they 
just "left money on the table" (Ritter, 1991). Underpricing is probably the most often 
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used variable in IPO research due to its importance in both the finance literature (Ritter 
and Welch, 2002) and the management literature (Certo, Dalton & Daily, 2001). 
According to some authors, this is the primary measure to assess litigation risk of an IPO 
firm (Tinic, 1988) and the amount of information asymmetry (Ritter & Welch, 2002; 
Loughran & Ritter, 2004), while for others it is one of the most important signaling 
mechanisms about a firm's future (Anderson, Beard & Born, 1995). In this dissertation, 
this is the primary variable that will be used to measure to what extent underpricing acts 
as a signaling mechanism about the firm's future. 
Underpricing is not the only variable used by researchers to measure short-term 
IPO performance. One of the other most popular measures of short-term IPO 
performance is the amount of proceeds raised. IPO proceeds reflect the capital gathered 
from the first-time offering (Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995). According to some authors 
(Pagano et al., 1998), the amount of proceeds raised during the IPO process determines 
how successful the management was in convincing the public about the real value of the 
company. Other short-term IPO performance measures that Certo et al. (2009) mention 
are: IPO price premium, representing the extent the initial price exceeds the book value 
of the assets (Fama & French, 1992), which is similar to Tobin's Q as a market-based 
measure of firm performance (Chung & Pruitt, 1994) and market valuation, which is 
measured by the total market capitalization of the firm right after the IPO, particularly at 
the end of the first day (Sanders & Boivie, 2004). 
Surprisingly, IPO researchers are not that interested with the long-term IPO 
performance. The measures of long-term post-IPO performance are not that different 
from classical performance measures of companies used in non-IPO based studies. 
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Primarily, researchers utilize either accounting-based or market-based measures to assess 
long-term IPO firm performance (Certo et al., 2010). Sales growth, return on assets, 
return on sales, return on equity, cash flow from operations, operating margin, and net 
profit are the primary accounting-based measures used (Amason, Shrader &Tompson, 
2006; Certo et al., 2009). Regarding market based measures which represent stock 
performance over the long run, holding period returns (Kroll et al., 2007) and cumulative 
abnormal returns (Kroll, Walters & Wright, 2008), are two of the most popular financial 
market measures used in the literature. 
Obviously, both short-term and long-term measures of IPO performance can only 
be used for assessing the performance of the firms that managed to go public and survive 
after the IPO for a certain period. Some scholars consider this survival as another 
measure of IPO success (Fisher & Pollock, 2004) particularly for young entrepreneurial 
firms (Jain & Kini, 2000) since a significant portion of IPO firms declare bankruptcy 
during the first few years following their IPO (Welbourne & Andrews, 1996; Certo et al., 
2010). In summary, different measures of IPO performance are present in the literature. 
As mentioned previously, the focus of this dissertation will be on underpricing as a 
signaling mechanism that triggers subsequent changes in firm ownership and corporate 
governance mechanisms. The next section discusses the literature regarding the 
uniqueness of young entrepreneurial firms in an IPO setting. 
Uniqueness of Young Entrepreneurial Firms 
Classical contentions of agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) involve 
corporate governance issues like the use of board independence and performance based 
compensation in order to align the interests of agents (executives) and principals 
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(owners). Pioneering studies in the field, like Booth and Deli (1996), Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrom and Johanson (2003), used large and well-established firms to test the 
propositions of agency theory. As Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) recognized that 
traditional governance mechanisms may result in unexpected consequences for young 
entrepreneurial firms, there is obviously a need to look at them from a different 
perspective as Kroll et al. (2007) suggest. 
Young firms, particularly the ones which recently completed IPOs, are at a 
vulnerable point in their evolution. They have to facilitate the transition from private 
ownership to public ownership while trying to keep up with the regulatory requirements 
of the governing bodies (Kroll et al., 2007). These types of firms, founded on 
entrepreneurial efficacy, face several uncertainties stemming from their inexperience with 
market mechanisms. Stinchcombe (1965) names this situation the "liability of newness." 
Although they seem to be simple business entities because of their size and age, due to 
this liability of newness, they may constitute more promising study units for management 
research (Kroll et al., 2007). Executives of young firms have access to limited resources 
and thus have limited strategic options (Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). Under these 
conditions, the creativity of the executives and their risk assessment abilities become 
more important. Thus, more interesting managerial implications may come from studies 
conducted on young entrepreneurial firms. 
The strength of an economy does not only depend on giant, well-established 
corporations. If that were the case, the recent bankruptcies of GM and Lehman Brothers 
would have diminished the hopes for the future of the U.S. economy. The reality is small 
to medium size enterprises are the main drivers of economies, both in the U.S. and 
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abroad. Considering this fact, studying young entrepreneurial firms also has more 
practical implications. If corporate governance research aims to provide the stakeholders 
of corporations with better insight into how to be successful, then corporate governance 
research focused on young entrepreneurial firms should provide valuable guidance 
concerning governance practices. The outcome of such practices may be vital to the 
whole economy. Kroll et al. (2007) found that classical contentions of agency theory do 
not apply to young entrepreneurial firms. These firms are likely to perform better, at least 
during the initial years, if the majority of their boards are composed of original TMT 
members. Zahra and Filatotchev (2004) point out that founders and managers of 
entrepreneurial companies are in greater need of sharing their tacit knowledge through 
strong personal and stable relationships. In other words, as these companies are more 
people dependent, the implications of studies conducted on them will not only be of 
interest for macro management researchers but for micromanagement researchers as well. 
Before the hypotheses are developed, the last topic that should be addressed is 
environment. As suggested in Figure 1.1, environmental factors are proposed to play an 
important role. The next section is a brief introduction to two competing literature 
streams about external environment. 
Impact of Environment 
Several competing theories have been advanced suggesting environmental 
uncertainty as a key determinant of the appropriateness of the rational strategic decision 
processes (Priem, Rasheed & Kotulic, 1995). Fredrickson (1984) says that an 
organization's strategy determines the extent of the match or alignment between its 
external environment and its internal structure and process. Fredrickson (1984) 
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differentiates between synoptic and incremental models of strategy formulation. Synoptic 
is based on a rational model of decision making while incremental is more concerned 
with providing a more accurate description of how organizations actually make strategic 
decisions. The most fundamental issue in synoptic strategy is the concept of 
comprehensiveness. This concept can be defined as the extent to which an organization 
attempts to be exhaustive and inclusive in making and integrating decisions. 
Comprehensiveness involves the careful collection of information to evaluate various 
strategic alternatives, the analysis of the available information and the making of detailed 
long-term plans based on that information. Fredrickson (1984) and Fredrickson and 
Mitchell (1984) report that rational strategic decision processes are associated with 
superior performance in stable environments and inferior performance in unstable 
environments. Priem et al. (1995) define an unstable environment as an uncertain 
environment; that is one in which it is difficult to identify, measure and predict variables 
and causal relationships. 
If a dynamic environment can be considered as an uncertain one, then Fredrickson 
and colleagues propose that since there is not enough data and information, 
comprehensiveness in terms of analysis, which involves different decision makers 
coming together around a well-developed strategy, may not be applicable. In these types 
of environments, as there is too much uncertainty, a fast decision making process is 
needed and, with the limited amount of information, comprehensiveness under the 
umbrella of strategic rationality may not be possible. 
Contrary to the contentions of Fredrickson and his colleagues, Mintzberg (1973) 
proposes that some formal comprehensive planning may yield superior performance. 
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Eisenhardt (1989) and Miller and Friesen (1983) suggest that decision makers in dynamic 
environments, instead of departing from analytical requirements of comprehensive 
decision making, actually accelerate their cognitive processing. Under dynamic 
conditions, decision makers use more information and consider more alternatives. 
Besides being analytically comprehensive, they also turn out to be integratively 
comprehensive. In dynamic environments there should be quick and intelligent responses. 
Thus, according to this stream of research, comprehensive decision making may lead to 
better performance in dynamic environments. 
The other two dimensions of environment, as discussed by Dess and Beard 
(1984), should also be mentioned at this point. For instance, environmental complexity, 
determined by the presence of heterogeneity in the environmental variables, is known to 
have a significant impact on strategic decision making (Aldrich, 1979; Boyd, 1995) and 
subsequent firm performance (McArthur & Nystrom, 1991). In addition, munificence, 
which is about whether critical resources are available or abundant in the environment, is 
another known determinant of firm performance (Goll & Rasheed, 1997). 
In summary, all of these research streams consider environment as an important 
factor to consider for firm performance. This study considers it to have a moderating 
effect on the relationship between firm performance and TMT composition and board 
structure. Further details about this proposition will be provided in the hypotheses 
development section. 
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Hypotheses Development 
Underpricing is present if the stock issue price is lower than the first day closing 
price (Ritter, 1991). This means that if underpricing is present, those who gather shares 
from the underwriting process experience gains in their investment at the end of the first 
day. From a financial perspective, this is definitely what the initial investors want as long 
as they end up selling the shares for a profit. From the original management's perspective 
(i.e. leaving money on the table or appreciation of retained ownership) has already been 
discussed. However, the impact of this situation on subsequent movements in the firm's 
ownership structure needs further discussion. The first hypothesis is related to this 
question: what happens to the ownership structure of the firms that experience significant 
underpricing when they undergo an IPO? 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989) discuss the importance of underpricing as a signaling 
mechanism that can be used by investors to distinguish between good firms and bad 
firms: "Underpricing the firm's initial offering (which is an immediate loss to the initial 
owners) is a credible signal that the firm is good to investors, because only good firms 
can be expected to recoup this loss after the [firm's superior] performance is realized" 
(Allen & Faulhaber, 1989:304). What exactly does the term "good firm" mean? 
Obviously, if a firm is a good one, it is more likely to perform better in the future, and the 
investors in such firms are more likely to experience higher stock price appreciations and 
possibly steady income in the form of dividends (Welch, 1989). A logical investor would 
obviously like to invest in IPO firms that are considered to be "good" (Grinblatt & 
Hwang, 1989) as these IPO firms may offset the initial loss, due to underpricing, by 
future earnings. 
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Young entrepreneurial firms need to provide the public with more signals of 
quality than do well-established, large institutions. Considering the association of 
extensive information asymmetry with IPOs (Rock, 1986), underwriters definitely need 
to do more in the case of young firms to "leave a good taste in investors' mouths" 
(Ibbotson, 1975: 264) by valuing the firm less than what it is really worth. In other words, 
it is safe to say that younger and smaller firms are more likely to experience underpricing 
(Jain, 1994). Though the question remains: "once a young entrepreneurial firm IPO is 
underpriced, does that trigger post-IPO investors to step in and gather shares?" The 
answer to this question forms the basis of the first hypothesis. 
A recent study suggests that "IPO firms are characterized by different large-block 
holders of retained equity after listing" (Bruton, Filatotchev, Chahine & Wright, 2010: 
492). There is empirical evidence suggesting that investors are more likely to purchase 
blocks of stocks in publicly traded companies when they perceive expected benefits to 
exceed expected costs (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Bethel, Liebeskind & Opler, 1998). 
Considering signaling theory (Leland & Pyle, 1977), firms with significant underpricing 
signal quality and higher expected returns in the future (Allen & Faulhaber, 1989). This 
means that, with their limited knowledge, if investors perceive that the cost associated 
with buying blocks of shares in an underpriced IPO of a young entrepreneurial firm will 
be lower than the potential benefits likely to be experienced in the future, they would be 
likely to step in to gather share blocks in the company. It should be noted that share 
blocks are defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) to mean direct 
ownership of five percent or more of a firm's outstanding shares. This research proposes 
that, once the firm is underpriced, new potential blockholders are likely to emerge within 
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a reasonable time period. Some researchers contend that the managers underprice shares 
during the IPO in order to spread out ownership by making the firm attractive to small 
shareholders (Brennan & Franks, 1997). Their reasoning behind such action is to avoid 
active monitoring by future blockholders. However, others contend the opposite actually 
happens. For instance, Stoughton and Zechner (1998) suggest that, through underpricing, 
managers, perhaps unintentionally, create an incentive for potential large shareholders to 
buy the shares at a relatively low price right after the IPO. "The incentive is necessary 
because monitoring is costly to blockholders" (Howton, 2006:420). Because of their 
collective level of ownership, blockholders possess the power to influence organizational 
decisions (Sanders & Boivie, 2004). 
Relative to well-established firms, there is empirical evidence to recommend the 
adoption of different agency perspectives for young entrepreneurial firms (Kroll et al., 
2007). Being a well-established firm is already a signal of quality (Dunbar, 2000; Valero, 
Lee & Cai, 2009) while it is harder for younger firms to use different mechanisms as 
signals of their quality (Allen & Faulhaber, 1989). With this great information asymmetry 
present in the IPO process for entrepreneurial firms, underpricing should serve as the 
primary determinant of firm quality. Bruton, Filatotochev, Chahine and Wright (2010) 
mention that corporate governance research has already informed us about the presence 
of blockholders in relatively larger mature firms, but little has been done related to 
entrepreneurial firms that undergo an IPO. Merton (1987) suggests that being listed on a 
major stock exchange may help the firm to be more recognizable by the public. Large, 
well-established firms already receive enough attention from the public, which may not 
be the case for private and smaller firms. Once they get listed, the public may be more 
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interested in what happens in these types of firms. As the sample in this study consists of 
young entrepreneurial firms that have just completed an IPO, looking at the changes in 
their ownership structures following an IPO should definitely be of interest for 
researchers. Using the signaling model (Leland & Pyle, 1977) adopted in this study, the 
proposal is that if an entrepreneurial firm is underpriced during the IPO, blockholders 
with different objectives (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson & Grossman, 2002) will take that as a 
signal about the firm's promising future and will rush to accumulate block holdings in the 
company. Based on this contention, the first hypothesis is as follows: 
Hi: Young entrepreneurial firms experiencing significant underpricing will 
attract potential investors who acquire blockholder ownership positions in the 
focal firms. 
Once the ownership structure of the firm changes, one might expect subsequent 
changes in corporate governance mechanisms. According to Denis, Denis and Sarin 
(1997), ownership structure has a direct impact on executive turnover. In this study, the 
authors show that the presence of a new outside blockholder increases the likelihood of 
executive turnover; however, this is not surprising. Well-known contentions of agency 
theory are quite specific about interest alignment between the owners and the executives 
(Daily, Dalton, & Rajagopalan, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). From an agency 
perspective, an outside blockholder will be willing to bear monitoring costs and have 
someone watching out for his/her interests. A rational active investor probably would like 
to appoint at least some of his/her agents either as executives or directors or both. 
Finance literature is also very clear about the propensity of owners to monitor what is 
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going on in the company through their own agents (Admati, Pfleiderer & Zechner, 1994; 
Kahn&Winton, 1998). 
At this point, a brief review about blockholder ownership may be useful. In their 
seminal article, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) mathematically demonstrate why owning 
only five percent in a company can give that owner the right to be involved in the 
strategic decision making process. Parallel to that study, Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) 
empirically verified that blockholder ownership is associated with corporate restructuring 
and this is because the blockholders are able to put pressure on executives because of the 
five percent share they hold in the company. In a more recent article, Sanders and Boivie 
(2004) showed that blockholder ownership is strongly associated with firm valuation of 
publicly traded firms. Probably due for that reason, the SEC requires publicly traded 
companies to report all the owners with five percent or more shares in their annual 
reports. In addition, anyone who acquires beneficial ownership of five percent or has to 
file Schedule 13D within 10 days of that acquisition. Also at this point, a brief overview 
of Schedule 13D may be useful to understand how large shareholders are able to 
influence firm practices, including the ones with corporate governance policies. Item 4 of 
Schedule 13D is related with the intentions of the new large shareholder. Although the 
details of this item is beyond the scope of this study, in summary the new beneficial 
owner notifies the SEC and the public about its intentions with regard to new security 
issuance, mergers, acquisitions, sale or transfer of assets, any changes about current 
capitalization policies and similar issues. Particularly, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach 
(2008:3973) report that "section d" of Schedule 13D Item 4 is as follows: 
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"any change in the present board of directors or management of the issuer, 
including any plans or proposals to change the number or term of directors 
or to fill any existing vacancies on the board." 
Thus, new blockholders are able initiate changes in the corporate governance 
mechanisms of the firms in which they acquired controlling shares in. They can choose to 
do this either directly by electing directors and voting on changes in the corporate 
structure of the company or through informal negotiations and discussions (Crongvist & 
Fahlenbrach, 2008). Either way, their presence is likely to associated with changes in 
corporate governance practices. In other words, both theoretically and legally, only five 
percent ownership is sufficient to gain influence over the current firm governance 
systems. 
In contrast to privately owned companies, where the original founders act with 
complete freedom, publicly traded companies have to seek approval of their boards of 
directors for major strategic decisions (Burton, Helliar & Power, 2004). Bethel and 
Liebeskind (1993) report that blockholder ownership is associated with corporate 
restructuring, which, in the authors' terms, is an indication of pressure imposed on 
management by the new blockholders. Bouresli, Davidson and Abdulsalam (2002) 
empirically demonstrate that active investors in publicly traded companies will take 
active roles in reconfiguring the corporate governance mechanisms of the firms they have 
controlling shares in. Thus, it is more than likely that the new blockholders who acquired 
shares after the IPO due to the signaling affect of the severe underpricing will ask for 
changes in TMT and board structure. Corporate governance rules of the NYSE (New 
York Stock Exchange) and NASDAQ (National Association of Security Dealers 
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Automated Quotations) require companies to have independent outsiders in their boards 
(Kaufman & Englander, 2005; Kroll et al., 2007) although the empirical results regarding 
the benefits of such outsider dominance are mixed (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson, 
1998). Particularly in the case of young entreprenurial firms, there is strong empirical 
evidence of problems associated with such mandates. Kroll et al. (2007) for example, 
showed that outside-dominated boards designed to mitigate agency problems (Booth & 
Deli, 1996) are not effective for younger firms. However, active blockholders may not 
acknowledge that fact. For the purpose of watching out for their interests, they will be 
looking to have their own people in key positions. Obviously, the first key position that 
comes to mind is being a member of the TMT. This research proposes that, following the 
changes in ownership structure, new blockholders will ask some of the original TMT 
members to step down and will replace them with new ones. This will automatically 
create a higher rate of change in TMT structure in the years following the IPO. 
Obviously, as new executives come in and the old ones leave, one should be able to 
observe considerable differences between the TMT structures over the years following 
the IPO. Like other studies, this study considers a five-year time period to assess whether 
such a relationship exists (Hillier, Linn & Colgan, 2005). Throughout the five years 
following the IPOs of the young entrepreneurial firms, it is proposed that the rate of 
change in TMT turnover should be higher once the new blockholders emerge in the 
firm's ownership structure. This discussion leads to the following hypotheses: 
H2: Blockholder ownership structure changes following the IPO process of young 
entrepreneurial firms will lead to a higher rate of change in TMT membership 
over the subsequent five-year period. 
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Beyond the higher rate of change in TMT membership, the same logic may also 
apply to board membership. As Fama and Jensen (1983) specify, boards derive their 
power from the owners so their structures will be based on the actions of the owners. In 
the case of young entrepreneurial firms, the chance of owners asking for changes in board 
structure is equal to the chances of them asking for changes in TMT structure, if not more 
so. Kaufman and Englander (2005) discuss the need for IPO firms to include outside 
directors on the board for the purpose of satisfying external constituents. Deutsch and 
Ross (2003), in parallel, highlight the importance of the presence of outside directors in 
IPO firms to attract external resources. IPO firms, at this vulnerable point of their 
evolution, are in need of external resources (Kroll et al., 2007). If new owners, with fresh 
interest in the company, increase the chances of access to external resource as Deutsch 
and Ross (2003) suggest, then their requests for changes in the status quo within the 
company will be taken more seriously. Considering the blockholders' legitimate power 
on top of that, it is logical to expect new directors to be appointed by them to the board. 
Beatty and Zajac (1994) propose several mechanisms associated with monitoring 
and related incentives. The first mechanism is the classic outside dominance of the board 
as mandated by agency theory researchers (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). The 
second involves tying the incentives of the directors to those of the owners in order to 
create more vigilant monitoring (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988). The third mechanism 
involves separating the CEO and chairman positions (Lorsch & Maclver, 1989). The 
fourth and fifth mechanisms Beaty and Zajac (1994) discuss are directly related to this 
study. First of all, they mention the possible effects of a large equity holder. They 
contend, blockholders will be keen for monitoring practices so they are more likely to be 
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active in appointment decisions. Also, in the case of IPOs, venture capitalists, who are 
likely to acquire shares well before the IPO, are prone to be active monitors. An active 
shareholder, either as a regular blockholder or as a venture capitalist, will be playing a 
role in board structuring. Therefore, blockholders who acquire shares after the IPO will 
be likely to appoint their own directors to the board. As a previous study suggests, the 
"greater the proportion of affiliated board members, the easier it is for an entrenched 
controlling shareholder to pursue its objectives" (Yeh, Shu & Guo, 2008:147). 
Considering a blockholder as an owner of five percent or more controlling shares in a 
firm (Kroll et al., 1997), their presence should be associated with a higher rate of change 
in board structure. The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3: Blockholder ownership structure changes following the IPO process of young 
entrepreneurial firms will lead to a higher rate of change in board membership 
over the subsequent five-year period. 
In addition to the direct relationships between blockholder ownership structure 
changes and higher rates of change in TMT and board membership, an indirect 
relationship between blockholder ownership and TMT change may also exist. If a board 
is a reflection of the owners and is expected to serve the owner's interests (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983), then one may expect new directors, appointed by the new owners, to 
request changes in TMT composition. In other words, the higher rate of change in TMT 
composition associated with ownership structure change may be the result of changes in 
the board. 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) document the connection between the power of 
the board and its potential impact on corporate governance issues. Boards are legally 
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empowered to act on behalf of the owners (Finkelstein, 1992). Directors have the power 
to hire, fire, and promote executives (Mace, 1971). Shivdasani and Yermack (1999:1829) 
observe: "Directors are voted into office by stockholders and have a fiduciary 
responsibility to protect stockholders' interests. Along with their legal duties of reviewing 
the corporation's major plans and actions, directors are charged with selecting, 
compensating, evaluating, and, when appropriate, dismissing top managers." This means 
that, not only will the new directors look after the interests of the blockholder owners, but 
they will also perform the hiring and firing of new executives based on the new owners' 
expectations. In the case of IPOs, I discussed earlier about the new blockholders and their 
association with higher rates of change in TMT composition and board structure. Beyond 
that, new blockholders', instead of directly dealing with the appointment of executives, 
may also ask the newly appointed directors to initiate change for them. It may be 
reasonable to expect changes in TMT composition following the changes in board 
structure. Based on this discussion, the following hypothesis is formed as complementary 
to Hypotheses 2: 
H4: Higher rates of change in board composition of young entrepreneurial firms 
will be associated with a higher rate of change in TMT membership over the 
subsequent five-year period. 
To this point, nothing has been mentioned regarding what happens to performance 
following the changes in corporate governance mechanisms. The next set of hypotheses 
deals with this issue. Obviously, management researchers, in general, aim to address the 
question "what is the outcome" of the strategic management process. In the case of for-
profit organizations, the ultimate goal of a firm is to enhance the value of its 
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shareholders' investment. For entrepreneurial firms which just recently underwent an IPO 
the goal is no different. However the uniqueness, as already discussed, is important. The 
applicability of popular theories like agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and 
resource-based view (Barney, 1991) in the young entrepreneurial context must next be 
reviewed. 
Over the years, researchers in different fields have focused on the stock market 
performance of the IPO companies (Brennan & Franks, 1997; Mikkelson et al., 1997, 
Pham, Kalev & Steen, 2003). This is probably due to the popular belief that most IPO 
firms fail within the first few years following the IPO (Ritter, 1991; Loughran & Ritter, 
1995). Instead of paying attention to the long run operating performance of young IPO 
firms, researchers tend to concentrate more on the short run stock performance (Ritter & 
Welch, 2002). Recently, some researchers considered two-year holding period returns as 
a measure of post-IPO performance (Kroll et al., 2007, Walters et al., 2010). Other 
researchers highlight the need for considering longer periods to assess post-IPO 
performance (Fisher & Pollock, 2004). So far, it has been proposed that, due to certain 
signaling mechanisms during the IPO stage, new owners will be attracted to the young 
entrepreneurial firms. Once they acquire controlling shares, directly or indirectly, they are 
likely to request changes in corporate governance systems (e.g. changes in TMT 
compositions and board structures). What happens afterwards is the focus of next set of 
hypothesis. 
First of all, what happens when the original TMT is changed? Recalling the 
resource-based view may be helpful in answering this question. As Barney (1991) 
observes, firms need valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable resources to gain a 
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sustainable competitive advantage. One type of resource is obviously the firm's 
executives (Berman, Down & Hill, 2002). Particularly in the case of young 
entrepreneurial firms, executives with extensive knowledge of, and experience with the 
firm are definitely a potential source of competitive advantage (Kor, 2003). In fact, these 
executives are the ones who brought the firm to the IPO stage. In smaller firms, 
companies rely heavily on the knowledge base available within the boundaries of the 
organization. Once a new owner asks for changes in the TMT composition, some of these 
knowledgeable executives will probably be asked to step down while others, who are 
appointed by the new blockholders, either directly or indirectly, will take their places. 
This dissertation proposes that, by doing so, firms lose a significant source of competitive 
advantage. This should result in lower operating performance in the five-year period 
following the IPO. Fisher and Pollock (2004) argue that post-IPO success is enhanced 
with more cohesive management teams. Kroll et al. (2007) found strong evidence of 
enhanced post-IPO performance with original executives in place. According to that 
study, the contentions of agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) may not be the 
answer for young entrepreneurial firms. Jain and Kini (1994) report that post-IPO 
performance will suffer less if the portion of control retained by the original executives is 
greater. Original TMT members, with their long-term tenure with the company and their 
contribution to the entrepreneurial efficacy of it, possess valuable tacit knowledge and a 
commonly shared vision (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990, Kor, 2003). Therefore, the 
performance of these firms should suffer once the TMT membership rate of change 
accelerates. Based on this discussion, the following hypothesis is formed: 
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Hs: Higher rates of change in TMT membership of young entrepreneurial firms 
will be associated with lower operating performance over the subsequent five-
year period. 
Obviously, not only may changes in TMT composition have a detrimental effect 
on post-IPO performance, but other organizational leadership, such as the directors 
(Certo et al., 2007), should also be considered. Referring to the resource based view 
(Barney, 1991) once again, directors, just like executives, constitute an important 
resource for a company (Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003). The benefits may be in 
different forms for different types of directors. According to Hillman, Cannella and 
Paetzold (2000), outside directors can be classified as business experts, who are ex-senior 
executives and directors of other firms, support specialists, who unlike business experts 
lack general management experience but possess expertise in an important area such as 
law, and community influentials, who happen to have connections to the outside world 
(e.g., politicians). Although the differences among these three types of directors are 
beyond the scope of the study, it is proposed that any of them who are appointed by the 
new blockholders will be likely to have an impact on the firm's performance. 
Beatty and Zajac (1994) observed that, the traditional board independence 
recommendation of agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) is not as important in the 
IPO context. The importance of keeping the original executives in place for younger 
firms has already been discussed. The same logic also applies to directors. In fact, if the 
tacit knowledge and shared vision of the executives is a source of competitive advantage 
(Kor, 2003), then the board that historically facilitated this connection through 
appropriate monitoring and involvement in the strategic decision making process, is just 
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as important a source of competitive advantage. Researchers already consider directors to 
be a reflection of the owners (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The same researchers also suggest 
that, in smaller firms, for better performance, strategic decision making needs to be 
retained by the same individuals (Fama & Jensen, 1983, Walters et al., 2010). The 
dominant coalition in a firm, which is composed of the strategic leaders (Certo et al. 
2007), is likely to take the firm further with a shared vision (Nelson, 2003). In the 
context of young entrepreneurial firms that just underwent an IPO, the new owners, who 
are inexperienced with the focal firm and who acquired shares because of the positive 
signals they perceived following the IPO, can see less clearly what needs to be done. 
Kroll et al. (2007) not only recommend that the original executives stay in place, but also 
prescribe a board that is primarily composed of them. As agency problems are less acute 
in younger and smaller firms (Walters et al., 2010), a more cohesive TMT and Board of 
Directors may be needed for better performance. In that regard, a similar relationship is 
likely to be observed between board composition and firm performance as observed 
between TMT membership and firm performance within the five years following the 
IPO. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H6: Higher rates of change in board membership of young entrepreneurial firms 
will be associated with lower operating performance over the subsequent five-
year period. 
One of the fundamental contributions of the study of strategic management is an 
emphasis on the need to adapt to the environment. As Duncan (1972) defines it, the 
environment is the totality of physical and social factors that are taken directly into 
consideration in the decision making behavior of the individuals in organizations. Duncan 
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(1972) also makes a distinction between the internal environment, which is composed of 
physical and social factors within the boundaries of an organization, and the external 
environment, which is composed of social and physical factors outside the boundaries of 
an organization. As the external environment is outside the boundaries of the 
organization, it is almost impossible for a firm to control it but to deal with it by creating 
some internal mechanisms (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). In the case of a young 
entrepreneurial firm that just underwent an IPO, those internal mechanisms may be the 
entrepreneurial efficacy of the original TMTs and directors. 
Dess and Beard (1984) specify three dimensions of the environment that are 
important for its assessment. These are munificence, which is the capacity of the market 
to support sustained growth, dynamism, which is the stability-instability of the market, 
and complexity, which is the heterogeneity of the environmental variables the market 
players have to cope with. Over the years, researchers have investigated the 
environment's impact on structure (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Norburn & Birley, 1988; 
Karaevli, 2007), strategy (Miller, 1988; Gilley & Rasheed, 2000) and decision-making 
processes (Frederickson & Mitchell, 1984; Priem et al., 1995; Baum & Wally, 2003; 
Grag et al., 2003). The environment is one of the most important contingency variables 
with which a firm has to contend (Tosi & Slocum, 1984, Goll & Rasheed, 2004). This 
part of my study, explains why the different dimensions of environment as mentioned by 
Dess and Beard (1984) are likely to moderate the relationships between a higher rate of 
change in TMT composition and board structure and subsequent firm performance. 
Dynamism refers to the stability of the environment the firm operates in. If 
changes are taking place rapidly in the environment, strategic decision making is harder 
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due to increased uncertainty (Dess & Beard, 1984). In turbulent environments, executives 
are required to deal with constant change (Galbraith, 1973; Wholey & Brittain, 1989). 
Once things become uncertain, it is harder for decision makers to effectively plan 
(Aldrich, 1979). Managers operating in such environments are expected to implement 
broader ranges of strategic options (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Karaevli, 2007). 
Akgun, Keskin and Byrne (2007) show that emotional capability in innovative firms, 
which may be a proxy for entrepreneurial efficacy in younger firms, is positively related 
to firm performance and dynamism moderates this relationship such that the relationship 
gets stronger under dynamic conditions. In parallel, the entrepreneurship literature shows 
the moderating effect of dynamic environments on the relationship between 
entrepreneurial orientation and firm performance (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005). As 
previously mentioned, executives of younger firms have limited resources and, as a 
natural result of that, they have limited strategic options (Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). So, 
if the environment is dynamic, given the limited resources, it becomes even harder for 
executives to perform their strategic decision making duties. Not surprisingly, researchers 
have empirically demonstrated a negative relationship between firm performance and 
dynamism (Bantel, 1998). In a more recent study, Ahmad, Ramayah, Wilson and 
Kummerov (2010) investigate whether environmental stability moderates the positive 
relationship between entrepreneurial competency and firm performance of small to 
medium enterprises (SMEs). Entrepreneurial competency is defined as "underlying 
characteristics such as generic specific knowledge, motives, traits, self-images, social 
roles, and skills which result in venture birth, survival, and/or growth" (Bird, 1995:51). 
Ahmad and his colleagues found that entrepreneurial competencies are positively related 
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with firm performances of SMEs located in Malaysia, and under dynamic environmental 
conditions, entrepreneurs minimize the negative effects of this dynamism so the 
relationship between entrepreneurial competencies, which is similar to entrepreneurial 
efficacy in young entrepreneurial firms, and firm performance gets even stronger. In the 
case of younger firms, which face the vulnerabilities of liability of newness 
(Stinchcombe, 1965), unstable environments may require the presence entrepreneurial 
efficacy inherent with the original owners. If researchers have already considered the 
importance of TMT routines with regard to performance and environment relationships 
(Bourgeois, 1980, March, 1991; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993), then it is logical to expect a 
moderating impact of environmental dynamism on the relationship between the TMT 
structure and firm performance. Within the context of this study, it is proposed that 
dynamism will determine how detrimental the changes in the TMT structure will be on 
firm performance. Therefore, the following hypothesis is constructed: 
H7: The relationship between the rate of change in TMT membership and 
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental dynamism, such that 
the more dynamic the environment, the more detrimental the effects of a higher 
rate of change in TMT membership are on operating performance. 
The same logic also applies to the complexity dimension of the environment. First 
of all, complexity refers to the presence of heterogeneity in the environmental variables 
(Child, 1972, Duncan, 1972). According to Dess and Beard (1984), once the environment 
becomes more complex, it becomes harder for executives to perform their environmental 
scanning duties and to acquire resources from beyond the borders of the organization. 
Under complex conditions, firms have to cope with more inputs and outputs available in 
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the environment (Dess & Beard, 1984; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993) which also increases 
the need for well-structured strategies (Aldrich, 1979). For instance, Boyd (1995) 
recommends the practice of CEO duality in highly complex environments, although a 
long-term debate is ongoing among academicians about how effective duality is under 
normal conditions (Desai, Kroll & Wright, 2003). Covin and Slevin (1989) argue that, 
under hostile environmental conditions, which is the case in complex environments, firm 
performance is positively related with strategic postures. "Strategic posture can be 
broadly defined as a firm's overall competitive orientation. A firm's entrepreneurial-
conservation orientation is indicative of its strategic posture" (Covin & Slevin, 1989:77). 
As discussed previously, a young small firm that just completed the IPO process is in 
need of greater inputs from the original founder entrepreneurs. Just like the pre-IPO 
success of the firm, the post-IPO success of the firm relies on how well they maintain 
their entrepreneurial efficacy. Thus, just like dynamism, environmental complexity 
should also behave as an interaction term on the relationship between the rate of change 
in TMT structure and firm performance. In fact, there is empirical evidence suggesting 
that environmental complexity moderates the relationship between strategy and firm 
performance (McArthur & Nystrom, 1991). Assuming that the level of complexity 
inherent in the environment remained constant from the pre- to post-IPO period, if the 
previous strategies of the smaller firm, enacted by original TMTs taking environmental 
complexity into consideration, were not working, it probably would not have been able to 
make it to the IPO stage. Once it completes the IPO, the small firm still needs the tacit 
knowledge provided by the original executives. For that reason, the following hypothesis 
is proposed: 
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Hs: The relationship between the rate of change in TMT membership and 
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental complexity, such 
that the more complex the environment, the more detrimental the effects of higher 
rates of change in the TMT membership on operating performance. 
The final dimension Dess and Beard (1984) mention is munificence. 
Environmental munificence refers to the environment's ability to support sustained 
growth (Aldrich, 1979; Dess & Beard, 1984; Goll & Rasheed, 1997). "Munificent 
environments support growth of resources within firms, providing a reserve against 
competitive and environmental threats" (Baum & Wally, 2003:1110). Casrogiovanni 
(1991:542) describes the lack or presence of munificence as "the scarceness or abundance 
of critical resources needed by (one or more) firms operating within an environment." 
Researchers acknowledge the fact that younger firms suffer from a lack of critical 
resources (Zahra & Filatotchev, 1994). Operating under less munificent conditions makes 
it even harder for such firms to function. In that case, the knowledge base provided by the 
original executives becomes more critical to deal with external conditions. Once the 
original structure is altered by the new owners, it is likely that the new executives will 
diminish the firm's capacity to deal with the lack of munificence. That means 
performance is likely to suffer. Goll and Rasheed (1997) find that rational decision 
making is associated more strongly with performance under highly munificent 
environments. Covin and Slevin (1989) associate munificence with benign environments 
and propose that a conservative strategic posture (in contrast with an entrepreneurial 
strategic posture) is needed for better performance under these conditions. 
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In addition to their findings about complexity, McArthur and Nystrom (1991) also 
demonstrate environmental munificence's moderating effect on the relationship between 
strategy and firm performance. In munificent environments, executives can use more 
discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987, Walters et al., 2010). In the case of young 
entrepreneurial firms, more discretion is needed because the importance of making the 
"right choice" is heightened (Slevin & Covin, 1997) due to the limited availability of 
resources (Baum & Wally, 2003). Furthermore, it has been empirically found that 
munificence has a direct effect on firm performance (Bantel, 1998). Based on this 
discussion, environmental munificence may be expected to have a moderating effect on 
the relationship between rate of change in TMT membership and firm performance. The 
following hypothesis is constructed based on this expectation: 
H9: The relationship between the rate of change in TMT membership and 
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental munificence, such 
that the less munificent the environment, the more detrimental the effects of a 
higher rate of change in the TMT membership will be on operating performance. 
Referring to the initial model regarding the series of relationships, as depicted in 
Figure 1.1, the environment will not only have a moderating effect on the TMT structure 
and firm performance relationship, but one may also expect it to influence the 
relationship between board composition and firm performance. Environmental 
uncertainty is known to moderate the relationship between board composition and firm 
performance (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). It may not be necessary to repeat the theoretical 
background regarding the board composition and firm performance relationship. As a 
snapshot, researchers acknowledge the fact that the board of directors is one of the 
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primary determinants of a firm's performance (Daily & Dalton, 1992). It has also been 
proposed that directors are reflections of the owners (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Boards can 
provide the executives with new business concepts (Zahra & Pearce, 1989) and expertise 
(Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Furthermore, some researchers also propose that, in 
smaller firms, it is better to retain the strategic decision making in the same individuals as 
the dominant coalition, which is composed of not only executives but also the directors 
(Certo et al., 2007), is more likely to positively affect firm performance if there is a 
shared vision (Nelson, 2003; Walters et al., 2010). In summary, firms operating in 
dynamic, complex and less munificent environments will need more input from their 
directors. The question is, do the new directors appointed by the new owners help to 
mitigate the agency problems as proposed by agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
or does reconfiguring the original board yield lower performance in the case of young 
entrepreneurial firms (Kroll et al., 2007)? Based on the underlying theme of this study, 
the following hypotheses are tested to answer this question: 
HJO: The relationship between the rate of change in board membership and 
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental dynamism, such that 
the more dynamic the environment, the more detrimental the effects of higher 
rates of change in board composition on operating performance. 
Hn: The relationship between the rate of change in board membership and 
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental complexity, such 
that the more complex the environment, the more detrimental the effects of higher 
rates of change in board composition on operating performance. 
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H12: The relationship between the rate of change in board membership and 
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental munificence, such 
that the less munificent the environment, the more detrimental the effects of 
higher rates of change in board composition on operating performance. 
The next section summarizes the plan for addressing issues with regard to 
methodology such as data sources and data collection, potential variables, statistical 
methods and sample. 
CHAPTER 3 
SAMPLE AND METHODS 
Sample 
The sample that was used in this study was constructed using the SDC Database. 
This database is used to construct samples in IPO studies (Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, 2003; 
Kim, Pukthuanthong-Le, & Walker, 2008). IPO firms that went public between 2001 and 
2005 were included in the study. The subsequent governance and accounting data was 
collected for each company which means that years 2002 to 2010 were included in the 
study (2002-2006 for companies that went public in 2001, 2003-2007 for companies that 
went public in 2002, 2004-2008 for companies that went public in 2003, 2005-2009 for 
companies that went public in 2004, 2006-2010 for companies that went public in 2005). 
The reason to choose 2001 as the initial year for this study was to avoid the potential 
impact of stock market fluctuations during 2000 (Walters et al., 2010). Also, focusing on 
multiple years is likely to reduce the effects of macroeconomic conditions of a specific 
year within the realm of my study (Nelson, 2003; Walters et al., 2010). Founding year of 
the company was also taken into account. As previously mentioned, the focus in this 
study was on young entreprenurial firms. Based on the literature, a firm is considered 
young if it is founded within the previous ten-year period (Kroll et al., 2007). In that 
regard, IPO firms that were founded in year 1991 and forward were included in this 
study. By using this restriction, it is assumed that all the firms included in this study were 
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still in their young entreprenurial phases (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Carpenter et 
al., 2003). Financial sector companies, real estate funds and energy companies were 
eliminated as the legal requirements for such firms are different than other types of firms 
(Schnatterly, 2003). 
The search on SDC database revealed that between Jan 1st 2001 and Dec 31st 
2005, there were 320 IPO firms that were founded within the previous ten-year period. 
From that list, commercial banks, mutual funds, investment funds, credit agencies, real 
estate funds and energy companies were eliminated. Companies that were part of parent 
organizations, which were founded more than 10 years ago were also eliminated from the 
sample. The final sample consisted of 185 young entrepreneurial firms. 
Prospectus information that contained governance and performance data were 
gathered from the SEC's Edgar database which is a popular source in IPO studies (Kroll 
et al., 2007). The other data source that was used to determine IPO and subsequent stock 
prices was the CRSP database. Accounting data was gathered from Research Insight and 
Disclosers databases. These databases were also used to collect the environmental data. 
In case there were any missing data, company websites were used as secondary data 
sources. Corporate governance information was accessed through annual reports 
published in the SEC Edgar Database and company websites. 
Analytical Analysis 
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
Firm Performance: A key dependent variable in this study was firm performance 
as the main theme of this dissertation was to assess the impact of corporate governance 
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changes following the IPO on firm performance. There are several performance variables 
used in the literature. One group of researchers adopt stock-market-based performance 
view (Zhang & Wiersema, 2009) and use variables tied to the stock performances of 
companies, like holding period returns or stock price growth, while others decide to use 
accounting-based measures (Morgan, Vorhies & Mason, 2009) such as return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE) or return on sales (ROS). In this study, both types of 
measures were used to measure firm performance. First, Tobin's Q was adopted as a 
market-based performance measure following other corporate governance-performance 
relationship based studies (Yermack, 1996; Wright et al., 2005; Orlando, Murthi & Kiran, 
2007; King & Santor, 2008; Iyengar & Zampelli, 2009). Data for estimating Tobin's Q 
was collected from Compustat Research Insight Database. The calculation method 
adopted in this study is consistent with the method developed by Chung and Pruitt 
(1994). The formula is as follows: 
Tobin 'sQ = (MV + PS + Debt) / TA. 
MV refers to the total market value and is calculated by the product of a firm's 
share price and the number of shares outstanding. PS (if applicable) is the value of the 
preferred stock outstanding. Debt is the value of the firm's long-term debt and current 
liabilities minus the current assets. Finally, TA is the book value of the total assets. This 
estimation of Tobin's Q has been used in previous studies (Yermack, 1996; Wright et al., 
1996; Wright et al., 2005). 
The accounting-based performance measure adopted in this study was return on 
assets (ROA). ROA was calculated as net income divided by total assets. Rate of change 
in blockholder ownership, rate of change in board membership and new executive 
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appointees were also be used as dependent variables. Further information about them will 
be provided in the next section. 
Independent Variables 
Underpricing: Several variables have been used in finance literature to predict 
IPO performance. This study chose to employ underpricing as the primary determinant 
variable. 
Underpricing is defined as the difference between a firm's IPO issue price and its 
first day closing price (Arthurs et al., 2008). The first day return, which was reported in 
CRSP database, was used as a proxy for underpricing. If this variable's value is positive 
then the IPO is successful from the company's standpoint in that investors initially paid 
more money than the company is worth. If the situation is reversed it means the first day 
closing price is higher than the initial offer price, so the company's shares were offered 
at a price less than the market's imputed value of the firm, and the management has left 
money on the table. When this happens, based on the arguments offered earlier, 
subsequent changes are expected in ownership structure and corporate governance 
mechanisms. 
Rate of change in blockholder ownership: Blockholders are shareholders with five 
percent or more of the firm's outstanding shares (Kroll et al., 1997). The way the rate of 
change in blockholder ownership is operationalized is somewhat unique, but I believe is 
consistent with the main theme of this study. First the number of blockholders at period t 
is determined. Then, the number of blockholders at period t+ 1 is determined. In the next 
step, the number of new blockholders emerged at period /+1 is identified. Finally, the 
number of blockholders at /+1 is deducted from the summation of the number of 
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blockholders at / and the number of new blockholders at t+l and then this value is 
divided by the number of blockholders at t. The mathematical representation is as 
follows: 
Rate of change in blockholders
 t+\ = (number of blockholder st + number of new 
blockholder s,+\ -number of blockholders
 t+\)/number of blockholders t 
By adopting this operationalization method, I considered replacement of original 
owners with new ones to be detrimental for the fims rather than the new owners securing 
controlling shares while the original owners are still in place. 
TMT Membership: TMT membership is determined by looking at the prospectus 
and proxy statements. If a person is listed in the top executive's list on the corresponding 
document than he or she is considered a member of the top management team (Cohen & 
Dean, 2005). These data was collected for the IPO date and the five years following the 
IPO date. The rate of change methodology mentioned above could not be used to 
calculate the rate of change in TMT since the data about executives reported in annual 
proxy statements is not as reliable as it is for the members of the boards of directors. In 
the next chapter, this is situation is demonstrated through an example. Instead of the rate 
of change variable, I used the number of new executive appointees as a proxy for changes 
in TMT. 
Rate of change in board membership: Board membership is determined by 
looking at the prospectus and proxy statements as well. If the person is listed as a director 
then he or she is considered a member of the board. As with TMT membership, these 
data was collected for the IPO date and the five years following the IPO date. The way 
the rate of change variable is operationalized is very similar to the methodology adopted 
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for calculating the rate of change in ownership structure. This time, number of directors 
at period t+l is determined. In the second step, the number of new directors at period t+2 
and the number of directors at t+2 are identified. The number of directors at t+2 is 
deducted from the summation of the number of directors at t+l and the new number of 
directors at t+l. The result is divided into number of directors at t+l to calculate the rate 
of change. The mathematical representation is as follows: 
Rate of change in directors
 t+2 = (number of directors t+\ + number of new directorst+2-
number of directors,+2)/number ofdirectorst+\ 
It should be noted, once the original directors are replaced by new directors, I 
believe the entrepreneurial efficacy is diminished. The above method of calculating rate 
of change accounts for that situation and is also consistent with the general theme of this 
study. 
Moderating Variables 
Various dimensions of the external environment are moderating variables in this 
study, as in earlier related studies (Walters et al., 2010). As mentioned before, according 
to Dess and Beard (1984) there are three dimensions of environment. These are 
munificence, dynamism and complexity. Several methods have been used in the literature 
to calculate these three variables (Walters et al., 2010). In this study, I chose to adopt the 
methods used by Palmer and Wiesman (1999) to calculate the environmental complexity 
variable. It is calculated by dividing the aggregate sales of the four largest firms in each 
corresponding industry by the total sales of that industry where the industry is identified 
by the three-digit SIC code. Industry concentration was used to account for 
environmental dynamism. This variable was calculated by dividing the aggregate of the 
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sales figures reported for the four largest companies in an industry divided by the 
aggregate sales of the industry from the prior two year period where industry is 
determined by the four-digit SIC codes (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Finally, 
environmental munificence was calculated by the average industry sales growth rate 
during the five-year period where industry was once again determined by the four-digit 
SIC codes (Wiersman & Bantel, 1993; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). All of the sales 
values were gathered from the Compustat database. 
Control Variables 
Several control variables were included in this study. As investors may perceive 
less risk associated with IPOs underwritten by prestigious underwriters (Carter, Frederick 
& Singh, 1998) underwriter reputation is likely to affect IPO returns (Beatty & Ritter, 
1986; Bruton et al., 2010). Carter et al. (1998) analyzed several measures of underwriter 
reputation and concluded that all of them are correlated with IPO performance. Two 
primary measures Carter and his colleagues specify are: the CM measure developed by 
Carter and Manaster (1990), and the MW measure developed by Megginson and Weiss 
(1991). This study adopted the CM measure, which uses the relative position of an 
underwriter with the highest rating of nine. This data was readily available online at 
Professor Jay Ritter's web-site (bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm). 
Demographic variables are known to impact firm performance (Cohen & Dean, 
2005; Higgins & Gulati, 2006). For instance, researchers showed that demographic 
variables like TMT and director age can determine the risk propensity of those 
individuals (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). In addition, education is shown to be positively 
related with innovation capabilities of a firm (Bantel & Jackson, 1989), and industry 
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experience is found to be positively related with organizational growth (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990). All these variables were used as control variables in the below 
mentioned models. The size of a firm is also likely to be a determinant factor of firm 
performance and corporate governance practices (Dorata & Petra, 2008). Thus, firm size, 
measured by the natural log of sales, was used as a control variable as it has been 
included in previous studies (Miller, 1991; Carpenter, 2002). In order to account for 
prior firm performance on IPO performance (Walters et al., 2010), return to shareholders 
and return on assets were used as proxy variables (McDonald, Khanna & Westphal, 
2008). Venture capitalist presence is known to lower initial returns of an IPO and 
subsequent firm performance (Meggison & Weiss, 1991) and also likely to serve as a 
signaling mechanism for publicly traded companies (Sanders & Boivie, 2004) so a 
dummy variable was used to account for venture capitalist presence at the time of the 
IPO. Number of executives and directors were used to account for possible effects for 
TMT and board size on firm performance (Liu, Atinc & Kroll, 2011). Findings about 
duality are inconsistent and the debate is going on for some time (Desai et al., 2003). 
Some scholars found duality to be beneficial for firm performance (Davis, Shurman & 
Donaldson, 1997; Braun & Sharma, 2007) while others recommend the separation of 
chairman and chief executive positions (Rechner & Dalton, 1991). In this study, duality is 
controlled for and operationalized with a dummy variable. Although my sample is 
composed of primarily American-based firms, there are also some foreign-based IPOs. In 
order to account for possible effects of firm nationality (Bruner, Chaplinsky & 
Ramchand, 2004), a dummy variable is used as a control variable. Finally, founder 
effects on IPO performance and subsequent firm performance have been shown to be 
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positive in previous studies (Brennan & Franks, 1997; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). In 
this study, presence of founder as a blockholder at the time of the IPO and as either as a 
chairman or as a CEO during the post-IPO stage are used as control variables in various 
models mentioned below. 
Methods 
The statistical methods to be used in this study are hierarchical linear regression 
and ANOVA. Several different regression models were developed to test the previously 
mentioned hypotheses. Below are these models: 
Rate of change blockholder ownership^ i)= Po + P]Underpricing(f) + P2Firm Size + PsFirm 
Nationality + P/fVenture capitalists presence + PsFounder Presence + PeUnderwriter 
prestige 
(Expected sign of Pi is + with statistical significance), 
Number of new executive appointeeS(,+2) = Po + PiRate of change in blockholder 
ownership(,+i) + P2Firm Size + PsFirm Nationality + P4Duality + PsFirm performance + 
P6TMT size (Expected sign of PJ is + with statistical significance), 
Rate of change in board membership^) = Po + PiRate of change in blockholder 
ownership^]) + P2Firm Size + P3Firm Nationality + P4Duality + PsFirm performance + 
PeBoard size 
(Expected sign of Pi is + with statistical significance), 
Number of new executive appointees(,+3) = Po + PiRate of change in board of directors^) 
+ P2Firm Size + PsFirm Nationality + P4Duality + PsFirm performance 
(Expected sign of pi is + with statistical significance), 
Tobin's Q(,+3) = Po + PiNumber of new executive appointeeS(/+2)+ P2 Number of new 
executive appointees
 (/+2) X dynamism(,+2) + P3 Number of new executive appointees (,+2) 
X complexity^) + P4 Number of new executive appointees (,+2) X Munificence
 (/+2) + 
PsFirm Size + P6Firm Nationality + PyDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of 
executives with prior industry experience + pioAverage age of executives + PnExecutives 
with advanced graduate degrees + PsFounder as the CEO 
(Expected signs of Pi, P2 and P3 are + and P4 is - with statistical significance), 
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R0A(,+3) = Po + PiNumber of new executive appointeeS(,+2)+ P2 Number of new executive 
appointees (,+2) X dynamism^) + P3 Number of new executive appointees (,+2) X 
complexity^) + P4 Number of new executive appointees (/+2) X Munificence (/+2) + 
PsFirm Size + PeFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of 
executives with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of executives + PnExecutives 
with advanced graduate degrees + PsFounder as the CEO 
(Expected signs of Pi, P2 and p3 are + and P4 is - with statistical significance), 
Tobin's Q(/+3) = Po + PjRate of change in board of directorS(,+2)+ P2Rate of change in 
board of directors^) X dynamism^) + P3 Rate of change in board of directors^) X 
complexity^) + P4 Rate of change in board of directors^) X Munificence (,+2) + 
PsFirm Size + PeFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of 
directors with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of directors + PnDirectors with 
advanced graduate degrees + PsFounder as the chairman 
(Expected signs of Pi, P2 and P3 are + and P4 is - with statistical significance), 
ROA(,+3) = Po + PiRate of change in board of directorS(/+2)+ P2Rate of change in board of 
directors(/+2) X dynamism^) + P3 Rate of change in board of directorS(/+2) X 
complexity^) + P4 Rate of change in board of directorS(,+2) X Munificence (,+2) + 
PsFirm Size + PsFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of 
directors with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of directors + PnDirectors with 
advanced graduate degrees + PsFounder as the chairman 
(Expected signs of Pi, P2 and P3 are + and P4 is - with statistical significance), 
Tobin's Q<y+4) = Po + PiNumber of new executive appointeeS(,+3)+ P2 Number of new 
executive appointees (,+3) X dynamism^) + P3 Number of new executive appointees (,+3) 
X complexity^) + P4 Number of new executive appointees (,+3) X Munificence (,+3) + 
PsFirm Size + PsFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of 
executives with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of executives + Pi (Executives 
with advanced graduate degrees + PsFounder as the CEO, 
ROA(,+4) = Po + PiNumber of new executive appointees(,+3)+ P2 Number of new executive 
appointees (,+3) X dynamism^+3) + P3 Number of new executive appointees (,+3) X 
complexity^) + P4 Number of new executive appointees (,+3) X Munificence
 (,+3) + 
PsFirm Size + PsFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of 
executives with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of executives + PnExecutives 
with advanced graduate degrees + PsFounder as the CEO, 
Tobin's Q(/+s) = Po + PiNumber of new executive appointeeS(/+4)+ P2 Number of new 
executive appointees (,+4) X dynamism(,+4) + P3 Number of new executive appointees (,+4) 
X complexity^) + P4 Number of new executive appointees
 (,+4) X Munificence (/+4) + 
PsFirm Size + PgFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of 
executives with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of executives + PnExecutives 
with advanced graduate degrees + p^Founder as the CEO 
(Expected signs of Pi, P2 and P3 are + and P4 is - with statistical significance), 
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ROA(,+5) = Po + PiNumber of new executive appointeeS(,+4)+ P2 Number of new executive 
appointees (,+4) X dynamism^) + P3 Number of new executive appointees (,+4) X 
complexity^) + P4 Number of new executive appointees (,+4) X Munificence (,+4) + 
PsFirm Size + PsFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of 
executives with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of executives + PnExecutives 
with advanced graduate degrees + P^Founder as the CEO 
(Expected signs of Pi, P2 and P3 are + and P4 is - with statistical significance), 
Tobin's Q0+4) = Po + PiRate of change in board of directors(,+3)+ P2Rate of change in 
board of directorS(/+3) X dynamism^) + P3 Rate of change in board of directors^) X 
complexity^) + P4 Rate of change in board of directors^) X Munificence (,+3) + 
PsFirm Size + psFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of 
directors with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of directors + PnDirectors with 
advanced graduate degrees + P^Founder as the chairman, 
ROA(,+4) = Po + PiRate of change in board of directors(,+3)+ P2Rate of change in board of 
directors(,+3) X dynamism^) + P3 Rate of change in board of directors^) X 
complexity^) + P4 Rate of change in board of directorS(,+3) X Munificence (,+3) + 
psFirm Size + PsFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + p9Percentage of 
directors with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of directors + PnDirectors with 
advanced graduate degrees + P^Founder as the chairman, 
Tobin's Q0+5) = Po + PiRate of change in board of directors(,+4)+ P2Rate of change in 
board of directorS(<+4) X dynamism^) + P3 Rate of change in board of directors^) X 
complexityo+4) + P4 Rate of change in board of directors(,+4) X Munificence (,+4) + 
PsFirm Size + PsFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of 
directors with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of directors + PnDirectors with 
advanced graduate degrees + P^Founder as the chairman, and 
ROA(,+5) = Po + PiRate of change in board of directors(,+4)+ p2Rate of change in board of 
directors(/+4) X dynamism^) + P3 Rate of change in board of directors^) X 
complexity^) + P4 Rate of change in board of directorS(*+4) X Munificence (,+4) + 
PsFirm Size + PsFirm Nationality + PvDuality + PsFirm performance + PgPercentage of 
directors with prior industry experience + PioAverage age of directors + PnDirectors with 
advanced graduate degrees + P ^ Founder as the chairman. 
CHAPTER 4 
PRESENTATION OF DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter reports the results of the empirical analysis. In the first section, the 
descriptive statistics and correlations are reported together with information about the 
sample. In the second part, results of several statistical procedures are presented for 
hypotheses testing. 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation 
Before getting into the details of the descriptive statistics, it may be useful to 
provide some information about the sample. Table 4.1 is presented for this purpose. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, using the SDC Database, firms that went public in 2001-2005 
were identified. Among those firms, only the ones that were founded within the 10-year 
period prior to the IPO date were chosen as previous researchers had done (Kroll et al., 
2007). Among the 320 companies that were identified, commercial banks, mutual funds, 
investment banks, investment funds, credit agencies, real estate funds, and energy 
companies are eliminated as they are faced with unusual legal requirements of going 
public owing to their operational and/or regulatory uniqueness (Schnatterly, 2003). The 
companies that were part of parent organizations, which were founded more than 10 
years ago, were also eliminated. 
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Table 4.1 About the Sample 
71 
Variable 
IPO Year 
Nationality 
Frequency 
Venture Capitalist 
Presence 
Founder Presence 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
American 
Foreign 
Percentage of outside directors 
Percentage of 
shares owned by 
executives and 
directors 
First day Return 
(underpricing) 
Board Size IPO 
TMT Size IPO 
First 
Year 
Acquired 3 
Merged 0 
Delisted 0 
Total 3 
IPO 
First Year 
Second 
Year 
Third Year 
Fourth 
Year 
Fifth Year 
Minimum 
0.000 
0.160 
1.200 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
-22.670 
2.000 
2.000 
Second Third Fourth 
Year Year Year 
3 8 7 
5 4 8 
1 2 8 
9 14 23 
23 
15 
17 
81 
49 
185 
39 
126 
76 
Maximum 
100.000 
90.070 
88.900 
89.300 
87.900 
92.400 
92.600 
85.670 
14.000 
17.000 
Fifth 
Year 
5 
6 
3 
14 
Total 
26 
23 
14 
63 
Percent 
12.4 
8.1 
9.2 
43.8 
26.5 
83.8 
16.2 
70 
41.1 
Mean 
74.030 
40.170 
33.750 
26.680 
21.420 
19.200 
16.130 
1.920 
7.220 
6.160 
Percentage 
14.1 
12.4 
7.6 
34.1 
Table 4.1 (Continued) 
SIC CODE 
2020 
2329 
2800 
2834 
2835 
2836 
2869 
3272 
3480 
357 J 
3572 
3577 
3589 
3646 
3651 
3661 
3672 
3674 
3690 
3714 
3812 
3841 
3842 
3843 
3845 
3955 
3990 
4213 
4400 
4412 
4512 
4813 
4822 
4833 
4899 
5015 
Frequency 
1 
1 
1 
26 
2 
4 
2 
18 
11 
4 
6 
Percent 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
14.1 
1.1 
2.2 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
1.1 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
1.6 
0.5 
9.7 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
5.9 
0.5 
0.5 
2.7 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
2.2 
0.5 
3.2 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
SIC CODE 
5031 
5047 
5065 
5140 
5511 
5712 
5812 
5944 
5947 
5961 
5984 
7011 
7200 
7311 
7319 
7320 
7361 
7370 
7371 
7372 
7373 
7374 
7375 
7379 
7380 
7381 
7389 
7812 
7990 
8011 
8062 
8082 
8200 
8731 
8734 
8742 
Frequency 
2 
2 
5 
15 
5 
4 
1 
2 
1 
1 
11 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
1 
2 
Percent 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
1.1 
1.1 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
2.7 
8.1 
2.7 
2.2 
0.5 
1.1 
0.5 
0.5 
5.9 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
1.1 
0.5 
1.6 
0.5 
1.1 
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The final sample consisted of 185 companies. 12.4 percent of the companies in 
my sample went public in 2001, while 8.1 percent in 2002, 9.2 percent in 2003, 43.8 
percent in 2004 and 26.5 percent of the sample companies went public in 2005. Among 
those companies, 155 (84 percent) were American based and 30 (16 percent) were 
foreign based. Looking at industry representation, 72 different SIC codes are represented 
with none of the industries representing more than 14.1 percent of the sample (SIC 2834-
Pharmaceautical Preparations represented 14.1 percent of the sample). 
While the time span chosen for this study is 2001-2005, a significant number of 
the companies that went public were not active for the whole five-year period (34.1 
percent). Out of the 185 companies, 26 of them were acquired (14.1 percent) by another 
company, 23 of them merged with another company (12.4) and 14 of them were delisted 
voluntarily or due to bankruptcy (7.6 percent). Out of these 63 companies, 3 companies 
(1.6 percent) in 2001, 9 companies (4.9 percent) in 2002, 14 companies (7.6 percent) in 
2003, 23 companies (12.4 percent) in 2004 and 14 companies (7.6 percent) in 2005 got 
acquired or were involved in merger or got delisted. Three companies were acquired 
within the first year while none of the companies merged with another company or got 
delisted during the first year. Although identifying the reasons behind why the firms were 
acquired, merged or delisted is beyond the scope of this study, observing this many 
companies being lost from the sample is worthy of note and warrants attention by future 
researchers of this field. 
Due to recent SEC regulations and the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 and exchange 
listing requirements, publicly traded companies are now required to have at least 50 
percent of their directors be independent outsiders (Peng, 2004). This explains why none 
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of the companies had less than 50 percent board vigilance. Surprisingly, the average 
percentage of outside directors on the board was 74 percent. Almost 70 percent of the 
companies had venture capitalist backing as shown in previous research (Bruton et al., 
2010) and 41 percent of the companies reported their founder to be a member of the 
board of directors when the firm went public. The average percentage of shares owned by 
current executives and directors declined from 40 percent at the IPO to 16 percent by the 
fifth year following the IPO. This finding is similar to previous research (Certo, 2003) 
and supports my proposal concerning changes in the ownership structure of IPO firms 
following the IPO process. The average first day returns was 1.9 percent with a low of 
22.7 percent loss and a maximum of 85 percent gain. The average board size was seven 
directors and the average TMT size was six executives which also coincides with 
previously conducted studies (Carpenter et al., 2003). I believe that all of the above 
information can be considered as support for the reliability of the data collection 
procedure. I now turn to a discussion of the descriptive statistics and correlations. 
Table 4.2 reports the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations among the 
variables included in this study. As seen from this table, there were 44 variables included 
as dependent, independent or control variables in different ANOVA or ordinary least 
square procedures. Starting with the first variable, return on first day trading, and the 
mean value is 1.9 percent. Looking at the bivariate correlations of this variable with the 
other variables, we observe that, change in ownership (/)=0.141,/?<.10), venture capitalist 
presence (p=0A5S, p<.05), rate of change in blockholder ownership at /+1 (p=0.170, 
p<.05), rate of change in board of directors at t+2 (p=0A33, p<A0) are positively related 
with underpricing. 
Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations 
\ a n a b l e Name Mean S D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Return on first day 0 01°20 0 1178b 
(underpricing) 
2 Change in"ownership i m i J ^0 27 14 i t 
(dummy) 
3 firm Sl7e 10 5679b z 17751 076 106 
4 Nationality ot the 0 8 784 o 36960 010 036 
tirm (dummy) 
5 VC presence 0 70f 10 0 4o904 158 Z 5 J 
(dummy) 
6 Founder presence 0 41081 0 49332 
7 Underwriter prestige ~i 23340 3 41448 
8 RC 111 blockholder 0 20643 0 25719 
ownership (t+l) 
9 Rate ot change in 0 19180 0 24880 l " t 175 097 114 179 113 082 187 
directors (t+2) 
10 Duality 0 44809 0 4986o 080 00^ 0o2 - 106 028 176 - 013 068 - 063 
073 
092 
170 
027 
102 
778 
169 
113 
066 
061 
193 
130 
080 
z54 
- 108 
506 
zl9 
 
- z24 
023 
086 
324 
155 
100 
121 
047 
004 
085 
249 
- 058 
 
062 
z02 
11 ROA t+l -17 0z340 10 30681 047 - 015  -  -    088 - 014 041 
12 Numbcrof ^ 3 j519 1 72556 025 015      029 125t 135t 032 
Directors t+l 
13 Number Of new 1 12644 1 22408 020 070 163 007 138t 101 097 - 118 047 044 096 062 
executive appointees 
(t+2) 
14 Number ot 6 15847 z 32805 001 036 137t - 033 161 - 033 138t 024 - 047 - 016 033 192 122 
Executives (IPO) 
l i Number of new 1 29375 1 371 6 071 058 z00 184 065 002 098 080 1541 085 079 130 zOl 159 
executive appointees 
(t+3) 
16 Rate of change in 0 10526 0 16196 058 z l 5 - 083 086 037 027 082 247 185 022 139t 093 - 204 115 064 
directors (t+l) 
17 Rale of change 111 0 1 ^59 0 30577 012 008 0o7 048 164 - 116 040 053 049 - 012 - 017 005 - 007 - 079 072 
directors (t+3) 
18 Rate ot change 111 0 9 2716 0 320^0 082 - 130 - 199 023 038 03b 230 - 065 019 115 283 021 029 090 - 008 
directors (t+4) 
19 Rate Of change 111 0 22014 0 33166 071t 107 - 141 010 117 029 - 006 108 052 - 012 - 094 157t 095 054 112 
directors (t+5) 
20 RC 111 blockholder 0 36344 0 312b2 005 193 - 0 j - 033 163 034 075 132t 186 - 023 022 - zOO 042 138t 070 
ovuurship (t+2) 
21 RC 111 blockholder 0 3^834 0 34014 135t 1 2 J 095 083 138 022 - 090 137t 009 068 - 003 - 075 053 018 - 025 
ownership (t+3) 
22 RC 111 blockholder 0 364o9 0 32115 014 047 128 042 z l l - 035 019 032 110 - 111 076 - 113 133 241 055 - J owntrship (t+4) 'Si 
Table 4 2 (Continued) 
Variable Name Mean S_D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
23 RC in blockholder 0 39042 0 33207 051 
ownership (t+5) 
24 Number of new 0 7^770 l 19387 031 
executive appointees 
(t+D 
25 Number of new 1 93617
 31343 - 082 
executive appointees 
(t+4) 
26 Number of new 0 °«^61 1 ?0 93 - 0z3 
executive appointees 
(t+5) 
N=l2s I 8 3 i < l 0 *p< 0b **p< 01 Variables are presented in the order they appear in the analyses 
0 6 5 
1 2 1 
0 2 5 
0 7 6 
034 
0 4 5 
1 5 8 t 
147 
148 
0 8 5 
- 7 7 6 
z 4 7 
0 3 5 
0 0 1 
- I l l 
- 004 
- 0 0 6 
0 2 5 • 
108 
0 4 0 
007 
- 1 8 6 
0 9 8 
0 3 0 
0 2 9 
224 
0 1 5 
0 2 1 
0 0 5 
- 008 
144 t 
1 3 6 
- 1 7 0 t 
0^8 
0 8 5 
1 0 3 
- 0 2 1 • 
- 017 
z l 9 
1 0 2 
- 0 4 5 
0 6 9 
1 2 5 
084 
0 1 1 
- 0 8 5 
1 0 5 
024 
0 0 9 
458 
0 9 7 
0 6 0 
- 0 4 6 
1 4 1 t 
3 5 6 
294 
Variable Name 
77 l o b i n s O t i 
78 T o b m s Q t+4 
79 l o b i n s Q t + j 
0 ROA t 
1 ROA t+4 
V ROA t+5 
roni 
Slmeholdei Return 
M e n 
4 Pc ic tn t i 0 e ot 
dneclois with poor 
industiy cxpenence 
35 A \ e n b c ol i ^ 
dtiectots 
6 education 
prestige (dnectois) 
37 Foundei 
C l n u n n n (dummy) 
38 hn\ nonmenti l 
Dymmism 
39 Ens iionmentTl 
Complexity 
40 Zn\ nonmenti l 
munificence 
41 Percent i le of 
executives with 
pnor mdustiy 
expenencc 
Mean 
3 
z 
1 
n 
19 
37 
z 
1 
a q 
0 
0 
i 
0 
0 
0 
2 2 D 
467 
9 3 j 
9 0 6 
976 
4 2 1 
737 
688 
8 6 7 
8 5 9 
3 0 
O J J 
4 7 8 
0 4 2 
7 9 9 
SD 
6 
1 
1 6 
<. 0 
1 3 6 
b6 
0 
D 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
1 4 3 
184 
364 
477 
COS 
187 
0 0 9 
314 
O i l 
3 4 8 
4 7 1 
0 J 3 
1 90 
0 4 7 
28 
0 
0 
- 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 0 
1 
02-5 
0 7 0 
034 
044 
044 
1">0 
0 4 2 
0 4 9 
1 2 0 
0 9 ^ 
168 
0 0 2 
0 0 2 
0 2 8 
0 6 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 0 
0 
- 0 
0 
0 
0 
- 0 
2 
087 
0 5 7 
0 7 3 
048 
0oD 
0 6 8 
0 0 6 
0 9 1 
0 2 0 
0 2 5 
0 1 6 
0 7 2 
0 2 6 
114 
0 1 3 
3 
0 128 
z 2 9 + * 
z 2 5 
1 5 5 * 
2 5 2 * 
3 0 3 * * 
0 1 3 2 
z 4 9 * 
- 0 131+ 
z 0 0 * * 
- 0 0 5 9 
0 0 3 3 
1 9 9 * * 
- z l 2 * * 
- 0 0 6 2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 0 
0 
0 
- 0 
4 
094 
198 + 
z 8 S * * 
094 
1 0 9 
1 4 0 
0 0 3 
1,90 
z 2 6 * + 
094 
0 9 7 
0 6 6 
1 3 1 t 
0 2 6 
o0 + 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 0 
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
5 
0 5 0 
0 4 1 
0 2 5 
0 5 1 
104 
0 5 3 
0 7 8 
0 2 6 
1 0 3 
0 8 8 
0 2 6 
058 
2 4 8 + * 
1 1 8 
0 2 9 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 0 
0 
0 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
6 
0 0 2 
1 4 9 + 
0 7 9 
0 7 o 
1 3 3 
1 0 2 
028 
0 5 9 
1 J 6 
1 1 6 
5 1 3 * * 
0 4 6 
0 6 5 
0 6 ° 
0 5 1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 0 
0 
- 0 
0 
- 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
7 
0 4 3 
0 8 3 
1 5 0 t 
014 
0 0 6 
0 2 1 
0 1 5 
0 7 2 
097 
0 2 3 
007 
0 0 1 
0 3 6 
0 4 6 
0 7 1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
- 0 
0 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
8 
0 0 7 
0 3 5 
044 
0 2 2 
0 3 1 
0 1 0 
0 0 1 
0 5 6 
0 4 9 
0 4 9 
0 0 J 
0 5 3 
00 
1 3 3 + 
004 
0 
- 0 
0 
0 
- 0 
o : 
0 
0 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
9 
088 
1 0 9 
1 2 6 
1 2 1 
0 0 6 
155 + 
1 8 9 * 
0 2 2 
0 5 9 
097 
0 0 3 
0 5 2 
1 2 0 
0 9 9 
0 5 3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 0 
0 
0 
- 0 
10 
0 9 7 
0 0 1 
014 
0 7 5 
044 
0 7 5 
0 9 6 
1 9 3 * * 
0 3 3 
137 
3 6 6 * * 
0 8 7 
024 
0 7 8 
1 9 5 * * 
0 
- 0 
0 
-
- 0 
0 
0 
0 
- 0 
0 
1 1 
z 8 3 * + 
1 0 9 
1 5 3 + 
3 4 4 * + 
3 6 8 * * 
6 4 7 * * 
1 6 3 * 
1 3 1 + 
1 7 6 * 
0 6 1 
0 4 9 
0 1 7 
0 9 1 
0 4 s 
074 
- 0 
- 0 
- 0 
- 0 
- 0 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
0 
0 
- 0 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
12 
0 7 2 
1 0 8 
0 1 3 
0 0 2 
0 4 0 
0 4 0 
0 0 9 
0 4 8 
087 
0 2 9 
0 9 0 
115 
0 2 6 
1 0 3 
1 5 4 * 
- 0 
- 0 
-
0 
0 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
- 0 
13 
154 + 
1 5 5 + 
2 0 1 * 
107 
1 3 6 + 
0 9 7 
004 
0 3 0 
0 5 9 
0 8 3 
0 6 0 
108 
004 
0 4 9 
0 8 1 
- 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 0 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
- 0 
- 0 
- 0 
- 0 
1 4 
0 8 6 
004 
1 7 1 + 
1 0 0 
024 
034 
008 
0 5 6 
0 5 6 
0 0 6 
0 7 3 
0 9 9 
0 7 3 
0 4 2 
0 3 5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
- 0 
0 
- 0 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
- 0 
15 
1 6 0 + 
124 
0 6 5 
1 0 9 
1 0 0 
0 3 6 
0 3 6 
0 5 8 
1 3 6 + 
0 1 9 
1 4 1 + 
004 
014 
0 7 5 
0 6 0 
^1 
ox 
Table 4.2 (Continued) 
V a r i a b l e N a m e M e a n S D 1 2 1C 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 
42 Ave;age age ot 4 4 . 7 4 2 
executives 
43 Fducalion ° . 8 3 2 
piestige (executives) 
44 Foundei CEO C . 3 4 4 
(dummy) 
6 . 8 6 6 - . 1 ^ 8 * + - 0 . 0 7 4 - 0 . 0 9 8 
0 . 3 7 1 0 . 0 8 2 0 . 0 7 0 - . 2 2 4 * + 
0 . 1 7 7 0 . 0 9 7 0 . 0 * 7 - . 1 6 9 * 
. 2 3 0 * + 
• 0 . 0 8 0 
- . 1 7 8 * 
- 0 . 0 6 5 
. 1 8 3 * 
- 0 . 0 6 6 
- . 1 9 9 + + 
0 . 1 1 0 
. 4 6 9 + * 
- 0 . 1 0 0 
0 . 0 0 5 
- 0 . 0 7 2 
- 0 . 0 6 0 
0 . 0 3 0 
- 0 . 0 2 0 
- 0 . 0 4 5 - 0 . 0 0 8 
0 . 0 5 1 - . 1 7 9 * 
- 0 . 0 6 0 . 3 2 0 * 
- . 2 5 3 * * . 1 6 9 * 0 . 0 1 7 - 0 . 0 4 7 - . 2 5 4 * * 
0 . 0 4 5 0 . 0 4 2 0 . 1 3 5 t . 1 5 0 * 0 . 0 4 2 
0 . 0 9 1 - . 1 6 4 * - 0 . 0 9 5 - 0 . 0 2 8 - 0 . 1 3 9 t 
N = 1 2 5 - 1 8 5 t < 10. */;< 0 5 . **/?< 01 V a r i a b l e s are p re sen ted in t he o rder they a p p e a r in the ana lyses 
V a r i a b l e N a m e 17 18 19 
45 Rate of change m dnectois ( t+l) 
46 Rate of change in directors ( ^ 3 ) 
47 Rate ot change in directois (t-*-4) 
48 Rate of change in directors (t+5) 
49 RC in blockholdei ownership (t+2) 
50 RC m blockholder ownership (t-^3) 
51 RC in blockholdei owneiship (t+4) 
52 RC in blockholdei owneiship (tJ-5) 
5^ Nunibet of new executive appointees (t+1) 
54 Numbci of new executive appointees (t+4) 
55 Number of new executive appointees (t+5) 
56 T o b m s Q H 3 
57 Tobin's Q t+4 
58 T o b m s Q t+5 
50 ROA t+3 
60 ROA 1+4 
6! ROA 1+5 
62 lotal Shareholdei Return 1 Year 
63 Peicentagc of directois with prioi industiy expenence 
64 A\ eiage ot age directois 
65 Education piestige (dnectois) 
66 Founder Chaiiman (dummy) 
67 Emuonmenta l Dynamism 
68 En\ uonmental Complexity 
69 Fnviionmental munificence 
70 Peicentage ol executives with prioi industry expenence- . 1 4 9 
71 A\eiage age of executives 
72 Education piestige (executives) 
7"^  Founder CEO (dummy) 
• 0 . 0 7 8 1 
0 . 1 3 3 
0 . 0 5 8 
0 . 1 2 0 
- 0 . 0 0 7 
• 0 . 0 4 2 
0 . 0 6 9 
. 3 4 0 + + 
0 . 0 5 7 
0 . 0 1 3 
0 . 0 0 1 
0 . 0 5 6 
0 . 0 2 7 
0 . 0 2 0 
0 . 0 3 1 
0 . 0 0 5 
0 . 0 6 6 
• 0 . 0 7 3 
- . 2 0 3 + * 
0 . 1 2 6 1 
0 . 0 5 2 
• 0 . 0 7 4 
0 . 0 3 3 
• 0 . 0 3 8 
-. 1  * 
• 0 . 1 2 1 
0 . 0 6 4 
0 . 0 7 0 
0 . 0 3 1 
0 . 0 0 7 
- 0 . 0 5 1 
0 . 1 1 6 
0 . 0 3 5 
- 0 . 0 7 2 
- 0 . 0 8 1 
0 . 0 7 5 
0 . 0 6 4 
- 0 . 1 3 7 1 
- 0 . 1 3 4 
- 0 . 0 8 8 
0 . 0 1 0 
0 . 0 3 8 
0 . 0 4 0 
- 0 . 0 9 0 
- 0 . 0 3 3 
- 0 . 0 3 6 
0 . 0 0 0 
- 0 . 1 3 1 1 
0 . 0 7 2 
- 0 . 1 4 41 
0 . 0 8 4 
0 . 1 2 7 1 
- 0 . 0 4 9 
0 . 1 0 2 
- 0 . 1 1 4 
0 . 
- 0 . 
0 . 
- 0 . 
0 
0 
- 0 
- 0 . 
- 0 , 
- 0 . 
-
-. 
-. 
- 0 
0 
0 
- 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
. 0 9 2 
. 0 4 8 
. 1 5 8 ' 
. 1 8 2 
. 0 4 6 
. 0 7 4 
. 0 3 2 
. 0 3 2 
. 0 3 2 
. 0 8 8 
. 0 4 2 
. 0 2 2 
. 2 0 5 
. 3 3 3 
. 2 3 8 
. 0 9 8 
. 0 8 9 
. 0 3 4 
. 0 7 3 
. 0 0 8 
. 0 4 4 
. 0 2 0 
. 0 4 7 
. 1 8 1 
. 0 5 6 
. 0 6 0 
0 . 0 6 0 
0 . 1 4 0 
0 . 0 6 7 
. 4 0 8 * * 
. 1 9 5 + 
0 . 0 3 2 
. 2 9 5 * * 
• 0 . 1 0 9 
- . 1 8 3 * 
0 . 0 ^ 5 
0 . 0 3 1 
0 . 0 3 4 
0 . 0 3 7 
0 . 0 5 0 
• 0 . 0 5 1 
• 0 . 0 2 2 
0 . 1 5 1 1 
0 . 0 4 6 
• 0 . 0 8 7 
0 . 0 1 6 
- . 1 8 3 + 
• 0 . 0 0 5 
0 . 0 2 2 
0 . 1 2 4 
0 . 0 3 9 
0 . 1 4 7 1 
. 1 7 1 * 
0 . 1 5 8 1 
0 . 1 2 2 
- 0 . 0 9 6 
. 1 8 5 * 
0 . 0 6 0 
- 0 . 0 4 0 
- 0 . 0 3 3 
- 0 . 0 3 9 
0 . 0 5 4 
0 . 0 5 8 
0 . 118 
- 0 . 0 4 8 
- 0 . 0 5 1 
0 . 0 9 1 
- 0 . 0 4 7 
- 0 . 0 8 9 
- 0 . 0 3 5 
- 0 . 0 6 6 
- 0 . 0 0 4 
- 0 . 0 1 6 
0 . 0 5 4 
- 0 . 0 1 7 
. 2 0 1 * 
0 . 1 5 9 1 
0 . 0 8 3 
- 0 . 1 3 0 
0 . 0 0 7 
- 0 . 0 6 8 
0 . 0 7 3 
0 . 1 2 3 
0 . 1 0 1 
0 . 1 0 3 
0 . 1 4 8 
- 0 . 0 7 0 
0 . 0 5 1 
0 . 0 5 6 
- 0 . 0 2 5 
- 0 . 0 0 9 
- 0 . 1 0 2 
- 0 . 0 5 2 
0 . 0 4 5 
0 . 0 6 0 
- 0 . 0 1 0 
0 . 0 9 3 
0 . 0 0 9 
0 . 1 2 0 
0 . 1 0 5 
- 0 . 0 0 7 
0 . 0 6 3 
0 . 0 7 8 
0 . 0 0 2 
- 0 . 0 5 6 
- 0 . 0 6 0 
- 0 . 0 2 8 
0 . 1 3 9 
- 0 . 1 5 5 1 
- 0 . 1 0 5 
- 0 . 0 6 1 
- 0 . 0 7 4 
- . 1 8 0 * 
- 0 . 0 4 3 
- 0 . 0 2 9 
- 0 . 0 5 8 
0 . 0 6 8 
- 0 . 0 7 2 
0 . 0 8 9 
- . 2 1 0 * 
0 . 1 0 0 
- 0 . 1 5 2 1 
0 . 0 5 6 
- 0 . 1 4 5 
- 0 . 0 6 9 
- 0 . 0 4 0 
0 . 0 9 8 
0 . 0 6 1 
- 0 . 0 8 9 
0 . 0 8 5 
0 . 0 2 8 
0 . 1 3 4 
- 0 . 0 1 2 
- . 1 8 9 * 
- 0 . 1 4 2 
0 . 0 6 9 
- 0 . 0 0 9 
- 0 . 0 9 9 
0 . 1 3 6 
0 . 0 2 5 
- 0 . 1 3 3 
0 . 0 4 0 
0 . 0 7 9 
- 0 . 0 2 7 
0 . 1 1 9 
. 2 1 2 
0 . 0 3 3 
0 . 0 4 5 
0 . 0 5 3 
- 0 . 0 1 1 
- 0 . 1 0 4 
- 0 . 1 0 5 
0 . 1 0 8 
- 0 . 0 2 2 
- 0 . 0 1 7 
- 0 . 0 2 4 
0 . 0 0 4 
- . 1 7 4 
- 0 . 0 8 6 
. 1 8 2 
0 . 0 2 4 
. 3 0 7 + 
- 0 . 1 2 8 
- 0 . 1 2 2 
- 0 . 1 2 2 
0 . 1 0 7 
0 . 1 2 7 
0 . 1 0 6 
- 0 . 0 8 4 
- 0 . 0 7 4 
- . 2 2 0 * 
0 . 1 0 6 
0 . 0 7 8 
0 . 0 4 1 
- 0 . 1 5 7 
- 0 . 0 4 0 
- 0 . 0 8 0 
- . 2 3 4 * 
0 . 0 4 7 
0 . 1 5 1 
- 0 . 0 8 1 
0 . 0 2 4 
0 . 0 5 4 
0 . 0 9 3 
0 . 1 1 2 
0 . 0 4 8 
0 . 0 5 7 
- 0 . 1 1 8 
- 0 . 0 9 6 
0 . 0 9 1 
0 . 1 2 5 
. 2 1 3 * 
0 . 1 4 0 
- 0 . 0 0 2 
0 . 0 0 4 
- 0 . 0 9 1 
0 . 0 3 0 
0 . 0 0 5 
- J 
N-125-185 | < 10, *p< 05. **p< 01 Variables aie presented in the order they appear in the analyses 
Table 4.2 (Continued) 
Variable Name 
74 Tobin's Q t+3 
75 Tobin's 0 t+4 
76 TobmsQ t+5 
77 ROA t+3 
78 ROA t+4 
79 ROA t+5 
80 1 olal Shareholder Return 1 
Year 
81 Percentage ol directors with 
prior industry experience 
82 Average oi age directors 
83 Education prestige 
(directors) 
84 Founder Chairman (dummy) 
85 Fnvironmcntal Dynamism 
86 Environmental Complexity 
87 Environmental munificence 
88 Percentage of executives 
with prior industry experience 
89 Average age ot executives 
90 Education prestige 
(executives) 
91 Founder CEO (dummy) 
27 
. 2 2 6 * * 
0 . 1 0 3 
- . 9 0 9 * * 
- . 6 6 9 * * 
0 . 0 0 3 
- 0 . 1 1 2 
- 0 . 0 4 0 
0 . 0 1 0 
- 0 . 1 1 3 
- 0 . 0 0 7 
0 . 0 4 1 
0 . 0 7 6 
- 0 . 0 5 7 
- 0 . 0 5 1 
- 0 . 0 2 0 
- . 1 7 2 * 
- 0 . 0 1 2 
28 
. 6 3 5 * * 
0 . 0 0 2 
0 . 0 4 9 
0 . 0 1 8 
0 . 0 5 9 
- 0 . 0 2 0 
- 0 . 0 5 9 
0 . 0 7 8 
0 . 0 5 6 
0 . 0 1 9 
0 . 1 0 7 
. 1 7 5 * 
- . 2 0 5 * 
- 0 . 1 6 0 + 
0 . 0 8 8 
0 . 1 0 2 
29 
0 . 0 3 3 
- 0 . 0 1 7 
- 0 . 0 5 4 
- 0 . 0 1 6 
0 . 0 0 4 
0 . 1 1 6 
0 . 0 4 1 
0 . 0 0 6 
- 0 . 0 4 5 
0 . 0 8 7 
0 . 0 9 9 
- 0 . 0 2 4 
- 0 . 0 3 8 
0 . 0 8 9 
0 . 1 4 9 + 
30 
. 7 6 4 * 
0 . 0 9 3 
. 1 8 9 * 
0 . 0 0 0 
- 0 . 0 7 7 
0 . 1 4 7 + 
0 . 0 5 7 
0 . 0 1 3 
- 0 . 0 2 7 
0 . 0 5 5 
- 0 . 0 1 7 
- 0 . 0 6 6 
. 1 6 3 * 
0 . 0 4 7 
3 1 
. 3 7 3 * * 
. 1 7 2 * 
- 0 . 0 4 7 
- 0 . 1 3 8 + 
0 . 1 0 6 
0 . 0 9 0 
0 . 0 1 4 
0 . 0 4 2 
- 0 . 0 4 3 
- 0 . 0 9 2 
- 0 . 1 0 4 
0 . 0 9 3 
0 . 0 4 6 
N= 125-185 1< 10, *p< 05, **p< 01 Variables are presented in the order they appear in the an 
Variable Name 
92 Average age ot executives 
4 1 
. 1 8 6 * 
93 Fducalion prestige (executives)-O . 047 
94 Founder CEO (dummy) - 0 . 0 0 7 
42 
- 0 . 1 3 7 + 
- . 2 3 C ** 0 
43 
. 0 9 5 
44 
32 
0 . 0 8 7 
- 0 . 1 2 6 
- . 1 9 5 * 
- 0 . 0 7 6 
0 . 0 4 8 
0 . 0 0 2 
0 . 0 3 2 
- 0 . 0 7 1 
- 0 . 0 9 6 
- . 2 5 3 * * 
- 0 . 0 2 5 
0 . 0 6 4 
alyses 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
0 
- 0 
0 
0 
0 
33 
037 
0 0 5 
099 
0 4 1 
012 
007 
067 
019 
059 
045 
040 
0 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
- 0 
0 
0 
0 
- 0 
34 
0 7 1 
129 + 
059 
0 1 5 
133 + 
069 
2 9 7 * * 
028 
119 
019 
-
- 0 
- 0 
- 0 
0 
-
- 0 
35 
1 7 4 * 
114 
0 2 6 
0 7 5 
030 
1 5 1 * 
4 8 1 * * 
2 0 5 * * 
112 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
0 
36 
085 
062 
099 
068 
005 
083 
5 6 8 * * 
112 
0 
- 0 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
0 
37 
129 + 
0 0 3 
012 
014 
120 
038 
5 9 3 * * 
0 
0 
- 0 
- 0 
-
0 
38 
1 0 1 
0 3 1 
002 
014 
2 1 1 * * 
079 
39 
- 0 . 1 2 1 
- . 2 1 7 * * 0 
- 0 . 0 2 9 - 0 
- 0 . 1 3 6 + 0 
- 0 . 0 2 3 0 
40 
058 
0 6 3 
116 
0 2 1 
N=125-I85 f< 10 *p< 05 **p< 01 Variables are presented in the order they appear in the analyses 
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Interestingly, we do not observe statistically significant bivariate correlations 
between this variable and firm size, board size, TMT size, rate of change in blockholder 
ownership in subsequent periods and firm performance. This means that the completion 
of the IPO process affects changes in firm governance mechanisms primarily in the first 
period following the IPO. Considering the series of interrelated relationships originally 
proposed, the lack of bivariate correlations between underpricing and the variables 
mentioned is not surprising and is in line with my original contentions. On the other 
hand, statistically significant relationships are observed between underpricing and the 
founder as the chairman dummy (/?=0.168, p<.05) and the average age of executives (p=-
0.198, p<.0l). These findings are in parallel with the contentions of the signaling model 
(Leland and Pyle, 1977). 
One other surprising finding, as far as the bivariate correlations are concerned, is 
the negative relationship between market based and accounting based measures. One 
would expect these two measures to be highly and positively related. That was not the 
case with the data collected for this study. This situation, once again, highlights the 
uniqueness of young entrepreneurial firms and the need to adopt different methods when 
analyzing them (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Kroll et al., 2007). I believe that, 
during the first few years, following the IPO, these companies are struggling to build 
healthy accounting systems while coping with the extensive attention paid to them by the 
market players. Some researchers refer to this situation as "liability of newness" 
(Stinchcombe, 1965) while I consider that to be a limited explanation. Another possible 
extension of this study is to investigate that process. In a recent study, Walters et al. 
(2010) used sales growth as a measure of firm performance along with return on assets. 
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Referring to previously conducted studies (Florin, Lubatkin, and Schulze, 2003), those 
authors propose that sales growth may be the most telling measure of performance during 
the initial years of a firm's existence. In this study, the firm size variable is measured by 
log of sales and the three dimensions of environment are determined by the variations in 
sales at the industry level. Thus, using sales growth as a performance measure could have 
inflated the explanatory power of the independent variables (firms size and the interaction 
effect would have explained most of the variance). Besides, as mentioned previously, a 
significant portion of the companies in my sample did not survive the entire five-year 
period, which means that for those companies sales growth figures either could not be 
calculated or only reflects the growth in one calendar year. 
The relationship between education prestige and average age of directors and 
executives is also worthy of noting. The average age of directors has a negative bivariate 
relationship with the "directors with advanced graduate degrees" dummy (p=-0A74, 
p<.05). The same case is true for the relationship between the average age of executives 
and "executives with advanced graduate degrees" dummy (p=-0A38, p<A0). The 
importance of education in executive decision-making is documented in past (Vance, 
1966) and recent (Roglio & Light, 2009) studies. It seems getting an advanced graduated 
degree, such as MBA, is getting more and more popular among the executives and 
directors. The potential impact of education in the case of young entrepreneurial firms 
should also be investigated in future extensions of this study. 
Finally, the relationships between venture capitalist presence and other variables 
need further explanation. As can be seen from Table 4.2, the venture capitalist presence 
dummy is positively related with underwriter prestige (p=0.324, p<.0l) and education 
81 
prestige of executives (y9=0.183, /?<.05). It also has a positive relationship between the 
rate of change in blockholder ownership (p=0A55,p<.05), the rate of change in directors 
(p=0A79,p<.05) and the number of new executive appointees (p=0A37, p<A0). It seems 
venture capitalists are likely to affect how the young entrepreneurial firms go through the 
IPO process, how they are governed and how they perform in the future as documented in 
previous studies (Dushnitsky and Shapira, 2010). The potential detrimental effects of that 
in the case of young entrepreneurial firms still needs further attention. For instance, 
should the contentions of this study prove true, the presence of venture capitalists may 
not be that beneficial after all. In other words, venture capitalists may be the type of 
owners that interfere with the corporate governance mechanisms of these firms. While 
the researchers report that most firms go through the IPO process with venture capitalists 
(Ritter, 1991), the performance of those that do not should be investigated in detail. 
Hypotheses Testing 
Several tables are constructed to report the results. Table 4.3 reports the results of 
an ANOVA procedure that assesses the differences in first day returns for companies that 
experience ownership change during the first year after the IPO. As can be seen, the 
difference between the mean values of the first day returns among the firms that 
experienced ownership change during the first year after the IPO and the firms that did 
not is marginally significant (F=3.511,/K.10). Looking at the details, it can be seen that 
the mean value of first day return for firms that experienced ownership change during the 
first year after the IPO is higher than that of the firms that did not experience ownership 
change (0.0314673 vs. -.0000421). This finding is parallel with previous findings 
(Stoughton and Zechner, 1998) and in line with Hypothesis 1. 
Table 4.3 ANOVA Results 
Variable 
Return on fust day 
(undeipi icing) 
Owneiship 
change 
No owneiship 
change 
N 
86 
90 
Mean 
- 0 . 0 0 0 0 4 2 1 
0 0314673 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.09128285 
0 12787505 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within groups 
Sum of Squares 
0.044 
2 .164 
df 
l 
174 
Mean Square 
0.044 
0.012 
F 
3 . 5 1 1 t 
Dependent variable is whether there is blockholder ownership change ' N=176 x< 10 *p< 05, **p< 01 
OO 
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To further investigate this finding, I created an ordinary least squares model 
where the dependent variable was the rate of change in blockholder ownership. It should 
be noted that the rate of change variable was not constructed to look solely at new owners 
coming in but to identify the situations when old owners are replaced by new ones. 
The way the rate of change was operationalized is consistent with my initial 
proposal regarding interference with the entrepreneurial efficacies of young 
entrepreneurial firms. In other words, as long as the pre-IPO blockholders are in place, 
they continue to provide their input to the firm, but changes in ownership become 
detrimental when old owners are replaced with new ones, who have limited knowledge of 
the company, take controlling positions. With that in mind, the results of Model 1 are 
reported on Table 4.4. Hierarchical linear regression is used to see whether underpricing 
of the IPO is a determining factor in subsequent changes in blockholder ownership. First, 
the control variables are entered. Among the control variables (firm size, nationality of 
the firm, venture capitalist's presence, underwriter prestige and presence of founder at the 
IPO), firm size (P=0.238,/?<.01) and venture capitalist presence ((3=0.229, p<.0l) proved 
to be significantly related to the rate of change in blockholder ownership at t+l time 
period. In other words, the larger the firm and greater the presence of venture capitalists 
at the time of the IPO (t), the more likely are young entrepreneurial firms to observe new 
owners replacing the original owners. Although I will be explaining the implications of 
this finding in the discussion section, at this point I observe that, it makes both theoretic 
and intuitive sense to observe such relationships (i.e. venture capitalists are likely to sell 
their shares after the IPO). In the second part of this model, the first day return variable is 
added. 
Table 4.4 Regression Results 
Constant 
Firm Size 
Nationality of the firm 
Venture capitalist presence 
Founder presence 
Underwriter prestige 
Return on first day (underpricing) 
Model F-value 
R-Square 
Change in R-Square 
D-W Statistic 
Stepl 
Standardized coefficient 
0 . 2 3 8 * * 
- 0 . 0 5 2 
0 . 2 2 9 * * 
0 . 0 3 2 
- 0 . 1 1 9 
3 . 5 1 9 * * 
0 . 0 9 9 
2 . 0 8 2 
t-value 
- 0 . 8 3 3 
3 . 0 8 4 
- 0 . 6 5 8 
2 . 8 5 5 
0 . 4 2 4 
0 . 1 5 0 
Step 2 
Standardized coefficients 
0 . 2 2 8 * * 
- 0 . 0 5 2 
0 . 2 0 9 
0 . 0 2 1 
- 0 . 1 2 5 
0.127t 
3 . 4 3 0 * * 
0 . 114 
0 . 0 1 5 t 
t-value 
- 0 . 6 6 5 
2 . 9 9 5 
- 0 . 6 5 3 
2 . 5 8 7 
0 . 7 8 4 
- 1 . 5 2 1 
1. 671 
VTF 
1 . 0 7 1 
1 . 1 3 5 
1 . 1 7 6 
1 . 0 3 7 
1 . 2 1 2 
1.041 
Dependent variable is "Rate of change in blockholder ownership ,+i,'' N=I67. |< 10. *p<.05: **p<01 
CXI 
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The relationship between the rate of change at t+l and the first day return of 
young entrepreneurial firms in my sample (t) came out to be positive and significant 
(P=0.127, p<A0). These results tell us that, the greater the underpricing of an IPO, the 
greater the subsequent rate of change in ownership. Once again, this is in line with the 
signaling model and is consistent with Hypothesis 1. As I mentioned previously, the 
implications of these findings will be further discussed in the discussion section. After 
the initial IPO performance, which was shown to influence the subsequent ownership 
change, I proposed that changes in corporate governance mechanisms of firms are likely 
to be observed. Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 are constructed to show those results. Once 
again, hierarchical regression models were used to check whether rate of change in 
blockholder ownership (t+l) influenced the rate of change in directors (t+2) and the new 
number of TMT members. Several things should be noted here. First, the way the rate of 
change in blockholder ownership was operationalized was very similar to the way the 
rate of change in boards of directors is operationalized. This time, replacement of original 
directors with new ones, rather than solely adding more directors to the board was 
considered. Hence, if the original directors were still active on the board, they were still 
capable of providing their input as Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggest. On the other 
hand, several issues arose regarding TMT membership during the data collection. Unlike 
the information reported for individual board members, most companies do not report 
background information on all of the members of their TMTs (except for the IPO period). 
Even if they occasionally do, the data on number of TMT is not reliable. For instance, 
one company reported information for 11 executives in the prospectus but only reported 
information for five executives in the proxy statement of the next year. 
Table 4.5 Regression Results 
Constant 
Firm Size 
Nationality of the firm 
Duality 
Firm Performance 
Board Size 
Rate of change in blockholder ownershipt+i 
Model F-value 
R-Square 
Change in R-Square 
D-W Statistic 
Step l 
Standardized coefficient 
0 . 7 0 0 
- 0 . 1 6 0 * 
- 0 . 0 7 3 
- 0 . 0 5 5 
0 . 1 4 1 t 
2 . 2 1 4 t 
0 . 0 6 4 
t-value 
0 . 6 2 5 
0 . 7 6 0 
- 2 . 0 4 0 
0 . 3 4 7 
- 0 . 6 0 8 
1 . 7 6 2 
2 . 1 5 8 
Step 2 
Standardized coefficients 
0 . 0 4 6 
- 0 . 1 5 2 t 
- 0 . 0 8 2 
- . 0 5 5 0 
0 . 1 2 8 
0.155* 
2 . 5 5 4 * 
0 . 0 8 6 
0 . 0 2 3 * 
t-value 
0 . 6 7 5 
0 . 5 0 5 
- 1 . 9 4 8 
- 1 . 0 7 4 
- 0 . 6 1 8 
1 . 614 
2. 012 
VIF 
1 . 4 8 5 
1 . 0 7 3 
1 . 0 3 6 
1 . 4 1 7 
1 . 1 1 7 
1.048 
Dependent variable is "Rate of change in board ot directors 1+2,' N=169, t< 10. * / J < . 0 5 ; ** / J< .01 
0 0 
Table 4.6 Regression Results 
Constant 
Firm Size 
Nationality of the firm 
Duality 
Firm Performance 
TMT Size 
Rate of change in blockholder ownership,+! 
Model F-value 
R-Square 
Change in R-Square 
D-W Statistic 
Step 1 
Standardized coefficient 
0 . 1 3 2 
0 . 0 1 7 
0 . 0 5 1 
0 . 0 3 1 
0 . 106 
1 . 2 9 9 
0 . 0 4 0 
t-value 
0 . 866 
1 . 4 5 0 
0 . 2 0 6 
0 . 6 4 5 
0 . 3 3 6 
1 . 3 3 7 
2 . 1 9 0 
Step 2 
Standardized coefficients 
0 . 1 6 1 t 
0 . 0 0 9 
0 . 0 5 9 
0 . 0 2 9 
0 . 108 
-0.158* 
1 . 7 6 7 
0 . 0 6 4 
0 . 0 2 4 * 
t-value 
- 0 . 1 8 7 
1 . 7 5 8 
0 . 1 1 4 
0 . 4 5 1 
0 . 3 2 0 
1 . 3 7 3 
-1.996 
VIF 
1 . 3 9 0 
1 . 0 6 2 
1 . 0 1 2 
1 . 3 5 1 
1 . 0 2 2 
1. 042 
Dependent variable is Number of new executives
 1+2 N=169 •]•< 10 *p< 05. **p< 01 
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Among these five executives, two were newly appointed. Once I checked the 
proxy statement of the third year, I observed that some of the original executives who 
were not reported in the previous proxy statement were still working for the company 
together with the newly appointed ones. Due to such complexities and lack of data, I 
chose to use the number of new executives as a proxy for change in TMT membership. 
Although the reliability of such a measure is questionable, I believe I am able to assess 
the impact of changes in ownership on one of the mechanisms of corporate governance 
(TMT membership) using this variable. 
With this in mind, the results in Table 4.4 imply that there is a positive 
relationship between the rate of change in board membership at t+2 and the rate of 
change in blockholder ownership at /+1. In column one, two of the control variables (firm 
size, nationality of the firm, duality, firm performance and board size at t+l) came out to 
be significantly related with rate of change in board membership. The nationality dummy 
variable was negatively related to rate of change in board membership (P=-0.160, p<05). 
Considering the difference in corporate governance traditions of American firms and 
international firms, this finding was expected. Board size was also positively related to 
the rate of change in boards of directors (P=0.141, p<.10). One thing to note is that prior 
performance (ROA at /+1) was not related to replacement of old directors with new 
directors (P=-0.055, p>A0). In the following pages, I will be reporting the results of 
subsequent firm performance reflecting changes in corporate governance mechanisms. 
Observing a non-significant relationship between prior firm performance and subsequent 
rate of change in board membership at this point tells us that, if I observe an impact on 
firm performance during the third year following the IPO, it is not because of how these 
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firms perform in prior periods (i.e. /+1) but it is due to intervention in the corporate 
governance mechanisms of young entrepreneurial firms during the second year following 
the IPO. 
As can be seen in step 2, the rate of change in blockholder ownership at t+l was 
positively and significantly related to rate of change in boards of directors at t+2 
(P=0.155, p<.05). Hence, the replacement of original blockholders at t+l due to IPO 
performance has a subsequent impact on replacement of original directors with new ones 
at t+2. This finding supports Hypothesis 3. Results show that, if new owners take 
controlling positions in these young entrepreneurial firms, they are likely to interfere with 
one of the corporate governance mechanisms (board of directors). The importance of this 
finding will be further discussed. 
The second type of corporate governance mechanism I investigate in this study is 
the rate of change in TMT membership. As I mentioned above, the proxy variable I 
choose to adopt is the number of new executives appointed as part of the TMT. The 
methodology adopted for analyzing the relationship between rate of change in directors 
and ownership was also adopted for this process. First, the control variables were added. 
Once again, firm size, nationality of the firm, duality, number of blockholders and 
previous year firm performance were used as control variables. Unlike the model that 
employed the rate of change in board of directors at t+2 as the dependent variable, the 
overall model did not prove to be significant (F=1.299,/?>.10). Looking at the individual 
coefficients, none of the control variables are significantly related with to dependent 
variable. 
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In the second step, the focal variable, rate of change in blockholder ownership at 
/+1 was added to the model. In contrast to my expectations, rate of change in blockholder 
ownership at t+l had a negative impact on the number of new executives at t+2 (P=-
0.158, p<.05). Although the overall model is still not significant (F=T.767, P>.10) for the 
second year, controlling for firm size, nationality of the firm, presence of duality, number 
of blockholders (t+l) and firm performance (t+l), when original blockholders are 
replaced by new ones at t+l period, the number of new executives appointees declines. 
Considering the positive relationship observed between the rate of change in boards of 
directors at t+2 and the rate of change in blockholders at t+l, this finding is worthy of 
note. It seems once the new owners take controlling positions in young entrepreneurial 
firms they are more likely to interfere with the structure of the board of directors rather 
than that of the TMT. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
Before considering the impact on firm performance, I also needed to investigate 
whether the changes in TMT were due to changes in boards of directors. Referring back 
to the bivariate correlations on Table 4.2 between the rate of change in boards of directors 
at t+2 and the number of new executives at t+3 time period, there was a positive 
correlation between the two (p=0.154, /?<. 10). Obviously, this correlation value does not 
indicate causality. However, it is an indication of some form of relationship between 
these two variables. To further explore this relationship, a regression model was 
estimated. As can be seen on Table 4.7, among the four control variables chosen for this 
model (firm size, nationality of the firm, duality and previous year firm performance) 
firm size and the firm nationality dummy were significantly related to the number of new 
executives at t+3. 
Table 4.7 Regression Results 
Constant 
Firm Size 
Nationality of the firm 
Duality 
Firm Performance 
Rate of change in board of directorst+2 
Model F-value 
R-Square 
Change in R-Square 
D-W Statistic 
Stepl 
Standardized coefficient 
0 . 1 8 8 * 
- 0 . 1 7 8 * 
- 0 . 1 1 5 
- 0 . 0 4 5 
3 . 1 2 6 * 
0 . 0 7 8 
t-value 
1 . 122 
2 . 0 5 5 
- 2 . 1 9 2 
- 1 . 4 5 5 
- 0 . 4 8 4 
2 . 0 3 6 
Step 2 
Standardized coefficients 
0 . 1 7 6 t 
- 0 . 1 6 4 t 
- 0 . 1 0 6 
- 0 . 0 3 7 
0. 069 
2 . 6 3 8 * 
0 . 0 8 2 
0 . 0 0 4 
t-value 
1 . 0 2 5 
1 . 9 0 2 
- 1 . 9 7 7 
- 1 . 3 2 6 
0 : 6 9 
0. 844 
VIF 
1 . 3 7 2 
1 . 1 0 6 
1 . 0 2 6 
1 . 3 7 5 
1. 084 
Dependent variable is "Number of new executives,+,."' N=l 53, t< 10, *p<.05\ **p<01 
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The relationship between firm size and the dependent variable was positive 
(P=0.188, _p<.05) which means that larger firms are more likely to experience new 
appointees to the TMT. Furthermore, there was a negative relationship between the 
nationality dummy and number of new executive appointees at t+3 (P=-0.178, p<.05). 
When the rate of change in boards of directors at t+2 was added to the model, contrary to 
my expectations, the relationship between that variable and the number of new executive 
appointees at t+3 was not statistically significant (P=0.069, _p>.10). This result suggests 
new executive appointees in young entrepreneurial firms do not result from changes in 
boards of directors when firm size, firm performance, firm nationality and presence of 
duality are controlled. It is important to note that, while the number of international firms 
in my sample is limited, at least for the third year, American companies are less likely to 
experience new executive appointees relative to international firms. In order to 
investigate this issue, I conducted an ANOVA test with which I compare the number of 
new executive appointees at t+l, t+2, t+3, t+4 and M-5 for American vs. international 
companies. As Table 4.8 shows, the mean values of number of new executives during the 
third, fourth and fifth years were statistically different among American and international 
companies. 
Since the same situation does not apply to the rate of change in boards of 
directors and blockholders for any of these periods, one wonders why this is the case. The 
answer, I believe, is the differences in firm size. As can be seen in Table 4.8, on average, 
among the firms in my sample, foreign firms are larger than American firms (F=5.346, 
p<05). 
Table 4.8 ANOVA Results 
Vauable 
New executive appointees (t+l) 
New executive appointees (t+2) 
New executive appointees (t+3) 
New executive appointees (t+4) 
New executive appointees (t+5) 
Fnm Size 
Ameucan 
Foieign 
Ameucan 
Foicign 
Ameucan 
Foieign 
Ameucan 
Foieign 
Ameucan 
Foieign 
Ameucan 
Foieign 
N 
153 
30 
146 
28 
133 
27 
116 
25 
98 
24 
154 
29 
Mean 
0 . 69 
0 . 97 
1 . 1 3 
1 . 11 
1 . 18 
1 . 8 5 
1 . 0 3 
6 . 1 2 
0 . 8 4 
1 . 5 8 
1 0 . 4 3 
1 1 . 43 
Standard Deviation 
1 . 1 7 1 
1 . 2 9 9 
1 . 1 3 3 
1 . 2 4 4 
1 . 3 0 2 
1 . 5 8 6 
1 . 0 7 1 
3 . 0 3 2 
1 . 1 6 4 
1 . 2 1 3 
2 . 2 1 6 
1 . 7 5 8 
Souice of Vauation 
Between Gioups 
Within gioups 
Between Groups 
Within gioups 
Between Gioups 
Within gioups 
Between Groups 
Within groups 
Between Gioups 
Within gioups 
Between Gioups 
Within gioups 
Sum ot Squares 
1 . 8 8 1 
2 5 7 . 5 2 9 
0 . 0 1 2 
2 5 9 . 2 0 6 
1 0 . 1 1 7 
2 8 9 . 0 7 7 
5 3 1 . 9 2 3 
3 5 2 . 5 0 2 
1 0 . 746 
1 6 5 . 2 2 1 
2 4 . 7 5 9 
8 3 8 . 2 0 6 
df 
1 
1 8 1 
1 
172 
1 
158 
1 
139 
1 
120 
1 
1 8 1 
Mean Squaie 
0 . 044 
0 . 0 1 2 
0 . 0 4 4 
0 . 0 1 2 
0 . 0 4 4 
0 . 0 1 2 
0 . 0 4 4 
0 . 0 1 2 
0 . 0 4 4 
0 . 0 1 2 
2 4 . 7 5 9 
4 . 631 
1 
0 
5 
209 
7 
5 
F 
322 
008 
5 3 0 * 
7 5 0 * * 
8 0 5 * * 
3 4 6 * 
Dependent variable is Nationality of the firm N=l 13-183 f< \0 *p<05 * *p< 01 
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Thus, the statistical difference between American and foreign firms with regard to 
the number of new executive appointments at t+3 (F=5.530, p<.20), t+4 (F=209.750, 
p<.01) and t+5 (F=7.805,/?<.01) can be attributed solely to firm size. This is in parallel to 
the statistically significant coefficient of firm size in the above mentioned regression 
model where number of new executives is the dependent variable. 
Another regression model was employed to look at the effect of changes in 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance in order to assess the final part of 
the interrelated relationships initially proposed. Two sets of performance measures were 
used. First, Tobin's Q, a market based measure, was used. Hypotheses 5 and 6 propose 
that, changes in corporate governance mechanisms in young entrepreneurial firms will 
result in lower performance. To find support for that proposition, Model 5 (Table 4.9) 
was constructed. In this model, firm size, nationality of the firm (dummy variable), 
presence of duality (dummy variable), total shareholder returns for 1 year (as a proxy for 
prior performance), percentage of directors with industry experience, average age of 
directors, directors with advanced degrees (dummy variable) and founder as the 
chairman (dummy variable) were used as control variables, Tobin's Q at t+3 was the 
dependent variable and the rate of change in board of directors at t+2 was the 
independent variable. First, the control variables were added. None of the control 
variables were observed to be significantly related with Tobin's Q at t+3. The sign of the 
coefficient on the relationship between firm size and Tobin's Q being negative was 
questionable. 
Table 4.9 Regression Results (Tobin's Q) 
Constant 
Firm Size 
Nationality of the firm 
Duality 
Firm Performance (total shareholder 
return) 
Percentage of directors with prior 
industry experience 
Average age of directors 
Presence of directors with advanced 
graduate degrees 
Founder Chairman 
Rate of change in board of directors,^ 
Rate of change in board directors X 
Environmental dynamism (interaction 
term) 
Rate of change in board directors X 
Environmental complexity (interaction 
term) 
Rate of change in board directors X 
En vironmental munificence 
(interaction term) 
Model F-value 
R-Square 
Change in R-Square 
D-W Statistic 
Step I 
Standardized 
coefficient 
- 0 . 1 4 8 
0 . 0 6 8 
0 . 0 8 1 
- 0 . 0 9 5 
- 0 . 0 4 5 
- 0 . 0 3 9 
- 0 . 1 3 2 
- 0 . 0 4 6 
1 . 1 1 4 
0 . 0 6 1 
t-value 
1 . 4 5 6 
- 1 . 6 1 5 
0 . 7 9 6 
0 . 8 7 4 
0 . 2 7 0 
- 0 . 5 1 0 
- 0 . 4 6 0 
- 1 . 4 8 3 
- 0 . 5 0 5 
Step 2 
Standardized 
coefficients 
- 0 . 1 7 5 1 
0 . 0 8 2 
0 . 0 8 9 
- 0 . 0 7 1 
- 0 . 0 3 9 
- 0 . 0 4 0 
- 0 . 1 5 5 t 
- 0 . 0 4 7 
0 . 1 3 8 
1 . 2 8 
0 . 0 7 8 
0 . 0 1 7 
t-value 
1 . 4 6 7 
- 1 . 8 7 8 
0 . 9 6 4 
0 . 9 6 0 
- 0 . 8 1 4 
- 0 . 4 4 3 
- 0 . 4 7 6 
- 1 . 7 2 5 
- 0 . 5 1 9 
1 . 5 8 3 
1 . 942 
Step 3 
Standardized 
coefficients 
- 0 . 2 1 3 * 
0 . 0 4 7 
0 . 0 8 6 
- 0 . 0 4 3 
- 0 . 0 2 5 
- 0 . 0 3 0 
- 0 . 1 5 1 t 
- 0 . 0 3 3 
- 0 . 0 6 7 
0 . 0 2 3 
0 . 3 7 1 
- 0 . 1 9 7 t 
1 . 3 2 2 
0 . 1 0 7 
0 . 0 2 9 
t-value 
1 . 5 2 4 
- 2 . 2 3 4 
0 . 5 1 0 
0 . 9 1 4 
- 0 . 4 9 5 
- 0 . 2 8 0 
- 0 . 3 4 6 
- 1 . 6 8 8 
- 0 . 3 6 4 
- 0 . 2 9 9 
0 . 9 8 2 
1 . 6 2 0 
- 1 . 6 7 5 
VIF 
1 . 3 5 0 
1 . 2 5 2 
1 . 3 0 9 
1 . 1 4 6 
1 . 157 
1 . 0 8 8 
1 . 1 8 5 
1 . 2 0 5 
7 . 4 9 9 
1 . 679 
7 . 7 9 6 
2 . 0 5 9 
Dependent variable is "Tobin's Q ,•,,'" N=I46, t< 10, *p<Q5; **p<.0\ 
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Referring back to the correlation table, the relationship between ROA at t+2 and firm size 
was positive as expected (p=0A46, p<A0) but the relationship between Tobin's Q at t+2 
and firm size was surprisingly negative (p=-0A89, p<.05). Furthermore, another 
performance measure, total shareholder returns for one year was positively related to 
Tobin's Q (p=0.457, p<.0l) and ROA (p=0A96, p<05) for the second period. This tells 
us that for the first couple of years, the relationship between market based and accounting 
based measures of young entrepreneurial firms was unusual and worthy of further 
exploration. Although this situation is beyond the scope of this study, I suspect that the 
situation is due to liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1969) of these young 
entrepreneurial firms as they struggle to build healthy financial structures. Furthermore, 
use of sales growth as a performance measure with different control and interaction 
variables in the future may shed some light on this irregularity. 
Once the rate of change in directors at t+2 was added to the model, no significant 
relationship was observed between the independent and dependent variables (P=0.138, 
p>A0). Not surprisingly, neither of these models were statistically significant (F=T.114, 
p>A0 and F=l .280, p>. 10). This means the hypothesis regarding the impact of changes in 
boards of directors as corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance is not 
supported once Tobin's Q in the third year following the IPO is used as the performance 
measure. 
The analysis of firm performance does not end with just looking at market based 
measures. We also need to use accounting based measures to assess firm performance. 
Table 4.10 reports the results of such an assessment. Once again, control variables were 
added in the first step. 
Table 4.10 Regression Results (ROA) 
Constant 
Firm Size 
Nationality of the firm 
Duality 
Firm Performance (total shareholder 
return) 
Percentage of directors with prior 
industry experience 
Average age of directors 
Presence of directors with advanced 
graduate degrees 
Founder Chairman 
Rate of change in hoard of directors,^ 
Rate of change in board directors X 
Environmental dynamism (interaction 
term) 
Rate of change in board directors X 
Environmental complexity (interaction 
term) 
Rate of change in hoard directors X 
Environmental munificence 
(interaction term) 
Model F-value 
R-Square 
Change in R-Square 
D-W Statistic 
Step 1 
Standardized 
coefficient 
0 . 1 6 9 * 
- 0 . 0 5 4 
- 0 . 0 6 6 
0 . 1 7 4 * 
0 . 0 1 0 
0 . 0 0 3 
0 . 1 7 5 * 
0 . 0 7 5 
2 . 0 9 3 * 
0 . 100 
t-value 
- 1 . 2 8 5 
2 . 0 1 8 
- 0 . 6 5 7 
- 0 . 7 5 1 
2 . 1 8 6 
0 . 1 2 0 
0 . 0 3 4 
2 . 0 9 6 
0 . 8 5 9 
Step 2 
Standardized 
coefficients 
0 . 1 9 9 * 
- 0 . 0 6 9 
- 0 . 0 7 7 
0 . 1 4 1 f 
0 . 0 0 5 
0 . 0 0 4 
0 . 2 0 2 * 
0 . 0 7 5 
- 0 . 1 6 5 * 
2 . 3 6 4 * 
0 . 124 
0 . 0 2 4 * 
t-value 
- 1 . 3 1 9 
2 . 3 6 8 
- 0 . 8 4 9 
- 0 . 8 8 4 
1 . 7 5 4 
0 . 0 6 6 
0 . 0 4 7 
2 . 4 0 8 
0 . 8 7 2 
- 2 . 0 4 4 
2 . 0 9 0 
Step 3 
Standardized 
coefficients 
0 . 2 4 1 * * 
- 0 . 0 3 3 
- 0 . 0 8 1 
0 . 1 1 4 
- 0 . 0 1 6 
- 0 . 0 1 3 
0 . 1 9 8 * 
0 . 0 5 7 
- 0 . 0 0 9 
0 . 0 2 1 
- 0 . 3 7 4 t 
0 . 2 5 5 * 
2 . 4 0 1 * * 
0 . 1 6 4 
0 . 0 4 0 t 
t-value 
- 1 . 3 4 6 
2 . 8 5 1 
- 0 . 3 9 7 
- 0 . 9 3 1 
1 . 4 2 3 
- 0 . 1 9 4 
- 0 . 1 6 4 
2 . 3 9 8 
0 . 6 6 5 
- 0 . 0 4 4 
0 . 2 2 2 
- 1 . 7 5 7 
2 . 3 8 3 
VIF 
1 . 2 6 0 
1 . 2 3 0 
1 . 3 3 9 
1 . 136 
1 . 1 5 4 
1 . 1 6 1 
1 . 2 0 2 
1 . 2 8 2 
7 . 5 5 6 
1 . 6 0 6 
7 . 9 5 6 
2 . 0 2 0 
Dependent variable is "ROA ,«," N=160, t< 10. *p<Q5: **p<.0\ 
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Among the control variables used in this model (firm size, nationality of the firm, 
duality presence, founder chairman of the board, average age of directors, percentage of 
directors with prior industry experience, nationality of the firm, directors with advanced 
degrees and prior firm performance), as expected, firm size (P=0.169,/?<.05), presence of 
directors with advanced degrees (P=0.175,/?<05) and prior firm performance using total 
shareholder returns as a proxy (P=0.174,/?<.05) were related with the ROA of period t+3. 
Moving on to the second step, where rate of change in boards of directors at t+2 was 
introduced, the relationship between the focal independent variable (rate of change in 
board of directors at t+2) and the dependent variable (ROA at t+3) was negative and 
statistically significant (P=-0.165, p<.05). This means that the rate of change in boards of 
directors at t+2 negatively impacts firm performance at t+3 when ROA was used as the 
performance measure, unlike the non-significant relationship observed when Tobin's Q 
was considered. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 6 and means that, based on 
my sample, changes in one of the corporate governance mechanisms, boards of directors, 
are likely to result in lower performance in the third period. Further investigation of this 
finding will be discussed in the next section. 
To deepen the analysis of the relationship between firm performance measures 
and the rate of change in boards of directors, other periods were also considered. As can 
be seen in Tables 4.11 - 4.14, once the performance measures from the fourth period are 
regressed against the rate of change in board of directors at t+3, no statistically significant 
relationships were observed between the rate of change in boards of directors at t+3 and 
Tobin's Q at t+4 (P=-0.123, p>A0) and ROA at t+4 (P=0.033, ;?>. 10). However, the 
findings were surprising when the fourth period and fifth periods are considered. 
Table 4.11 Regression Results (Tobin's Q) 
Constant 
Firm Size 
Nationality of the firm 
Duality 
Firm Performance (total shareholder 
return) 
Percentage of directors with prior 
industry experience 
Average age of directors 
Presence of directors with advanced 
graduate degrees 
Founder Chairman 
Rate of change in hoard of directors,+3 
Rate of change in hoard directors X 
Environmental 
dynamism (interaction term) 
Rate of change in board directors X 
Environmental complexity (interaction 
term) 
Rate of change in board directors X 
Environmental 
munificence (interaction term) 
Model F-value 
R-Square 
Change in R-Square 
D-W Statistic 
Stepl 
Standardized 
coefficient 
- 0 . 2 3 9 * 
0 . 121 
0 . 0 2 7 
0 . 1 0 4 
- 0 . 1 0 3 
- 0 . 0 8 6 
0 . 0 5 5 
- 0 . 0 1 7 
1 . 614 
0 . 0 9 4 
t-value 
2 . 0 6 6 
- 2 . 4 5 3 
1 . 3 5 7 
0 . 2 8 6 
1 . 170 
- 1 . 1 3 0 
- 0 . 9 7 0 
0 . 610 
- 0 . 1 8 0 
Step 2 
Standardized 
coefficients 
- 0 . 2 3 4 * 
0 . 1 2 6 
0 . 0 3 7 
0 . 103 
- 0 . 1 0 8 
- 0 . 0 7 5 
0 . 0 5 4 
- 0 . 0 4 2 
- 0 . 1 2 3 
1 . 6 7 0 
0 . 1 0 8 
0 . 0 1 4 
t-value 
2 . 0 2 6 
- 2 . 4 1 2 
1 . 4 1 0 
0 . 3 8 5 
1 . 1 6 5 
- 1 . 1 8 3 
- 0 . 8 5 1 
0 . 6 5 1 
- 0 . 4 3 8 
- 1 . 4 1 7 
2 . 118 
Step 3 
Standardized 
coefficients 
- 0 . 1 8 7 t 
0 . 1 3 5 
0 . 0 7 6 
0 . 1 0 2 
- 0 . 1 0 5 
- 0 . 0 6 6 
0 . 0 8 6 
- 0 . 0 7 9 
- 0 . 5 5 5 
- 0 . 0 2 1 
0 . 0 9 5 
0 . 3 9 8 + 
1 . 6 0 6 + 
0 . 1 3 7 
0 . 0 2 9 
t-value 
1 . 7 2 5 
- 1 . 8 7 3 
1 . 4 8 1 
0 . 7 7 7 
1 . 1 5 8 
- 1 . 144 
- 0 . 7 3 8 
0 . 9 3 5 
- 0 . 8 1 0 
- 1 . 2 9 8 
- 0 . 1 5 0 
0 . 2 7 9 
1 . 9 0 4 
VIF 
1 . 4 0 2 
1 . 1 6 9 
1 . 3 3 7 
1 . 0 9 2 
1 . 1 8 7 
1 . 124 
1 . 2 0 0 
1 . 3 1 9 
2 5 . 6 3 2 
2 . 7 5 1 
1 6 . 3 5 5 
6 . 1 2 8 
Dependent variable is "Tobin's Q
 l+4," N=I34, +< 10, *p<.05; **p<.0] 
Table 4.12 Regression Results (Tobin's Q) 
Constant 
Firm Size 
Nationality of the firm 
Duality 
Firm Performance (total shareholder 
return) 
Percentage of directors with prior 
industry experience 
Average age of directors 
Presence of directors with advanced 
graduate degrees 
Founder Chairman 
Rate of change in board of directors,^ 
Rate of change in board directors X 
Environmental 
dynamism (interaction term) 
Rate of change in hoard directors X 
Environmental complexity (interaction 
term) 
Rate of change in board directors X 
Environmental 
munificence (interaction term) 
Model F-value 
R-Square 
Change in R-Square 
D-W Statistic 
Step I 
Standardized 
coefficient 
- 0 . 1 8 2 1 
0 . 2 4 2 * 
0 . 0 6 2 
0 . 0 1 5 
- 0 . 0 5 2 
0 . 0 5 3 
0 . 0 3 0 
- 0 . 0 2 2 
1 . 8 3 3 1 
0 . 1 1 7 
t-value 
0 . 623 
- 1 . 8 4 2 
2 . 6 2 8 
0 . 6 2 0 
0 . 165 
- 0 . 5 5 2 
0 . 5 6 7 
0 . 3 2 3 
- 0 . 2 2 3 
Step 2 
Standardized 
coefficients 
- 0 . 2 2 9 * 
0 . 2 5 4 * * 
0 . 0 7 8 
- 0 . 0 1 4 
- 0 . 0 8 2 
0 . 0 6 7 
0 . 0 5 4 
- 0 . 0 2 3 
- 0 . 1 7 6 1 
2 . 0 2 3 * 
0 . 1 4 2 
0 . 0 2 5 t 
t-value 
0 . 7 3 4 
- 2 . 2 5 6 
2 . 7 7 2 
0 . 7 8 7 
- 0 . 1 4 6 
- 0 . 8 5 9 
0 . 7 2 7 
0 . 5 8 0 
- 0 . 2 3 6 
- 1 . 8 0 2 
2 . 2 2 5 
Step 3 
Standardized 
coefficients 
- 0 . 2 3 1 * 
0 . 2 5 1 
0 . 0 7 0 
- 0 . 0 1 2 
- 0 . 0 8 3 
0 . 0 7 2 
0 . 0 5 2 
- 0 . 0 2 3 
- 0 . 3 2 5 
0 . 0 5 0 
0 . 0 9 9 
0 . 0 4 1 
1 . 5 2 7 
0 . 1 4 6 
0 . 0 0 4 
t-value 
0 . 7 0 1 
- 2 . 2 3 5 
2 . 6 9 0 
0 . 6 9 2 
- 0 . 1 2 7 
- 0 . 8 3 8 
0 . 7 6 0 
0 . 5 4 5 
- 0 . 2 3 0 
- 1 . 3 6 0 
0 . 3 2 9 
0 . 4 3 0 
0 . 3 7 2 
VIF 
1 . 3 3 8 
1 . 0 9 2 
1 . 2 8 4 
1 . 1 2 6 
1 . 2 2 7 
1 . 1 2 7 
1 . 1 3 6 
1 . 2 2 3 
7 . 1 5 1 
2 . 9 0 5 
6 . 6 2 3 
1 . 5 4 7 
Dependent variable is "Tobin's Q
 l+5," N=I20, T< 10, *p<-05; **,e><.01 
Table 4.13 Regression Results (ROA) 
Constant 
Firm Size 
Nationality of the firm 
Duality 
Firm Performance (total shareholder 
return) 
Percentage of directors with prior 
industry experience 
Average age of directors 
Presence of directors with advanced 
graduate degrees 
Founder Chairman 
Rate of change in hoard of directors,+3 
Rate of change in hoard directors X 
Environmental 
dynamism (interaction term) 
Rate of change in board directors X 
Environmental complexity (interaction 
term) 
Rate of change in board directors X 
Environmental 
munificence (interaction term) 
Model F-value 
R-Square 
Change in R-Square 
D-W Statistic 
Step 1 
Standardized 
coefficient 
0 . 2 6 5 * * 
- 0 . 0 2 3 
0 . 0 8 4 
0 . 1 3 7 + 
0 . 0 0 3 
- 0 . 0 4 8 
0 . 1 3 9 
0 . 1 2 8 
2 . 6 0 5 * 
0 . 1 3 0 
t-value 
- 1 . 2 2 6 
3 . 0 4 4 
- 0 . 2 7 5 
- 0 . 9 2 8 
1 . 6 7 6 
0 . 0 3 5 
- 0 . 5 6 2 
1 . 6 3 1 
1 . 4 1 6 
Step 2 
Standardized 
coefficients 
0 . 2 6 3 * * 
- 0 . 0 2 4 
- 0 . 0 8 8 
0 . 1 3 7 + 
0 . 0 0 4 
- 0 . 0 4 7 
0 . 1 4 0 
0 . 1 3 6 
0 . 0 3 8 
2 . 3 3 0 * 
0 . 1 3 2 
0 . 0 0 2 
t-value 
- 1 . 2 4 9 
2 . 0 1 3 
- 0 . 2 8 2 
- 0 . 9 7 0 
1 . 6 7 4 
0 . 0 5 0 
- 0 . 5 4 8 
1 . 6 3 8 
1 . 4 7 2 
- 0 . 4 8 8 
2 . 0 9 6 
Step 3 
Standardized 
coefficients 
0 . 2 4 6 * * 
- 0 . 0 2 9 
- 0 . 1 0 0 
0 . 1 4 2 4 
0 . 0 0 6 
- 0 . 0 4 2 
0 . 1 3 4 
0 . 1 4 6 
0 . 0 4 2 
0 . 0 2 8 
0 . 0 6 4 
- 0 . 0 9 6 
1 . 7 6 8 1 
0 . 1 3 6 
0 . 0 0 4 
t-value 
- 1 . 1 9 3 
2 . 7 0 5 
- 0 . 3 2 3 
- 1 . 0 6 1 
1 . 7 0 8 
- 0 . 0 6 7 
- 0 . 4 7 1 
1 . 5 2 8 
1 . 5 5 4 
0 . 1 1 0 
0 . 2 1 1 
0 . 2 0 0 
- 0 . 5 3 2 
VIF 
1 . 2 9 7 
1 . 2 2 0 
1 . 3 9 1 
1 . 0 8 1 
1 . 1 5 2 
1 . 2 1 6 
1 . 2 0 9 
1 . 3 8 7 
2 3 . 3 8 0 
2 . 684 
1 5 . 8 1 2 
5 . 0 8 5 
Dependent variable is "ROA
 w , " N=148, t<IO: *p<.05: **p<.01 
Table 4.14 Regression Results (ROA) 
Constant 
Firm Size 
Nationality of the firm 
Duality 
Firm Performance (total shareholder 
return) 
Percentage of directors with prior 
industry experience 
Average age of directors 
Presence of directors with advanced 
graduate degrees 
Founder Chairman 
Rate of change in board of dlrectorss+4 
Rate of change in board directors X 
Environmental 
dynamism (interaction term) 
Rate of change in hoard directors X 
Environmental complexity (interaction 
term) 
Rate of change in board directors X 
Environmental 
munificence (interaction term) 
Model F-value 
R-Square 
Change in R-Square 
D-W Statistic 
Step 1 
Standardized 
coefficient 
0 . 2 4 8 * * 
- 0 . 0 5 2 
0 . 0 4 0 
0 . 0 7 4 
- 0 . 0 4 6 
- 0 . 1 5 7 1 
- 0 . 0 3 8 
0 . 0 0 2 
2 . 2 7 7 * 
0 . 1 3 1 
t-value 
0 . 2 5 6 
2 . 7 0 3 
- 0 . 5 7 7 
0 . 4 1 2 
0 . 8 4 0 
- 0 . 5 1 5 
- 1 . 6 9 7 
- 0 . 4 1 5 
0 . 0 1 5 
Step 2 
Standardized 
coefficients 
0 . 1 8 6 * 
- 0 . 0 4 5 
0 . 0 7 0 
0 . 0 2 1 
- 0 . 1 0 3 
- 0 . 1 3 9 
0 . 0 0 8 
- 0 . 0 2 0 
- 0 . 3 2 6 * * 
3 . 8 2 6 * * 
0 . 2 2 3 
0 . 0 9 2 * * 
t-value 
0 . 5 6 3 
2 . 1 0 3 
- 0 . 5 2 1 
0 . 7 6 1 
0 . 2 5 3 
- 1 . 2 0 5 
- 1 . 5 8 1 
0 . 0 9 5 
- 0 . 2 1 2 
- 3 . 7 7 2 
2 . 035 
Step 3 
Standardized 
coefficients 
0 . 1 9 5 * 
- 0 . 0 4 8 
0 . 0 6 1 
0 . 0 2 5 
- 0 . 0 7 7 
- 0 . 1 2 6 
0 . 0 1 6 
- 0 . 0 2 6 
- 0 . 3 6 9 
0 . 1 6 3 
- 0 . 0 1 8 
- 0 . 1 3 8 
3 . 1 9 9 * * 
0 . 2 4 7 
0 . 0 2 4 
t-value 
0 . 3 7 0 
2 . 2 0 1 
- 0 . 5 6 1 
0 . 6 5 8 
0 . 2 9 5 
- 0 . 8 8 4 
- 1 . 4 3 1 
0 . 1 8 5 
- 0 . 2 8 3 
- 1 . 6 0 1 
1 . 2 1 3 
- 0 . 0 8 0 
- 1 . 4 8 1 
VIF 
1 . 2 2 0 
1 . 1 6 2 
1 . 3 2 0 
1 . 1 0 5 
1 . 1 7 5 
1 . 2 0 6 
1 . 1 7 7 
1 . 3 4 0 
8 . 2 4 8 
2 . 8 0 2 
7 . 6 8 0 
1 . 3 5 0 
Dependent variable is "ROA «,"N=130, f< 10, *p<.05\ **p<.0\ Q 
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As mentioned on Table 4.12, once Tobin's Q from the fifth period is regressed 
against the same control variables and the rate of change in boards of directors from the 
fourth period, the relationship was negative and statistically significant (P=-0.176,p<.10). 
This relationship becomes even stronger when the dependent variable is ROA for the 
fifth period (P=-0.326,/K.01). An important point to note is, Tobin's Q and ROA values 
reveal similar results as the years pass, which I believe is an indication of these young 
entrepreneurial firms becoming more established in terms of both book and market 
values. 
In short, looking at the different results, one can observe that the changes in 
boards of directors have a negative impact firm performance of young entrepreneurial 
firms included in this study. This finding is in line with Hypotheses 6 and will be 
explained further in the discussion section. 
The second type of corporate governance mechanism, TMT members, is also 
investigated using similar but different control variables and the same performance 
measures. The results of this analysis are reported on Table 4.15. In this model, firm size, 
nationality of the firm (dummy variable), presence of duality (dummy variable), total 
shareholder returns (as a proxy for prior performance), percentage of executives with 
industry experience, average age of executives, executives with advanced degrees 
(dummy variable) and founder as the CEO (dummy variable) were used as control 
variables, Tobin's Q at t+3 as the dependent variable and the number of new executive 
appointees at t+2 as the independent variable. Neither the model with the control 
variables nor the model with number of new executive appointees added was significant. 
Table 4.15 Regression Results (Tobin's Q) 
Constant 
Firm Size 
Nationality of the firm 
Duality 
Firm Performance (total shareholder return) 
Percentage of executives with prior 
industry experience 
Average age of executives 
Presence of executives with advanced graduate 
degrees 
Founder CEO 
Number of new executive appointees,^ 
Number of new executive appointees X 
Environmental dynamism (interaction term) 
Number of new executive appointees X 
Environmental complexity (interaction term) 
Number of new executive appointees X 
Environmental munificence (interaction term) 
Model F-value 
R-Square 
Change in R-Square 
D-W Statistic 
Step 1 
Standardized 
coefficient 
- 0 . 1 6 1 t 
0 . 0 8 1 
0 . 0 7 1 
- 0 . 0 8 3 
- 0 . 0 5 2 
- 0 . 0 7 0 
- 0 . 2 1 0 * 
- 0 . 0 4 8 
1 . 6 1 0 
0 . 0 8 9 
t-value 
2 . 1 9 1 
- 1 . 7 4 0 
0 . 9 3 0 
0 . 7 5 3 
- 0 . 9 5 9 
- 0 . 5 8 8 
- 0 . 7 8 9 
- 2 . 3 8 7 
- 0 . 5 1 5 
Step 2 
Standardized 
coefficients 
- 0 . 1 3 7 
0 . 0 7 7 
0 . 0 8 7 
- 0 . 0 8 4 
- 0 . 0 6 0 
- 0 . 0 5 9 
- 0 . 1 8 1 * 
- 0 . 0 6 4 
- 0 . 1 1 2 
1 . 6 1 3 
0 . 1 0 0 
0 . 0 1 1 
t-value 
2 . 0 7 4 
- 1 . 4 5 9 
0 . 8 8 6 
0 . 9 0 8 
- 0 . 9 7 3 
- 0 . 6 8 3 
- 0 . 6 6 1 
- 1 . 9 9 7 
- 0 . 6 8 3 
- 1 . 2 5 7 
2 . 0 1 4 
Step 3 
Standardized 
coefficients 
- 0 . 1 2 7 
0 . 0 7 2 
0 . 0 9 2 
- 0 . 0 9 3 
- 0 . 0 7 0 
- 0 . 0 5 6 
- 0 . 1 8 5 * 
- 0 . 0 6 2 
- 0 . 1 0 5 
0 . 0 4 6 
- 0 . 0 4 8 
0 . 0 0 0 
1 . 2 1 7 
0 . 1 0 2 
0 . 0 0 2 
t-value 
2 . 0 2 1 
- 1 . 2 8 1 
0 . 7 9 2 
0 . 9 4 7 
- 1 . 0 4 7 
- 0 . 7 4 6 
- 0 . 6 2 5 
- 2 . 0 0 3 
- 0 . 6 5 5 
- 0 . 5 2 4 
0 . 4 3 0 
- 0 . 4 2 6 
0 . 0 0 2 
VIF 
1 . 4 0 6 
1 . 1 8 8 
1 . 3 5 2 
1 . 1 2 0 
1 . 2 4 6 
1 . 1 5 6 
1 . 2 1 3 
1 . 2 8 5 
5 . 7 0 8 
1 . 6 2 3 
1 . 8 0 4 
5 . 5 7 4 
Dependent variable is "Tobm's Q ,+•„" N=141, f< 10, *p<.05; **p<01 
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The only two control variables that were found to be significantly related with 
Tobin's Q at t+3 was the dummy variable that accounts for the presence of executives 
with master's or higher degrees (P=-0.210, p<.05) and the firm size variable (P=-0.161, 
p<. 10).This finding implies that companies with executives who do not have advanced 
degrees are more likely to experience new appointees to their boards. Once the number of 
new executive appointees was added to the model, the coefficient for the independent 
variable became statistically non-significant (P=-0.112, p>A0). Hence, at least for the 
third year after the IPO, there was no relationship present between the number of new 
executive appointees and firm performance when Tobin's Q was considered as the 
performance measure. 
The findings were not different when ROA was used as the performance measure. 
According to Table 4.16, among the control variables, ROA at t+3 was positively related 
with prior firm performance (P=0.152,/K.10) and with the dummy variable that accounts 
for the presence of executives with advanced degrees (P=0.185, p<.05). Once the main 
effect was introduced in the model, there was no significant relationship observed 
between the dependent and the independent variables (P=0.068, p>A0). This means that, 
as far as the changes in one of the corporate governance mechanisms, TMT, was 
concerned, these changes do not result in lower market based nor accounting based 
performance during the third year following the IPO. When further analyses were 
conducted by regressing firm performance at t+4 and t+5 against the number of new 
executive appointments at t+3 and t+4, none of the performance measures proved to be 
significantly related (The details of these analyses can be found in Table 4.17, 4.18, 4.19 
and 4.20). In short, Hypothesis 5 was not supported. 
Table 4.16 Regression Results (ROA) 
Constant 
Firm Size 
Nationality of the firm 
Duality 
Firm Performance (total shareholder return) 
Percentage of executives with prior 
industry experience 
Average age of executives 
Presence of executives with advanced graduate 
degrees 
Founder CEO 
Number of new executive appointees,+2 
Number of new executive appointees X 
Environmental dynamism (interaction term) 
Number of new executive appointees X 
Environmental complexity (interaction term) 
Number of new executive appointees X 
Environmental munificence (interaction term) 
Model F-value 
R-Square 
Change in R-Square 
D-W Statistic 
Step 1 
Standardized 
coefficient 
0 . 1 7 9 * 
- 0 . 0 5 3 
- 0 . 0 6 7 
0 . 1 5 2 + 
- 0 . 0 0 6 
0 . 0 1 3 
0 . 1 8 5 * 
0 . 0 7 0 
2 . 0 7 7 * 
0 . 102 
t-value 
- 1 . 5 9 5 
2 . 0 9 2 
- 0 . 6 2 7 
- 0 . 7 4 7 
1 . 8 8 1 
- 0 . 0 7 3 
0 . 1 5 0 
2 . 2 0 5 
0 . 7 7 6 
Step 2 
Standardized 
coefficients 
0 . 1 6 5 1 
- 0 . 0 5 5 
- 0 . 0 7 7 
0 . 1 5 3 1 
- 0 . 0 0 2 
0 . 0 0 5 
0 . 1 6 8 1 
0 . 0 7 9 
0 . 0 6 8 
1 . 9 1 6 1 
0 . 1 0 6 
0 . 0 0 4 
t-value 
- 1 . 4 8 0 
1 . 8 8 6 
- 0 . 6 4 2 
- 0 . 8 4 5 
1 . 8 9 4 
- 0 . 0 2 1 
0 . 0 6 1 
1 . 9 2 9 
0 . 8 6 4 
0 . 8 1 4 
2 . 1 1 6 
Step 3 
Standardized 
coefficients 
0 . 1 5 8 1 
- 0 . 0 5 0 
- 0 . 0 8 1 
0 . 1 5 9 1 
0 . 0 0 1 
0 . 0 0 4 
0 . 1 7 3 t 
0 . 0 7 7 
0 . 0 5 3 
- 0 . 0 2 4 
0 . 0 6 0 
- 0 . 0 1 2 
1 . 4 4 1 
0 . 1 0 9 
0 . 0 0 3 
t-value 
- 1 . 4 5 0 
1 . 7 2 2 
- 0 . 5 6 3 
- 0 . 8 8 3 
1 . 9 1 5 
0 . 0 1 5 
0 . 0 4 9 
1 . 9 5 8 
0 . 8 3 2 
0 . 2 7 8 
- 0 . 2 3 7 
0 . 5 7 5 
- 0 . 0 6 4 
VTF 
1 . 3 4 9 
1 . 2 3 4 
1 . 3 5 2 
1 . 0 9 2 
1 . 2 2 5 
1 . 2 4 7 
1 . 2 4 2 
1 . 3 6 2 
5 . 8 0 7 
1 . 6 2 1 
1 . 7 5 6 
5 . 6 0 4 
Dependent variable is "ROA ,+,,"N=155, f< 10, *p<05; **/?<. 01 
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Table 4.17 Regression Results (Tobin's Q) 
Constant 
Firm Size 
Nationality of the firm 
Duality 
Firm Performance (total shareholder return) 
Percentage of executives with prior 
industry experience 
Average age of executives 
Presence of executives with advanced graduate 
degrees 
Founder CEO 
Number of new executive appointees,^ 
Number of new executive appointees X 
Environmental dynamism (interaction term) 
Number of new executive appointees X 
Environmental complexity (interaction term) 
Number of new executive appointees X 
Environmental munificence (interaction term) 
Model F-value 
R-Square 
Change in R-Square 
D-W Statistic 
Step 1 
Standardized 
coefficient 
- 0 . 2 1 7 * 
0 . 1 5 8 1 
- 0 . 0 1 5 
0 . 0 7 6 
- 0 . 1 9 8 * 
- 0 . 1 6 5 1 
0 . 0 1 4 
0 . 0 1 9 
2 . 6 8 9 * * 
0 . 154 
l-vaiue 
3 . 4 8 0 
- 2 . 2 7 7 
1 . 7 6 6 
- 0 . 1 5 8 
0 . 8 6 4 
- 2 . 2 1 5 
- 1 . 8 5 6 
0 . 1 5 9 
0 . 2 0 2 
Step 2 
Standardized 
coefficients 
- 0 . 1 9 9 * 
0 . 1 4 3 
- 0 . 0 1 9 
0 . 0 7 1 
- 0 . 2 0 0 * 
- 0 . 1 8 9 
0 . 0 1 7 
- 0 . 0 0 1 
- 0 . 1 1 3 
2 . 5 6 9 * 
0 . 1 6 5 
0 . 0 1 1 
t-value 
3 . 6 6 8 
- 2 . 0 6 4 
1 . 5 9 7 
- 0 . 1 9 8 
0 . 8 1 0 
- 2 . 2 3 4 
- 2 . 0 7 9 
0 . 1 8 6 
- 0 . 0 1 2 
- 1 . 2 3 2 
2 . 0 9 1 
Step 3 
Standardized 
coefficients 
- 0 . 1 7 2 1 
0 . 1 4 8 
- 0 . 0 0 6 
0 . 0 7 2 
- 0 . 2 0 2 * 
- 0 . 1 9 9 * 
0 . 0 0 8 
- 0 . 0 1 5 
0 . 126 
0 . 0 6 8 
- 0 . 0 8 2 
0 . 0 9 9 
2 . 0 6 7 * 
0 . 1 7 9 
0 . 0 1 4 
t-value 
3 . 5 8 4 
- 1 . 7 3 5 
1 . 619 
- 0 . 0 6 0 
0 . 8 0 9 
- 2 . 2 3 9 
- 2 . 1 1 9 
0 . 0 9 4 
- 0 . 1 5 4 
- 0 . 6 4 1 
0 . 5 9 2 
- 0 . 4 2 1 
0 . 9 8 3 
VIF 
1 . 3 5 9 
1 . 1 5 7 
1 . 3 3 5 
1 . 0 8 7 
1 . 1 3 4 
1 . 2 2 2 
1 . 1 2 0 
1 . 3 2 9 
5 . 3 7 1 
1 . 8 5 9 
5 . 3 2 6 
1 . 4 0 6 
Dependent variable is "Tobin's Q
 l+4." N=127, f< 10, *p<M: **p<0\ 
Table 4.18 Regression Results (Tobin's Q) 
Constant 
Firm Size 
Nationality of the firm 
Duality 
Firm Performance (total shareholder return) 
Percentage of executives with prior 
industry experience 
Average age of executives 
Presence of executives with advanced graduate 
degrees 
Founder CEO 
Number of new executive appointees,^ 
Number of new executive appointees X 
Environmental dynamism (interaction term) 
Number of new executive appointees X 
Environmental complexity (interaction term) 
Number of new executive appointees X 
Environmental munificence (interaction term) 
Model F-value 
R-Square 
Change in R-Square 
D-W Statistic 
Stepl 
Standardized 
coefficient 
- 0 . 1 2 5 
0 . 3 0 8 * * 
0 . 0 0 6 
- 0 . 0 1 4 
- 0 . 0 2 4 
- 0 . 1 0 8 
0 . 0 8 4 
0 . 1 6 3 
2 . 4 8 5 * 
0 . 1 6 3 
t-value 
1 . 5 0 5 
- 1 . 2 6 7 
3 . 2 4 4 
0 . 0 5 8 
- 0 . 1 5 0 
- 0 . 2 5 4 
- 1 . 1 3 7 
0 . 8 7 5 
1 . 5 9 7 
Step 2 
Standardized 
coefficients 
- 0 . 1 3 7 
0 . 4 8 2 * * 
0 . 0 2 5 
0 . 0 0 5 
- 0 . 0 2 2 
- 0 . 1 0 2 
0 . 0 9 8 
0 . 1 3 5 
0 . 2 3 5 
2 . 5 4 3 * 
0 . 1 8 5 
0 . 0 2 2 
t-value 
0 . 7 6 0 
- 1 . 3 9 4 
3 . 3 9 3 
0 . 2 3 7 
0 . 0 4 8 
- 0 . 2 3 0 
- 1 . 0 8 0 
1 . 0 3 0 
1 . 3 2 3 
1 . 6 3 6 
2 . 3 7 7 
Step 3 
Standardized 
coefficients 
- 0 . 0 9 9 
0 . 5 3 2 * * 
0 . 0 6 8 
0 . 0 2 3 
- 0 . 0 1 2 
- 0 . 0 9 7 
0 . 0 8 6 
0 . 107 
- 0 . 0 2 4 
- 0 . 0 4 6 
0 . 2 7 9 
0 . 3 0 6 * 
2 . 7 4 9 
0 . 2 5 2 
0 . 0 6 7 * 
t-value 
0 . 3 3 5 
- 1 . 0 1 3 
3 . 7 7 0 
0 . 662 
0 . 2 4 7 
- 0 . 1 2 2 
- 1 . 0 2 7 
0 . 9 2 3 
1 . 0 6 3 
- 0 . 1 0 0 
- 0 . 2 7 2 
1 . 3 6 3 
2 . 6 0 8 
VIF 
1 . 2 5 7 
2 . 605 
1 . 3 7 1 
1 . 1 1 5 
1 . 1 6 3 
1 . 1 6 2 
1 . 145 
1 . 3 2 2 
7 . 5 0 5 
3 . 7 9 7 
5 . 4 9 7 
1 . 7 9 7 
Dependent variable is "Tobin's Q ,+,," N=l 11, | < 10, *p<.05: **p<.01 
Table 4.19 Regression Results (ROA) 
Constant 
Firm Size 
Nationality of the firm 
Duality 
Firm Performance (total shareholder return) 
Percentage of executives with prior 
industry experience 
Average age of executives 
Presence of executives with advanced graduate 
degrees 
Founder CEO 
Number of new executive appointees,+3 
Number of new executive appointees X 
Environmental dynamism (interaction term) 
Number of new executive appointees X 
Environmental complexity (interaction term) 
Number of new executive appointees X 
Environmental munificence (interaction term) 
Model F-value 
R-Square 
Change in R-Square 
D-W Statistic 
Step 1 
Standardized 
coefficient 
0 . 2 6 7 * * 
- 0 . 0 2 1 
- 0 . 0 8 5 
0 . 1 2 0 
- 0 . 0 7 7 
- 0 . 0 2 4 
0 . 1 1 7 
0 . 0 9 9 
2 . 2 8 6 * 
0 . 1 2 1 
t-value 
- 1 . 4 4 1 
2 . 9 9 9 
- 0 . 2 3 2 
- 0 . 9 0 9 
1 . 4 4 1 
- 0 . 8 9 7 
- 0 . 2 6 8 
1 . 3 4 9 
1 . 0 3 5 
Step 2 
Standardized 
coefficients 
0 . 2 5 9 * * 
- 0 . 0 1 5 
- 0 . 0 8 4 
0 . 1 2 2 
- 0 . 0 7 8 
- 0 . 0 1 2 
0 . 116 
0 . 1 0 7 
0 . 0 4 9 
2 . 0 5 7 * 
0 . 1 2 3 
0 . 0 0 2 
t-value 
- 1 . 5 2 2 
2 . 8 8 7 
- 0 . 1 7 2 
- 0 . 8 8 8 
1 . 4 5 7 
- 0 . 9 1 0 
- 0 . 1 3 4 
1 . 3 2 9 
1 . 1 0 7 
0 . 5 6 4 
2 . 1 3 7 
Step 3 
Standardized 
coefficients 
0 . 2 5 6 * * 
- 0 . 0 1 7 
- 0 . 0 8 5 
0 . 123 
- 0 . 0 7 7 
- 0 . 0 1 1 
0 . 1 1 7 
0 . 1 0 8 
0 . 0 3 7 
- 0 . 0 0 0 
0 . 0 2 0 
- 0 . 0 1 1 
1 . 5 1 1 
0 . 1 2 3 
0 . 0 0 0 
t-value 
- 1 . 4 8 7 
2 . 2 7 3 
- 0 . 1 8 1 
- 0 . 8 8 8 
1 . 4 4 4 
- 0 . 8 7 6 
- 0 . 1 1 2 
1 . 3 2 3 
1 . 0 9 6 
0 . 1 9 3 
- 0 . 0 0 1 
0 . 1 0 2 
- 0 . 1 1 5 
VIF 
1 . 2 9 6 
1 . 2 4 8 
1 . 3 5 0 
1 . 0 6 3 
1 . 1 3 5 
1 . 3 5 5 
1 . 1 5 1 
1 . 4 2 0 
5 . 4 4 7 
1 . 8 5 6 
5 . 4 3 4 
1 . 4 0 0 
Dependent variable is "ROA
 l+4," N=142, | < 10. *p<.Q5\ **p<.0\ 
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Table 4.20 Regression Results (ROA) 
Constant 
Firm Size 
Nationality of the firm 
Duality 
Firm Performance (total shareholder return) 
Percentage of executives with prior 
industry experience 
Average age of executives 
Presence of executives with advanced graduate 
degrees 
Founder CEO 
Number of new executive appointees,+4 
Number of new executive appointees X 
Environmental dynamism (interaction term) 
Number of new executive appointees X 
Environmental complexity (interaction term) 
Number of new executive appointees X 
Environmental munificence (interaction term) 
Model F-value 
R-Square 
Change in R-Square 
D-W Statistic 
Stepl 
Standardized 
coefficient 
0 . 1 8 6 t 
- 0 . 0 3 9 
0 . 0 6 1 
0 . 0 5 2 
- 0 . 0 3 1 
- 0 . 1 8 7 t 
- 0 . 0 6 0 
- 0 . 0 1 6 
1 . 5 4 2 
0 . 0 9 8 
t-value 
0 . 3 8 3 
1 . 9 4 9 
- 0 . 4 0 3 
0 . 5 9 1 
0 . 5 6 2 
- 0 . 3 2 4 
- 1 . 8 9 0 
- 0 . 6 2 6 
- 0 . 1 5 1 
Step 2 
Standardized 
coefficients 
0 . 1 8 5 1 
- 0 . 0 2 6 
0 . 0 6 2 
0 . 0 5 3 
- 0 . 0 3 1 
- 0 . 1 8 7 + 
- 0 . 0 5 9 
- 0 . 0 1 8 
0 . 0 1 7 
1 . 3 6 0 
0 . 0 9 8 
0 . 0 0 0 
t-value 
0 . 3 2 2 
1 . 9 3 1 
- 0 . 1 8 0 
0 . 5 9 6 
0 . 5 7 1 
- 0 . 3 2 5 
- 1 . 8 8 1 
- 0 . 6 1 0 
- 0 . 1 6 8 
0 . 1 2 1 
• 
2 . 0 1 0 
Step 3 
Standardized 
coefficients 
0 . 1 9 5 1 
- 0 . 0 1 1 
0 . 0 6 7 
0 . 0 5 5 
- 0 . 0 2 7 
- 0 . 1 9 3 1 
- 0 . 0 6 2 
- 0 . 0 2 4 
0 . 0 1 4 
0 . 0 0 8 
- 0 . 0 1 2 
0 . 0 4 6 
1 . 0 1 4 
0 . 100 
0 . 0 0 2 
t-value 
0 . 2 5 5 
1 . 9 5 2 
- 0 . 0 7 4 
0 . 624 
0 . 5 8 0 
- 0 . 2 7 6 
- 1 . 8 6 1 
- 0 . 6 3 0 
- 0 . 2 2 1 
0 . 0 5 5 
0 . 0 4 8 
- 0 . 0 5 5 
0 . 3 8 3 
VIF 
1 . 2 2 5 
2 . 7 7 3 
1 . 4 1 0 
1 . 1 0 3 
1 . 1 5 7 
1 . 3 2 0 
1 . 1 7 5 
1 . 4 7 0 
7 . 7 1 3 
3 . 1 2 5 
5 . 8 5 1 
1 . 7 7 4 
Dependent variable is "ROA ,+, "N=I23,+< 10. *p<.05; **/}<.01 
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The last set of hypotheses focused on the impact of environment on the 
relationship between changes in corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance. Hypotheses 7, 8, and 9 are about the moderating effects of environmental 
dimensions on the relationship between changes in TMT membership and operating 
performance, while hypotheses 10, 11, and 12 address the effect of environmental 
dimensions on the relationship between changes in board composition and operational 
performance. In order to test these hypotheses, the models constructed to test the main 
effects were extended to include possible interaction effects. 
First, please recall that, as mentioned in the methods section, the three dimensions 
of environment chosen to be included in this study were environmental complexity, 
environmental dynamism and environmental munificence (Dess and Beard, 1984). The 
ways these three variables were operationalized are detailed in the method section. The 
third column of Table 4.15 contains the interaction terms added to the regression model 
where number of new executive appointees was the main effect. As can be seen, when 
TMT change main effect is included in the model, the overall F value of this model was 
not significant when Tobin's Q served as the dependent variable (F=l .217, /?>. 10). The 
dynamism interaction term (P=0.046, p>A0), complexity interaction term (P=-0.048, 
p>.10) and munificence interaction term (P=-0.000, p<A0) did not have statistically 
significant relationships with firm performance when Tobin's Q at t+3 was the dependent 
variable. The results do not change when ROA at t+3 is used as the dependent variable. 
Once again, the overall model is not significant (F= 1.441, p>.10) and the results did not 
reveal any relationships between the interaction terms and firm performance (P=-0.024, 
p>A0 - P=0.060, p>.10 - P=-0.012, p>A0). These results tell us that, when number of 
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new executives appointed on the board is the main effect (controlling for firm size, 
nationality of the firm, presence of duality, prior firm performance, average age of 
executives, executives with advanced graduate degrees, presence of founder as the CEO), 
environmental complexity, dynamism and munificence do not exacerbate the relationship 
between the changes in corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance (at t+3). 
Turning back to Table 4.9 which reports the results of the regression model which 
includes Tobin's Q (t+3) as the dependent variable, the rate of change in boards of 
directors as the main effect and dynamism, complexity and munificence as the interaction 
terms (firm size, nationality of the firm, presence of duality, founder chairman, directors 
with advanced graduate degrees, percentage of directors with prior industry experience 
and prior firm performance as the control variables), the model with the interaction term 
was not significant (F=1.322,p>.10). Among the individual beta coefficients, dynamism 
(P=0.023, p>A0) and complexity (P=0.371, p>A0) were not related to the dependent 
variable. However, the interaction term of munificence is negatively related with Tobin's 
Q (p=-0.197, p<A0). Since the overall model was not significant, that finding is not 
deterministic. 
Table 4.10 contains the results of the regression model with ROA (t+3) and the 
rate of change in boards of directors (t+2), the interactions terms and the above 
mentioned control variables. The results of this model are more promising. First, there 
was no statistically significant relationship observed for the moderating effect of 
environmental dynamism on the relationship between rate of change in boards of 
directors and firm performance (P=0.021, p>A0). However, as hypothesized, the 
complexity interaction term was marginally and negatively significant (P=-0.374, p<A0) 
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and the munificence interaction term was positively (P=0.255, p<.05) related to ROA 
(M-3). According to these findings, the detrimental effect of interfering with one of the 
corporate governance mechanisms, boards of directors, on firm performance is 
exacerbated by environmental complexity such that, under environmentally complex 
situations, young entrepreneurial firms are in need of the original directors to cope up 
with the external complexities. In other words, based on my sample, once the new owners 
appoint their agents to the board of a young entrepreneurial firm, they should be aware 
that, if the firm is facing environmental complexity, the new directors may not be able to 
lead the firm in a positive direction. 
The same logic also applies when the environment is munificent. Referring to the 
third column of Table 4.10, I found a positive relationship between the munificence 
interaction term and firm performance when ROA (/+3) was used as the performance 
measure (P=0.255, p<.05). Hence, the more munificent the environment, the less 
detrimental the effects of changes in corporate governance mechanisms on firm 
performance. From a different perspective, more detrimental is the impact of the main 
effect on the dependent variable when the environment is less munificent. In short, 
Hypotheses 7, 8, 9 and 10 were not supported but Hypotheses 11 and 12 were supported. 
The implications of all these findings will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Table 4.21 summarizes the findings of this study. In short, several interesting 
findings shed light on many of the unknowns of IPO and corporate governance research. 
To recap, the results reveal that there is a positive relationship between the first day 
return (underpricing) and rate of change in blockholder ownership during the first year 
after the IPO. 
Table 4.21 Summary of Results 
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Hypotheses 
HI: Young entrepreneurial firms experiencing significant underpricing will 
attract potential investors who acquire blockholder ownership positions in the 
focal firms. 
H2: Blockholder ownership structure changes following the IPO process of 
young entrepreneurial firms will lead to a higher rate of change in TMT 
membership over the subsequent five-year period. 
H3: Blockholder ownership structure changes following the IPO process of 
young entrepreneurial firms will lead to a higher rate of change in board 
membership over the subsequent five-year period. 
H4: Higher rates of change in board composition of young entrepreneurial 
firms will be associated with a higher rate of change in TMT membership 
over the subsequent five-year period. 
H5: Higher rates of change in TMT membership of young entrepreneurial 
firms will be associated with lower operating performance over the 
subsequent five-year period. 
H6: Higher rates of change in board membership of young entrepreneurial 
firms will be associated with lower operating performance over the 
subsequent five-year period. 
H7: The relationship between the rate of change in TMT membership and 
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental dynamism, such 
that the more dynamic the environment, the more detrimental the effects of a 
higher rate of change in TMT membership are on operating performance. 
H8: The relationship between the rate of change in TMT membership and 
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental complexity, 
such that the more complex the environment, the more detrimental the effects 
of higher rates of change in the TMT membership on operating performance. 
H9: The relationship between the rate of change in TMT membership and 
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental munificence, 
such that the less munificent the environment, the more detrimental the 
effects of a higher rate of change in the TMT membership will be on 
operating performance. 
H10: The relationship between the rate of change in board membership and 
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental dynamism, such 
that the more dynamic the environment, the more detrimental the effects of 
higher rates of change in board composition on operating performance. 
Hit: The relationship between the rate of change in board membership and 
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental complexity, 
such that the more complex the environment, the more detrimental the effects 
of higher rates of change in board composition on operating performance. 
H12: The relationship between the rate of change in board membership and 
operating performance will be exacerbated by environmental munificence, 
such that the less munificent the environment, the more detrimental the 
effects of higher rates of change in board composition on operating 
performance. 
Result 
Supported 
Not Supported 
Supported 
Not Supported 
Not Supported 
Partially Supported 
Not Supported 
Not Supported 
Not Supported 
Not Supported 
Supported 
Supported 
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In addition, the rate of change in blockholder ownership results in a higher rate of 
change in boards of directors during the second year but does not affect the number of 
new executive appointees for the same period. More importantly, the results show that 
higher rates of change in boards of directors have a detrimental effect on firm 
performance when an accounting based measure is used as the performance indicator. I 
was not able to replicate those results when a market-based measure was used as the 
performance measure. The higher number of new executive appointees was not related to 
firm performance. Finally, environmental complexity and munificence were shown to 
moderate the relationship between the changes in boards of directors and firm 
performance but not on the relationship between changes in TMT and firm performance. 
In the next section, I will be discussing the implications of all of these findings. 
CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS 
Research Findings 
My purpose in this study was to build several models for explaining the 
relationships between IPO underpricing, changes in ownership, changes in corporate 
governance mechanisms of young entrepreneurial firms and its impact on subsequent 
performance. I also investigated whether the external environment may impact such 
relationships. Based on the contentions of the signaling model (Leland &Pyle, 1977), 
Hypothesis 1 proposed that firms with higher returns on the first day, which means "the 
original owners have just left money on the table" (Ritter, 1991), were initially 
underpriced, and will experience changes in blockholder ownership after the IPO. Once 
some of the original blockholders are replaced with new ones, based on the general 
tendency of principals looking after their interests through appointment of their own 
agents (Daily et al., 2003), hypotheses 2 and 3 proposed that there will be subsequent 
changes observed in corporate governance mechanisms such as a higher rate of change in 
TMT membership (Hypothesis 2) and the board of directors (Hypothesis 3). In 
Hypothesis 4, I also proposed that the changes in TMT membership may also result from 
changes in the board of directors. 
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After these proposed changes in corporate governance mechanisms, based on the 
need for original directors and executives to continue with the previously successful 
entrepreneurial activities and not to diminish the entrepreneurial efficacy, hypotheses 5 
and 6 proposed lower operating performance resulting from changes in corporate 
governance mechanisms. In the final sets of hypotheses (7-12) I also proposed that three 
dimensions of external environment, dynamism, complexity and munificence, as 
mentioned by Dess and Beard (1984) will exacerbate the negative relationship between 
the changes in corporate governance mechanism and operating performances of young 
entrepreneurial firms. 
Looking at the results, I observed a positive relationship between first day returns 
and changes in blockholder ownership during the first year following the IPO. This 
finding was supported with not only regression analysis but also with an ANOVA that 
looked at the differences in underpricing for the firms that experience ownership change 
within the first year after the IPO time and for those that did not. These results show that 
subsequent blockholders assess the IPO performance of young entrepreneurial firms. The 
theoretical implications of these changes will be discussed in the following pages. In 
addition, the results also showed a positive association between rate of change in 
blockholder ownership and follow-up changes in board of directors. While the same 
situation did not apply to number of new executives, as I already mentioned, the way the 
variable is operationalized may be the reason behind that lack of significance. The 
significant relationship between the changes in board of directors and changes in 
blockholder ownership demonstrate that new owners are willing to appoint their own 
agents to look after their interests. 
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The next set of hypotheses was about the impact of changes in corporate 
governance mechanisms on firm performance. The results showed that when market 
based measures are used, the governance changes do not result in lower performance. 
However, when accounting based measures are used, I was able to show that the changes 
in boards of directors resulted in lower operating performance while the same was not the 
case for the relationship between the number of new executives and subsequent 
performance. This lack of significance is meaningful within the context of the general 
theme of this study as I originally proposed that these relationships are interrelated. In 
other words, since the changes in blockholder ownership did not result in a higher 
number of new executive appointments, the results did not reveal an impact of that 
variable on subsequent operating performance. On the other hand, blockholder ownership 
positively affected the rate of change in boards of directors, which resulted in subsequent 
negative impact on firm performance. This is in parallel to the general theme of this 
study. This finding shows that if the new owners of young entrepreneurial firms decide to 
interfere with the entrepreneurial efficacy of these firms by appointing new directors to 
the board, there is a negative impact on operating performance that is immediately 
observed after those changes. The managerial and theoretical impactions of that will be 
discussed further in the following pages. 
Finally, the results also demonstrated that the negative relationship between 
changes in the boards of directors and operating performance is exacerbated by 
environmental complexity and munificence. Under complex conditions, young 
entrepreneurial firms are still in need of the expertise and social capital provided by their 
original directors. In addition, if the environment is not munificent enough, these firms, 
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once again are in need of the experience, expertise and knowledge of their directors to 
cope with external conditions. The lack of significance of these potential moderator 
variables on the relationship between number of new executive appointments and 
operating performance once again makes intuitive sense. Since the results did not show 
any relationship between new executive appointments and firm performance, it is not 
surprising to observe a lack of relationship. 
In short, these results show support for the general theme of this study and also 
for some of the individual hypotheses. I now turn to discuss the theoretical and 
managerial implications of these findings. This chapter will also explain the limitations 
and potential future extensions of this study and provide conclusions. 
Theoretical Implications 
Several theoretical implications of the findings of this study are worthy of 
mentioning. Recalling the propositions of signaling theory (Leland & Pyle, 1977; Welch, 
1989; Allen & Faulhaber, 1989), underpricing is considered to be a signal about a firm's 
future. Research also suggests that investors are more likely to purchase blocks of stock 
in publicly traded companies when they perceive expected benefits to exceed expected 
costs (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Bethel et al., 1998). Based on the data I collected, I 
managed to demonstrate that young entrepreneurial firms with higher first day returns are 
likely to experience higher rates of change in blockholder ownership. This is in line with 
the basic contentions of the above-mentioned researchers. Recall from Chapter 3 that the 
rate of change variable is calculated based on the original owners being replaced by the 
new owners rather than the new owners gathering shares in the company while the 
original owners are still in place. This way of operationalizing the variable is unique and 
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makes theoretical sense. I proposed that young entrepreneurial firms, due their unique 
nature, are in need of inputs, knowledge, expertise and experience provided by their 
original owners that brought the company to the IPO stage. If they are still in place, they 
will continue to provide these resources. If new blockholders replace them, this process 
becomes more difficult. I believe finding a relationship between rates of change in 
blockholder ownership and underpricing is meaningful from that perspective. 
The findings become even more meaningful when I turn to the relationship 
between rate of change in blockholder ownership and the rate of change in board 
membership. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there seems to be a positive 
relationship between the two. Beaty and Zajac (1994) contend that large equity holders 
will be keen for monitoring practices so they are more likely to be active in appointment 
decisions. Thus, new blockholders that replace the original ones, also decide to replace 
some of the original directors with their own appointees. In other words, once the new 
blockholders possess controlling power in young entrepreneurial firms, they are prone to 
interfere with the structure of the board of directors. I believe that such a finding is 
important for not only the IPO literature but also for the shareholder activism concept of 
corporate governance research. More importantly, these results demonstrate that in young 
entrepreneurial firms new blockholders are more interested in board composition than the 
top management team. For that reason, I was unable to demonstrate a significant 
relationship between new executive appointees and changes in ownership structure. As I 
mentioned before, while the lack of a statistically significant relationship may be due to 
the way the change in TMT variable was operationalized, new owners appear less 
interested in TMT composition than board composition. This means that, as members of 
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the dominant coalition, boards of directors receive more attention from active 
shareholders. New executive appointees do not seem to be a result of new directors 
either. This situation, once again, supports my explanation of more interest being paid to 
boards of directors rather than executives. 
One of the motivators of this study was to demonstrate the detrimental effects of 
the transformations in young entrepreneurial firms during the post IPO period on 
operating performance. Kroll et al. (2007) recommended that the original executives of 
young entrepreneurial firms are needed for better post-IPO performance. In a previous 
study, Kor (2003) proposed that both sets of members of the dominant coalition are 
needed for success in IPO firms as the expertise and experience provided by the original 
members of the TMT and board of directors are sources of competitive advantage for 
such unique business entities. The results of this study show that, when accounting based 
measures are considered, interfering with the board of directors of the firms included in 
the analyses results in lower operating performance. I was not able to demonstrate that to 
be the case for executives though. This is not surprising as the replacement of these 
executives was not a result of new owners. I expected to observe a relationship between 
IPO performance and the rate of change in blockholder ownership during the first year 
following the IPO and then higher rates of changes in boards of directors and TMTs. 
Since the owners did not interfere with the TMTs of the firms included in this study, the 
changes in TMT did not result in lower operating performance. On the other hand, the 
extensive amount of attention paid to boards of directors and interference with the boards 
through replacement of original directors with new ones resulted in lower accounting-
based operating performance. Although agency theorists (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) are 
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interested in presence of board vigilance for better firm performance, this may not be that 
crucial in the case of young entrepreneurial firms. Walters et al. (2010) mentioned that 
the agency problems are less acute in younger and smaller firms. Fama and Jensen (1983) 
recommended that in smaller firms, for better performance, strategic decision-making 
should be retained by the same individuals. The findings of this study support the 
propositions of those authors. 
The difference in results between the market-based and accounting-based 
performance measures should also be discussed. My expectation was that different 
performance measures would reveal similar results and be positively related with each 
other. That was not the case with my data. King and Santor (2008) offer a good 
explanation for this contradiction. In their study, the authors observed that the 
organizational performances of the companies in their sample looked much better when 
ROA values are considered versus when Tobin's Q values are used as performance 
measures. A majority of the companies in their sample were family-owned businesses. 
Considering my sample was composed of young entrepreneurial firms, their explanation 
of this inconsistency in performance measures is applicable to the present study. "Family 
owned firms have higher profitability, but that future expected cash-flows are discounted 
more heavily by investors due to threat of expropriation by controlling shareholders" 
(King and Santor, 2008:2429). This is probably why I observed a strong negative 
correlation between accounting-based and market-based measures. Furthermore, this is 
also probably why as these young entrepreneurial firms become more established and the 
market players get to know them, their accounting-based and market-based performance 
measures start to reveal similar results. Ibbotson (1975) mention that underwriters should 
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"leave a good taste in investor's mouth" as the risk associated with them is more 
extensive. In fact, that is why younger firms experience more underpricing (Jain, 1994). 
It turns out that for the first couple of years following an IPO, young entrepreneurial 
firms are still considered to be risky by investors which are reflected in lower-market 
based measures. While some of these companies do really well, it takes some time for 
investors to gain confidence in them. The uniqueness of young entrepreneurial firms 
(Kroll et al., 2007) and the need for adopting different mechanisms in their governance 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996) were previously mentioned. The difference between 
the performance measures also means that researchers should be cautious about the way 
they measure the performances of these types of firms. In addition to the major findings 
of this study, I believe the inconsistency observed between performance measures is also 
important and needs further attention in future studies. 
The results also showed the moderating effects of some of the environmental 
variables. Recalling the work of Fredrickson (1984) concerning the need for companies 
to match their internal structure and processes with external environments, and the work 
of other researchers (McAurthur & Nystrom; Boyd, 1995; Goll & Rasheed, 1997) that 
highlighted the need to account for environment when making strategic decisions, I 
believe it is not surprising to observe two of the dimensions of environment exacerbate 
the relationship between changes in corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance. In the case of young entrepreneurial firms, the results revealed that the need 
for original directors to provide their tacit knowledge (Kor, 2003) becomes even more 
critical given greater environmental complexity and less munificence. Young 
entrepreneurial firms are in need of internal mechanisms to deal with the external 
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environment (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Walters & Buhian, 2004). Furthermore, the 
reason for not observing a moderating effect for environmental dynamism may be 
explained by the famous "liability of newness" contention of Stinchcombe (1965). Based 
on these results, I suspect that these younger firms are already operating in dynamic 
conditions due this liability of newness thus the lack of impact by environmental 
dynamism is understandable. On the other hand, environmental complexity and 
munificence dimensions of Dess and Beard (1984) do play a role and should be taken 
into account for the strategic decision making process. 
Implications for Management Practice 
Several implications for management practice emerge from this study. First, post-
IPO shareholders of young entrepreneurial firms should be aware of the fact that if they 
interfere with the corporate governance mechanisms of these firms, their performance 
tends to suffer. Second, the impact on performance flows through the board of directors 
rather than the TMT. Thus, executives of these firms should expect to see new 
appointments on board of directors right after new owners secure controlling shares. 
Third, the results show that boards are more important than they used to be. In today's 
economy, board members are more active and should be given greater scrutiny as they 
are now strategic decision makers rather than simple monitors of executive actions. 
Fourth, strategic decision makers of young entrepreneurial firms should understand that 
at this stage the market pays for growth rather than operating efficiency. In other words, 
no matter how successful they are based on accounting measures, it takes some time for 
the market to recognize that success. They are also seen as highly risky and because of 
that risk, they should expect to leave some money on the table during the IPO process. 
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Furthermore, young entrepreneurial firms are in need of the tacit knowledge provided by 
their original members of the dominant coalition if they want to maintain the 
entrepreneurial efficacy that brought them this far. Finally, the results show that young 
entrepreneurial firms, due to their size and liability of newness, are more volatile against 
the external environment. These firms should be aware that the need for retaining the 
original directors is even stronger when the external environment is dynamic and less 
munificent. 
Future Research, Limitations, Conclusion 
There are several possible future extensions of this study. For instance, the IPO 
stage of these firms should be investigated more thoroughly. While I managed to 
demonstrate the indirect effect of IPO performance on subsequent operating performance 
through changes in ownership and corporate governance mechanisms, I believe the story 
does not end there. What else triggers changes in ownership structure other than 
underpricing? What else triggers changes in corporate governance mechanisms other than 
the changes in ownership structure? Furthermore, researchers may adopt different ways 
of operationalizing certain variables. For example, rather than using new executive 
appointments as I did in this study, future researchers may prefer a different variable. 
Also, several other performance variables such as market return and return on equity can 
be introduced in future models. If possible, use of survey data from the strategic decision 
makers of young entrepreneurial firms may be insightful in understanding the decision-
making routines in these companies. 
Recalling the descriptive statistics mentioned in Chapter 4, the future researchers 
should also be looking into the potential importance of three variables in IPO literature. 
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These variables are: education structures of executives and directors, the presence of 
mergers and acquisitions among IPO firms, and the importance of venture capitalists on 
ownership structure. Among these variables, venture capitalists are probably the one that 
received the highest amount of attention. Previous studies demonstrated that venture 
capitalist presence is associated with lower IPO returns (Meggison & Weiss, 1991) and 
serve as a signaling mechanism for publicly traded firms (Sanders & Boivie, 2004). 
However, to my knowledge, their impact on subsequent changes in ownership structure 
was not thoroughly investigated. Such an investigation will not only serve the IPO 
literature but also the corporate governance literature. In addition, previous researchers 
were interested in the impact of education in firm governance (Bantel & Jackson, 1989). 
These authors were able to demonstrate that education is a determinant factor in firm 
innovation capabilities. Yet, to my knowledge, the importance of education in the case of 
young entrepreneurial firms is not clear. In future extensions of this study, that may be 
another variable to consider. Finally, as mentioned in the results section, a significant 
portion of the companies in my sample were acquired by or merged with other 
companies. Some of them were also delisted either voluntary or involuntarily due to 
bankruptcy. These happenings are certainly of interest to the researchers of 
entrepreneurship and corporate governance literatures. The answers to questions such as 
"what type of young entrepreneurial firms involve in acquisitions or mergers" and "why 
some young IPO firms go bankrupt so quickly?" will shed light to some of the unknowns 
of both streams of research. 
Like any other study, this study has limitations. I tried to construct a large 
database, but the sample size in my study is limited. I used a five-year period for my 
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study although the sample size would have been much higher if a ten-year period was 
considered. Rather than using the 2001-2005 period, the sample size could have been 
larger if I had used 1996-2005 period. In future extensions of this study, my plan is to 
collect data for extended periods. Due to the sample size, my models did not have high 
statistical power. If I can manage to increase the sample size in the future extensions of 
this study this limitation will be eliminated. I did not include financial sector or energy 
sector companies in this study. Future researchers may choose to investigate the behavior 
of these specific industries apart from the industries included in my study. 
In this study, my purpose was to contribute to the corporate governance, strategic 
management and entrepreneurship literatures and provide some insights for practitioners 
about young entrepreneurial firms. The results showed that the traditional approach 
adopted by shareholders to appoint their agents is not applicable in the case of these types 
of firms. It is natural for market players to gather controlling shares in promising firms. 
Yet, new shareholders should have confidence in the original strategic decision makers 
rather than having previously known parties to look after their interests. Investing in 
young and smaller firms is by itself risky, these investors should not make the situation 
more complicated by interfering with the corporate governance mechanisms of these 
firms. After all, my results showed that this interference is detrimental for firm 
performance, which is probably the last thing they would want to happen. 
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